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THESIS

**CREATING SOF NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF NATO
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AS A TESTING GROUND FOR
SOF INTEGRATION**

by

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June 2011

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**CREATING SOF NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF NATO
SOF AS A TESTING GROUND FOR SOF INTEGRATION**

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Headquarters and its predecessor the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) have made significant progress in special operations interoperability during its brief history. Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence sharing, equipment, and structure within NATO SOF units remain. The lessons learned from the past decade of persistent conflict and emergence of advanced communication capabilities offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance special operations interoperability within NATO and abroad.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BICES	Battlefield Information, Collection, & Exploitation System.
BN	Battalion
CSOF	Coalition Special Operations Forces
DA	Direct Action
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FSSF	First Special Service Force
GRP	Group
ISAF	International Service and Assistance Force
JCET	Joint Combined Executed Training
MA	Military Assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSCC	NATO SOF Coordination Center
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSTEP	NATO SOF Training and Education Program
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOTG	Special Operations Task Group
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOCEUR	United States Special Operations Command Europe

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

During the opening decade of the 21st century, non-state actors, waging asymmetric conflict, emerged as common security threats to industrialized nations in an increasingly interconnected global economy. The non-state actors challenging NATO at home and abroad are not influenced easily by traditional deterrence measures or alliances. Security partnerships and military alliances must adapt to challenge asymmetric threats with common resolve and unity of effort to remain relevant. Many conventional military units lack capacity, training, and tactical flexibility to combat the greatest threats to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Across the NATO Alliance, political and military leaders recognize the utility and economy of force potential for special operation forces (SOF). NATO and its partners should recognize the utility of establishing collaborative SOF networks capable of facilitating rapid offensive and defense measures against emerging threats. NATO's failure to collaborate and adapt will undermine the relevancy of the alliance and threaten its population and infrastructure.

The newly formed NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) in Mons, Belgium provides the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) a “primary point of development, direction and coordination for all NATO Special Operations-related activities.”¹ Despite the dysfunction and bureaucracy of the larger NATO alliance, the NSHQ serves as a relevant and vibrant component meeting vital security gaps across Europe, North American, and beyond. This organization serves as a prototype and hub for establishing similar regional SOF organizations around the globe to establish a worldwide SOF network combating terror and asymmetric threats. This report highlights current unique opportunities for success where previous integration efforts have failed. The unique convergence of favorable conditions creates the greatest potential for long-term interoperability and cohesion since the end of World War II. Some of these opportunities include common experience during Afghanistan operations, emerging networking

¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “NSHQ Mission,” 2011, <http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/page/mission/>.

capabilities, and NSHQ backed initiatives to increase special operations integration and common trust. NATO SOF capacity building initiatives serve as the best defense to prevent significant degradation of current capabilities, camaraderie, and cooperation gained through combined operations over the past decade. Harnessing this unprecedented momentum will enhance NATO SOF interoperability and performance in combined operations.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This research explored methods that contribute to effective combined special operations integration, cohesion, and increased tactical performance. The author highlights combined SOF operations from the past decade to identify best practices in unit integration seeking to achieve optimal coalition special operations interoperability in future conflicts and domestic security operations. This analysis holistically examined various mechanisms and methods that foster effective multinational SOF integration to meet the threats of the 21st century.

The scope of this research defined how strengthening communication and interoperability between coalition special operations forces can additionally facilitate integration with international diplomatic, inter-agency, and national level law enforcement partners. Diplomatic channels traditionally served as the primary method of international cooperation, yet extensive professional networks created by special operations forces offer other valuable avenues for coordination and communication. Although the need for special operations integration is global, the large number of units and wide range of tactical and technical capabilities make a detailed global study impractical. Although conventional forces face similar challenges to coalition warfare, SOF coalitions' smaller sizes, common language capacity, and intimate tactical relationships make integration more feasible, and their study more prudent. The NHSQ serves as an excellent testing ground to analyze SOF interoperability issues. The NSHQ is the expansion of the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) established in early

2007. The NSHQ has close working relationships with non NATO special operations partners, and other key allies in Asia. These relationships create potential to export key policy recommendations beyond the NATO Alliance.

C. BACKGROUND

Twenty-first century threats, such as terrorism, piracy, cyber-warfare, and weapons of mass destruction, pose common challenges to the industrialized nations of the world. The complexity of modern international threats requires specialized skills, integrated intelligence, and military cooperation. To meet these challenges, combined special operations units must achieve seamless strategic integration with global allies and inter-agency partners to achieve success in future combined operations. Despite advances made during the conflicts of the past two decades, tactical level special operations integration is still problematic. During the past decade, special operations units have relied on personal relationships and liaison officers to overcome interoperability issues and bridge communication gaps with inter-agency partners. Identifying formalized mechanisms to improve communication among special operations units and their partners will be essential to improve long-term interoperability and enhanced performance.

Achieving global integration will require seamless communication and interoperability between coalition special operations units, conventional military allies, interagency partners, and international organizations. The Madrid and London bombings, and the extensive financing and recruiting terrorist networks in Europe, establish a clear focus for NSHQ beyond out of area commitments. The 2010 United States National Security Strategy emphasizes a commitment to coalition building, “our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for United States engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action.”² Despite military spending cuts in recent years, most European nations protected their special operations units’ budgets, in recognition of the wide range of domestic and international special operations

² United States Government Executive Branch, “2010 United States National Security Strategy,” 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

capabilities.³ The focus outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy and the increasing capabilities of European SOF indicate that greater coalition SOF integration will play a strategic role in United States-European relations.

The NATO SOF Headquarters, and its predecessor NATO SOF Coordination Center, have made significant progress in SOF interoperability during its brief four-year history. Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence sharing, equipment, and structure within NATO SOF contributing nations remain. The lessons learned from the past decade of persistent conflict and permeation of modern communication capabilities offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance SOF interoperability. Although public support for NATO participation in Afghanistan has declined in recent years, the conflict has been a tremendous accelerant to develop NATO SOF integration and experience. The NSHQ's task over the next five years is to build upon this momentum and solidify long-term SOF interoperability and capacity within the alliance and its partners.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

In this report, the author proposes a framework of systems and procedures that increase interoperability and operational performance within coalition special operations and interagency partners in combined operations and domestic security initiatives. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters serves as a case study to analyze the feasibility of establishing other regional special operation organizations to facilitate unity of effort and interoperability against common asymmetric threats.

E. RELEVANT LITERATURE

Prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the concept of establishing a common special operations capability within NATO largely resided in works of fiction. Tom Clancy's 1998 novel *Rainbow Six* provided a fictional account of a coalition counter-terror force composed of SOF personnel from several NATO partners dedicated

³ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence," June 10, 2010, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_06/20100610_PR_CP_2010_078.pdf.

to combat non-state actor “free-agents.”⁴ Several books on early combined SOF operations by Task Force K-Bar in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan described the importance of fostering SOF interoperability, including *Not a Good Day to Die* by Sean Naylor.⁵ Nora Bensahel’s RAND report, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, provides an overview of some of the early combined efforts in the early stages of the Global War on Terror and advocates a balanced United States approach that combines bilateral and multinational SOF efforts.⁶ Andrew Hoehn and Sarah Harting’s RAND report, *Risking NATO*, provides a detailed analysis of the alliance’s operation in Afghanistan, which predicts a dwindling NATO presence in the conflict and increased focus of domestic security threats across Europe.⁷ The limited subsequent literature specifically dedicated to coalition special operations interoperability and the establishment of NATO SOF resides in military journal articles or NATO publications. The first journal article prescribing a detailed model for the establishment of a NATO SOF command was Gompert and Smith’s, *Creating a NATO Special Operations Force*.⁸ This groundbreaking work described a potential framework for a counter-terror element within the NATO command consisting of rotating “inner ring” units prepared to deploy within 24 hours and other “outer ring” partner units that would share common interoperability and training goals.⁹ Some of the concepts prescribed by Gompert and Smith gained further traction with the publication of General James Jones’s article, *A Blueprint for Change*, which highlights the initiatives of the newly formed NATO SOF Coordination Center.¹⁰

⁴ Tom Clancy, *Rainbow Six*, 1st ed. (New York: Berkley, 1999).

⁵ Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005).

⁶ Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and The European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Project Air Force, 2003), <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1746/>.

⁷ Andrew Hoehn and Project Air Force (U.S.), *Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2010).

⁸ David Gompert and Raymond Smith, “Creating a NATO Special Operations Force,” *Defense Horizons*, no. 52 (March 1, 2006).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ James Jones, “A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations,” Issue 45 (2nd Quarter, 2007).

Beyond the limited number of journal articles dedicated specifically to NATO SOF integration, the NSHQ has published many of the other relevant documents pertaining to NATO SOF. *The NATO SOF Study* published in 2008 sought input from NATO SOF personnel concerning progress made through the NSCC's transformation efforts.¹¹ Additional documents produced by the NSHQ include the *Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) Manual* and the *Combined/Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CJFSOCC) Manual*.¹² These documents give a theoretical overview to structure forces for enhanced integration while emphasizing that national SOF forces should primarily structure their forces to meet national military objectives. The *NATO Military Committee Special Operations Policy* and subsequent *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations* provide more of an operational level overview of SOF operations that describes the establishment of forward temporary headquarters and command relationships during contingency operations.¹³ Although these manuals highlight some of the important interoperability issues in a conflict, they do not fully describe how to best integrate forces prior to deployment.

U.S. doctrine offers limited insight into best practices in special operations integration. U.S. *Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations* describes planning factors to consider in multinational operations, such as varying force capabilities, rules of engagement, intelligence sharing limitations, and language barriers.¹⁴ *Field Manual 100-8: The Army in Multinational Operations* states that U.S. Special Forces are well suited to fill the role of coalition support teams due to “their regional orientation, language capability, and requirement to train foreign

¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study,” December 2008.

¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, *NATO Special Operations Coordination Center SOTG Manual*, Version 1.0 (2009); and NATO SOF Coordination Center, “NATO Special Operations Coordination Center CJFSOCC Manual” (December 11, 2009).

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Publications 3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” January 27, 2009; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Military Committee Decision 437/1, Special Operations Policy,” June 11, 2006.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force,” 2007, IV-5.

forces.”¹⁵ The manual further cites the key role these elements have in building cohesion and synchronizing operations during coalition operations.¹⁶ These manuals outline some of the challenges and opportunities in multinational special operations, but they not offer advanced solutions for achieving full integration of special operations capabilities and resources.

Although limited literature exists specifically relating to the dynamics of NATO special operations, many scholars have addressed NATO’s evolving mission against emerging threats. Much of this literature outlines the common threats facing NATO members, such as rogue states, piracy, weapons of mass destruction, criminal activity, and terrorism.¹⁷ Further analysis focuses on the political debate and tension between the United States, France, and Germany prior to the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹⁸ Many contemporary reviews of NATO, such as James Goldgeier’s holistic overview of the alliance *The Future of NATO*, focus on the ability of the alliance to respond quickly to emerging threats and remain flexible to adapt to irregular threats.¹⁹ Although these references provide valuable insight into what must be done to make the NATO alliance relevant in the 21st century, significant voids remain in the available literature describing how to accomplish these tasks.

Despite renewed interest in the Afghanistan conflict, limited coverage has examined ISAF special operations integration in Afghanistan or ongoing NATO SOF interoperability initiatives. This critical void in literature leaves most military scholars unaware of NATO special operations units’ recent progress. The NSHQ produced its *Biennial Review* in 2010, a valuable resource serving as a roadmap for future initiatives,

¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, “FM 100-8: The Army in Multinational Operations,” 1997, 2–20.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ For overview on NATO’s evolving mission following the invasion of Afghanistan see: Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” and David Yost “*NATO and International Organizations*.”

¹⁸ For a brief highlight of the many contemporary articles documenting the diplomatic row between the United States, France and Germany prior to initiation of combat operations in Iraq, see: BBC News World Edition, “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remarks,” January 23, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm>; and Josef Joffe, “The World—The Alliance is Dead. Long Live the New Alliance,” September 29, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/29/weekinreview/the-world-the-alliance-is-dead-long-live-the-new-alliance.html>.

¹⁹ James Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

as well as an assessment for previous efforts and description of current operations.²⁰ Within the United States Special Operations Command, exposure to NATO SOF initiatives is generally limited to members of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group forward deployed in Germany. This unit has cooperated with European special operations units for more than 50 years and has been an ISAF SOF contributor since 2007, while other American special operations units in Afghanistan operate under Operation Enduring Freedom auspices. The sparse literature and minimal operational exposure limits most U.S. special operations units' appreciation for the impressive resources and training available to NATO SOF members and partners.

In the past four years, several field grade officers have captured their experience in combined NATO SOF operations while attending the United States Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). These student theses represent some of the best sources of information regarding specific NATO SOF growth outside of NSHQ publications. U.S. Army Major Sean Berg discussed the initial stages of the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) and the structure and function of an emerging NATO SOF network in 2007.²¹ In 2009, U.S. Army Major Steve Taylor analyzed the goals and initial progress of the NSTI and recommended further support for future growth.²² In 2010, Norwegian Navy Commando Lieutenant Commander Kjetil Mellingen compared the growth of the Norwegian, Polish and Canadian Special Operations Command to recommend similar transformation within Norwegian special operations.²³ These three theses are only a sample of the previous and ongoing academic research conducted by NATO SOF officers in academic institutions across NATO contributing nations. Ongoing NATO SOF related research by

²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, "Biennial Review," 2010.

²¹ Robert Berg, "Reform of Command and Control Structures in North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces" (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 2007), <http://www.stormingmedia.us/32/3221/A322174.html>.

²² Steven Taylor, "The NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis Department, March 2009), http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Mar/09Mar_Taylor_S.pdf.

²³ Kjetil Mellingen, "Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces" (Master's thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Analysis Department, June 2010), http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Jun/10Jun_Mellingen.pdf.

multinational Naval Postgraduate School students include in-depth analysis of intelligence sharing and the BICES Network, integration of Dutch maritime forces, radicalization in Europe, and business development models for the NSHQ. These ongoing research projects by NATO SOF veterans attempt to capture their valuable combat experiences to assist NATO SOF development and success.

While limited resources focus specifically on NATO SOF, a number of resources document the changing security priorities for NATO allies. The threat of domestic terrorism across Europe has been the focus of a number of recent books including Melanie Phillips's *Londonistan*, Alison Pargeter's *The New Frontiers of Jihad*, and Zachary Shore's *Breeding Bin Ladens*.²⁴ In *Europe and Counterterrorism* Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis discuss European nations' post-2001 counterterrorism (CT) initiatives and efforts to balance domestic political sensitivities with U.S. global CT strategy.²⁵ Although these resources frame the evolution of contemporary threats, they do not provide sufficient coverage of the challenges presented by the global economic crisis, the difficulties of deterring non-state actors, and demographic change across Europe from a NATO security perspective.

F. CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE

Conceptual literature analyzing social bonding, trust development, network centric warfare, and global interdependence offer individual insights to create innovative solutions for SOF integration. A topic of debate within the international relations academic community focuses on the impact of globalization on global economic interdependency, political structures, and defense. Political economist Francis Fukuyama suggests contemporary thought on cultural conflict is too narrow. He proposes that exposure to cultural differences frequently encourage innovation and increased

²⁴ Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Steve Hewitt, *The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front Since 9-11* (London: Continuum, 2008); and Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan*, 1st ed. (New York: Encounter Books, 2006).

²⁵ Kristin Archick, *Europe and Counterterrorism* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003).

understanding.²⁶ Founders of the neoliberalism school, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe the multiple connections that collectively bind nations together in their theory of “complex interdependence.”²⁷ The highly interconnected European economy and prevalence of common threats to European nations typify many of these concepts, and offer a renewed mandate for NATO. Ongoing NSHQ initiatives build from these concepts and foster simultaneous advancement in cultural understanding while encouraging coalition SOF cohesion.

The subject of trust elicits much academic discussion, research, and debate relevant to forging camaraderie in combined SOF units. Much of this research has the potential to assist the NSHQ with its ongoing efforts to harness and enhance existing trust and camaraderie. Tom Tyler defines trust as “an attribution that people make about the motives of a group authority.”²⁸ Francis Fukuyama argues that trusted relationships develop along cultural lines and emphasizes the role of social capital, or the connections among and between social networks.²⁹ Jean Ensminger’s research argues that demographic factors within cultures further influence rational decision making.³⁰ These conclusions are especially relevant as the remnants of Cold War era divisions persist in some developing regions of Eastern Europe. Cook, Hardin, and Levi describe that a trusted relationship, “emerges out of mutual interdependence and the knowledge developed over time of reciprocal trustworthiness.”³¹ In this relationship, trust acts as a catalyst to generate even greater levels of future trust as seen with increased intelligence sharing in combat operations.

²⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity* (Free Press Paperbacks, 1996).

²⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (May 2009), 725.

²⁸ Tom Tyler, “Why Do People Rely on Others? Social Identity and Social Aspects of Trust,” in *Trust in Society* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 286.

²⁹ Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital and the Global Economy,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 5 (1995), 90.

³⁰ Jean Ensminger, “Reputations, Trust, and the Principal Agent Problem,” in *Trust in Society* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 186.

³¹ Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, *Cooperation Without Trust?* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).

Political economist Elinor Ostrom emphasizes the impact of trust, reciprocity, and reputation in cooperation and group performance.³² As NATO SOF attempts to establish unit camaraderie, the command must overcome long-standing unit reputations and loyalties to establish a greater common purpose than pure national interest. Philip Gordon describes the importance on trusted relationships in current military campaigns, “since (9–11), the benefits of having close allies with similar interests and values—and the tools to defend them—are all too clear.”³³ While trust is essential in counter-terror operations, mistrust can quickly erode coalition. Former Indian Army General Saighal keenly noted the necessity of maintaining trusted relationships among modern coalitions, “when mistrust increases, the global fight against terrorism will start petering out.”³⁴

The study of social bonds and cohesion provides significant insight to determine how small units can increase collective performance and relate to other organizations. The work of sociologist Mark Granovetter in strong and weak bonds has helped to illustrate how relationships between individuals can expand to link extended communities of associates.³⁵ SOF units’ ability to link inter-agency partners serves as an example of this dynamic. Research policy scientist Bruce Newsome has compared scientific research from around the world regarding whether soldiers in combat draw from pre-existing personal motivation or group enhanced motivation.³⁶ He concludes that the American military’s emphasis harnessing recruits intrinsic motivation held prior to their military service differs from most other militaries that prefer to focus on extrinsic motivation developed through teamwork and unit cohesion.³⁷ Additional research by Newsome analyzes the key factors that contribute to enhanced soldier performance with a detailed

³² Elinor Ostrom, *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003).

³³ Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001), 90.

³⁴ Vinod Saighal, *Dealing with Global Terrorism: The Way Forward* (New Dawn, 2004), 353.

³⁵ Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983): 233.

³⁶ Bruce Newsome, “The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 4 (2003).

³⁷ Ibid.

study comparing United States, United Kingdom, and German special operations.³⁸ Newsome refutes that SOF units' effectiveness relies on physical or psychological prowess, and argues that unique personnel management establishes unit cohesion and identity leading to increased performance.

The implications of this research indicate that selection and training of talented SOF personnel is merely the first step in achieving optimal performance gained through strong bonds within units. Military research psychologists, James Griffith and Mark Vaitkus, highlight the importance of group structure, stressful training, and social support to enhance small unit cohesion.³⁹ Military veterans have witnessed the importance of this dynamic. U.S. SOF participation in Joint Combined Executed Training (JCET) events with foreign militaries frequently focused on a combination of rigorous combined training by day and social outings by night. Ongoing efforts by the NSHQ attempt to capture momentum in small unit cohesion and established trust from combined operations over the past decade in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan to achieve increased global SOF integration and performance. The primary void noted in the surveyed literature was a detailed focus on the bonds that overcome cultural and language barriers to foster group dynamics inherent to SOF.⁴⁰

Considerable literature exists describing the impacts of emerging technology and network structures on modern conflict. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, a pioneer in the concept of network centric warfare, outlined how network centric warfare related to a “co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes.”⁴¹ In 1998, David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick Stein expanded on Cebrowski’s principles with *Network Centric Warfare*, while conceding that “at the current time NCW (network

³⁸ Bruce Newsome, *Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others* (Praeger Security International, 2007), 143.

³⁹ James Griffith and Mark Vaitkus, “Relating Cohesion to Stress, Strain, Disintegration, and Performance: An Organizing Framework—Military Psychology” 11, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 27–55.

⁴⁰ For an overview of United States Special Operations in the Post-9-11 world see: David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces*, Columbia University Press, 2007.

⁴¹ Arthur K Cebrowski and Jhon J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 124 (1998): 28–35.

centric warfare) is far more a state of mind than a concrete reality.”⁴² Defense analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s *Swarming & the Future of Conflict* outlined how small autonomous teams using modern communication to interconnect would be the best defense against emerging asymmetric threats.⁴³ Understanding the internal mechanisms within network structures and small units is essential to identify how to develop military responses to network centric threats. Social Scientists Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler have conducted extensive research on how network participation shapes the actions and perceptions of individuals and organizations and how information and influence travels through networks.⁴⁴

Subsequent work by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt established the foundations for the principles of “Netwar,” which describes how asymmetric threats have organized themselves in worldwide networks, and requires a focus on network centric warfare to counter these threats.⁴⁵ In *Networks and Netwars*, Arquilla, and Ronfeldt describe the traits inherent to a well functioning network:

The strongest networks will be those in which the organizational design is sustained by a winning story and a well-defined doctrine, and in which all this is layered atop advanced communications systems and rests on strong personal and social ties at the base.⁴⁶

NSHQ initiatives collectively described as the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network build upon this framework.⁴⁷ This report uses the framework established by Arquilla and Ronfeldt and the principles of the NSHQ’s collaborative network as basis for research and expansion of thought on network centric warfare and trust building on coalition SOF.

⁴² David Alberts, Jhon J Garstka, and Frederick Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

⁴³ John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), <http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/>.

⁴⁴ Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler, *Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives* (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2009).

⁴⁵ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html.

⁴⁶ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, 324.

⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner Collaborative Network (APCN),” 2011, <http://www.nscc.bices.org/page/APCN/>.

The literature on network centric warfare identifies the urgent need to connect all available resources to confront modern adversaries. Much of this literature proposes that modern military conventional structures remain unprepared to combat asymmetric threat, despite years of persistent conflict. In *Worst Enemy*, Arquilla outlines the American military's hesitancy to fully grasp his "netwar" doctrine and adapt to network centric threats, despite a long history of encountering similar structures in previous conflicts.⁴⁸ Foreign policy analyst Stephen Biddle contends that most early operations in Afghanistan were fought as "mid-intensity conflict" in a conventional manner using air power, rather than revolutionary warfare concepts.⁴⁹ Similarly, defense analysts Hy Rothstein proposes in *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* that following the success of initial operations against Taliban forces, U.S. military operations have become increasing conventional while its enemy has embraced unconventional tactics.⁵⁰ Despite the limited but well-publicized instances of some special operations forces using unconventional and network centric tactics, most NATO SOF operations in Afghanistan since 2002 used conventional tactics. Nine years later the American military and many of its NATO allies have large numbers of experienced veterans combating networked insurgent and terror groups, and possess a greater appreciation for emerging counterinsurgency and unconventional tactics. This young corps of veterans has the technical capacity and experience to implement the advocated network centric form of warfare. The void in this literature remains the practical implementation of SOF to achieve full global integration and identify how to build a strong binding narrative advocated by Arquilla and Rondfelt within a SOF coalition.⁵¹ As NATO nations begin to withdrawal troops from the Afghanistan conflict, the NSHQ must ensure it has established a strong narrative uniting NATO SOF units interconnected by social and technological ties.

⁴⁸ John Arquilla, *Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008).

⁴⁹ Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* (2003), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58811/stephen-biddle/afghanistan-and-the-future-of-warfare>.

⁵⁰ Hy S. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006).

⁵¹ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. OVERVIEW

The asymmetric threats of the 21st century pose common security challenges to nations around the globe. The NATO SOF Headquarters describes a vision to challenge these threats with the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network linking special operations units, inter-agency, political, and law enforcement organizations to combat emerging terrorist acts, asymmetric threats, and criminal activity.⁵² The concept of this collaborative network includes all of the multi-faceted initiatives to establish trust, camaraderie, cooperation, and communication between partner nations. The goal of this initiative is ensuring success in global military and security operations. The NATO SOF Headquarters cites the influence of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt's *Networks and Netwars* in structuring their network approach, which emphasizes the key roles of a strong narrative and organizational, doctrinal, technological, and social components.⁵³ This theoretical framework draws elements from all of the previously mentioned relevant literature to best describe mechanisms and processes that contribute to special operations organizational success. Although the theories proposed may have some relevance to other military organizations, the framework highlights specific group dynamics prevalent in special operations coalitions or other small unit collaborations.

This report builds upon Arquilla and Ronfeldt's framework and other relevant literature through emphasis on combined special operations from input from multinational special operations veterans and the author's personal experience.⁵⁴ The theoretical framework described first states the case for multinational special operations interoperability efforts, and describes why coalition SOF is a better economic and political investment than conventional forces. This argument frames the case for the

⁵² NSHQ Allied Partner Collaborative Network," NATO SOF Headquarters website, <http://www.nshq.nato.int/page/APCN/>.

⁵³ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*.

⁵⁴ Author has combined operational experience in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan with 18 NATO allies and partners from 2001 to 2009, and five years of service in U.S. Army units forward stationed in Germany.

framework's central focus of ensuring SOF coalitions achieve maximum performance once they are dedicated to a contingency operation through cooperation, communication, and training before conflicts arise.

While the NSHQ is the framework for this research, the basic concepts proposed may be applied to other regional networks promoting special operations interoperability. An alliance of regional special operations networks would effectively balance local security cooperation with building blocks essential for effective global special operations networks targeting non-state actors. This form of international SOF security cooperation would be a step toward achieving an effective global network structure advocated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt to combat competing asymmetric networks.⁵⁵ A graphical depiction of how regional SOF networks could contribute to a global counter-terror network follows.




Figure 1. Regional SOF Networks and Proposed Global Cooperation

⁵⁵ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*.

B. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF COALITION SOF

For the past decade, many NATO nations have deployed conventional troops to conflict areas around the world with enduring commitments. In nations that once eagerly welcomed western forces, their presence has become a divisive factor in political, social, and religious circles. To prevent this dynamic from further eroding public support and trust in western military forces across the developing world, special operations must take a central role in conflicts to reduce military footprints and facilitate host nation operations. While the limited footprint of any special operations element is preferable to conventional intervention, effective multinational special operations coalitions diffuse potential fears of western imperialism or domination.

The economic principle of supply and demand offers a simple metaphor for understanding the importance of coalition special operations forces in overseas contingency operations compared to large-scale conventional forces. During the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, coalition special operations units mitigated fears of American conquest, portrayed common resolve, and contributed valuable experience and capabilities to U.S. SOF efforts. During this timeframe, western forces were seen as a valuable commodity with increased demand balanced with a limited and prudent supply to prevent comparisons of previous Afghan military interventions. As the supply of western forces in conflict areas has increased since 2001, the perceived value of these forces by many local inhabitants, or consumer demand, has decreased. Large troop concentrations and sprawling military installations have contributed to market saturation in regions weary of western intentions and contributed to extremist recruiting efforts.

Coalition SOF intervention limits the western footprint in contingency operations while providing access to crucial combat multipliers, such as close air support, advanced imagery, and military assistance or training. In many forms of contingency operations, special operations forces act as significant force multipliers with each operator frequently providing a return on investment equal to several conventional troops. Coalition SOF offers a more economical and militarily viable option to achieve common security goals, while preserving favorable public opinion or demand within host nation partners for further assistance from coalition special operations.




Figure 2. SOF Economy of Force in Relation to Supply and Demand

C. ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE COALITION SOF PERFORMANCE

Establishing a practical theoretical framework for achieving the stated goals is essential for long-term special operations interoperability and increased performance. The absence of an existing framework specifically designed to explain the complex group dynamics inherent in coalition special operations development requires the adaptation and evolution of several related theoretical traditions and frameworks. This report attempts to propose a simple roadmap for developing coalition special operations capacity through the influences of existing areas of research and study.

The overarching hypothesis of this thesis proposes that special operations coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and common threats and goals, contribute to enhance effectiveness in combined operations. These dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that elevate special operations coalitions from marginal performance to become effective special operations networks built upon trust and reciprocity. Improved coalition special operations interoperability has the potential to serve as a catalyst to facilitate enhanced lateral communication between military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and interagency

partners. If a special operations coalition lacks any of the dynamics of trust, common threats and goals, or technical and social networking, it will not achieve optimal performance.

1. Camaraderie

The first dynamic of effective special operations coalitions is camaraderie. Camaraderie is the mutual trust and friendship within a small group built upon previous shared experiences, common lineages, and overlapping professional and personal relationships. Within a special operations coalition, camaraderie develops through a persistent presence characterized by the ability to maintain unit engagement and interaction for extended periods. Persistent presence creates the opportunity for units to interact socially and professionally in environments that build small unit cohesion. Special operations interoperability is most effective when units train and live within proximity. The frequency and variety of interactions between units increase the potential for SOF interoperability, where strong relationships have the potential to expand beyond casual meetings to take root as lasting relationships. Forward presence enables special operations units to gain regional expertise to bridge cultural divides, facilitate cohesion, and keep professional and personal relationship networks active through regular face-to-face meetings and socializing. When family members routinely socialize camaraderie increases, emphasizing the benefits of geographic proximity. Additionally, fluency in a common language is a key element to establishing deep personal relationships and developing the trust required for increased intelligence sharing. Special operations require clear communication and common definitions to facilitate the rapid pace of tactical operations.

2. Interdependence

The second dynamic of successful coalition special operations integration is security interdependence. Interdependence is an agreement of common goals dedicated to counter common threats. Common threats provide purpose to coalition special operations and the impetus to overcome national political objectives, ensure collective security, and instill collective responsibility. When these elements coalesce, units will equally

contribute to a cohesive team to protect their own national interests and gain trust within the coalition. The scope of modern security threats requires vital participation of all parties to ensure collective security. In this aspect, the domestic security of all NATO nations is only as strong as the combined efforts of the weakest national combined SOF, law enforcement, and interagency intelligence apparatus. The worldwide financial crisis and increasing government debt across North America and Europe is an emerging common threat to NATO nations. This renewed threat has created a requirement for increased cooperation to reduce expenses in countering transnational common threats. SOF coalitions must rely on all partners to prepare for domestic emergencies while maintaining skill sets needed by coalition special operations in out of area operations.

The complex nature of special operations demands that all elements develop advanced niche capabilities to complement coalition requirements while meeting common proficiency standards and basic soldier skills common to all partners. Any element with degraded capabilities reduces the effectiveness of the entire unit and puts other coalition members at risk. SOF units authorized to conduct operations against international threats in addition to domestic counter-terror roles are more likely to achieve greater interoperability at the tactical level through common equipment and combined premission training. Additionally, SOF units contributing to a coalition are more likely to share common mission essential task lists (METL) than conventional units and have more freedom to acquire specialized equipment outside of national logistics channels. With this flexibility, units are more likely to acquire equipment endorsed by other partner SOF units, and thus facilitate future interoperability.

3. Interoperability

The third dynamic of SOF interoperability is networking, which describes methods employed to foster personal and professional collaborative relationships or communicate through technical means. Factors that contribute to the ability of SOF partners to network include limited barriers to communication and access to both common and advanced communication capabilities. Barriers to open communication form hierarchies within a coalition, limit full participation by all participants, and create

mistrust across the network. An effective special operations coalition must allow all parties to contribute to intelligence production and communicate over classified networks. Contributing units must find an appropriate balance between protecting national secrets and providing coalition partners with need to know information concerning emerging threats. Special operations units must also have compatible communication portals to facilitate collaboration between units. Personal bonds formed in combat establish informal communication networks on which professional networks grow if technical structures are available to facilitate communication.

Digital age technology has created new opportunities for allies to maintain relationships following successful engagement including e-mail, social networking, cell phones, and face-to-face meetings. Maintaining an open flow of communication is essential to enable these relationships to flourish and encourage further collaboration over common classified networks as appropriate. Accordingly, fully functioning special operations networks harness face-to-face meetings in training, schools, or deployments through unclassified communications that create camaraderie and common bonds that result in increased communication over classified networks.




Figure 3. Building Blocks of SOF Networks

Beneficial special operations integration built upon camaraderie, network connectivity, and bonds between special operations coalitions extend beyond military relationships. SOF contingency operations require complex coordination with national level law enforcement, interagency partners, political leadership, and conventional military forces providing essential logistics and resources. This coordination provides special operations elements a high degree of network centrality. When special operations elements cooperate during combined missions, they provide a bridging capacity to open dialogue and cooperation between international partners that may not otherwise have routine communication.




Figure 4. Special Operations as a Nexus of Security Cooperation

Strong bonds and network connectivity between special operations units facilitate the flow of information between national partners and their international colleagues during combined operations, law enforcement, and diplomacy. Therefore, the development of trusted networks forged by common goals are not only essential to facilitate coalitions' success, but this integration also enables further partnership among many additional international partners supporting common operations. This relationship may be more critical in remote regions or emerging operations with limited communication infrastructure outside of special operations capabilities. The following diagram portrays the relationship of the three described dynamics of special operations coalitions.




Figure 5. Dynamics of Coalition Special Operations Integration

The dynamics of coalition special operations integration enhance interoperability and operational performance proportional to the number of complimentary variables shared among partner units. When a strong correlation of all three dynamics is present among units forming special operations coalitions, the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access enable the relationship to blossom into effective special operations coalitions. Special operations partners cannot ignore trust development until after crisis emerges; units must nurture relationships to ensure ad hoc coalitions develop upon a foundations of mutual respect, confidence, and assurance. The accelerant of responsibility describes the understanding that all members freely honor their commitments to ensure collective success. To achieve this goal, all parties must have an equal stake in the success of the organization. Finally, the accelerant of access allows special operations units to anticipate future threats and construct collaborative doctrine and tactical forums to identify how to best respond and alert partners of potential threats.

D. METHODOLOGY

This research analyzed NATO special operations forces using three methods to identify key limitations in coalition special operations integration. These methods included longitudinal and cross sectional case studies, survey research, and process tracing. Longitudinal case study analysis evaluated the rise of special operations units in NATO over the past 60 years, as well as the development of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters. Most NATO special operations units have conducted operations in Afghanistan, which presents a common operational venue for further cross sectional and longitudinal case study analysis over the nine-year's conflict. This analysis used academic material sited in the relevant literature of this report, personal interviews with unit members conducted by the author, and open source technical data concerning technical and military development across NATO.

The author drew from observations made during multiple trips to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008. This experience included participation in combined tactical operations with 18 allied nations during NATO led operations. In addition to deployments, the author lived in Germany for five years between 2001 and 2008 while stationed with United States Army Europe units, with frequent combined training opportunities and interaction with other NATO forces. Whenever possible, the author compared observations with U.S. and international colleagues participating in the same tactical operations and coalition special operations colleagues. Cross sectional data analysis compared trends, such as unit size, composition, national defense spending, and deployment information using data from *The Military Balance*.⁵⁶ World Bank economic data concerning technology infrastructure development in North American and Europe over the past two decades provided a common framework to analyze the potential success of NSHQ network initiatives.

This study used large-N cross sectional comparison by conducting survey research and interviews to gain additional insight not readily available in published data. The author traveled to the NATO SOF Headquarters in Mons, Belgium and the NATO

⁵⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2011,” 2011, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2011/>.

SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP) campus in Chièvres, Belgium in February 2011 to observe training, conduct interviews, and administer surveys to students and cadre. A subsequent visit to Germany conducted over five days in February 2011 surveyed and interviewed American special operations soldiers within a week of their return from participation in the ISAF SOF mission in Afghanistan. This report analyzed 225 surveys collected between January and May 2011. Throughout the research for this project, the author conducted more than 60 interviews at Chièvres Air Base, Belgium and various U.S. special operations elements stationed in Europe in February 2011, and at the Naval Postgraduate School from January 2011 to May 2011. The author conducted all interviews in person, including leadership, staff, support, and tactical soldiers from 18 NATO SOF nations.

Surveys and interviews provided additional insight into the best practices during the past two decades of conflict to achieve SOF integration within national and cultural context. In 2008, the author attended reunions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Washington, D.C. and the First Special Service Force (FSSF) in St. Paul, Minnesota. The valuable input of these early special operations veterans of WWII from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and France assisted in giving the author a realistic insight into various methods used by the forefathers of NATO SOF to establish small unit cohesion and unit effectiveness. In addition to interviews with NATO special operations soldiers and leaders, the author contacted many of the prominent scholars highlighted in the literature review to describe how their research may benefit special operations integration initiatives. The valuable feedback provided by these scholars in personal interviews, electronic mail, and phone conversations contributed to Chapter VII: Analysis and Recommendations. Survey research in this project is ongoing beyond the initial analysis presented in this report. A Naval Postgraduate multinational research team specifically analyzing intelligence sharing within special operations coalitions will publish further analysis in December 2011.

The concept of process tracing described the “chain of events” that contributes to effective coalition special operations described in relevant literature.⁵⁷ This method analyzed effective methods of special operations integration employed in combat zones to determine how these effective measures developed in training, doctrine, and common education prior to deployment. This method traced elements of friction within coalitions to identify where integration efforts have fallen short in pre-mission training and how these shortfalls have affected combat effectiveness. Establishing coalition special operations interoperability is both a science and an art form. The various methods employed during this research attempted to bridge both realms.

⁵⁷ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 1997.

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III. THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY OF SOF INTEGRATION

A OVERVIEW

Nearly nine years of persistent conflict since September 2001 has created a battle hardened and competent corps of coalition special operations veterans. Many current NATO SOF units trace their military lineage to multinational SOF units established during their grandparents' generation of WWII veterans. Like their WWII forefathers, the current corps of NATO SOF operators has gained extensive combat experience in combined operations over the past decade. Unlike their grandparents, most current soldiers will continue serving in their militaries for many years following their recent combat service as European militaries transition to all volunteer military forces. While the percentage of total national populations is a small fraction of the WWII generation, the total months deployed in combat zones per soldier in many cases has surpassed previous eras. Combined special operations units in earlier conflicts achieved tremendous success by learning to develop unit camaraderie and overcome bureaucratic limitations to achieve battlefield success. The rapid military drawdowns following World War II allowed much of this acquired knowledge and momentum to be lost. The wealth of experience and progress made over the past several years toward special operations interoperability may similarly be lost if proactive measures are not taken immediately. These efforts should capture best practices and formalize the personal relationships formed through combat in Afghanistan and beyond, to meet the irregular threats of the 21st century.

B. THE NATO SOF LINEAGE IN WORLD WAR I

The NSHQ follows the lineage of multinational special operations forces formed to meet common threats. Frequently, these units faced similar issues with intelligence sharing, unit cohesion, and interoperability plaguing modern special operations coalitions. Analysis of these units provides insight into the challenges facing contemporary integration efforts following the end of combat operations. These units included a number of multinational units and temporary commands established during

WWI, WWII, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. While technology and the structure of enemy forces have evolved, many special operations cohesion principles are timeless. T. E. Lawrence's employment of harassment attacks against Turkish supply routes using indigenous Arab forces demonstrated the capabilities of a small raiding force, as well as the importance of cultural understanding within combined units.⁵⁸

Beyond Lawrence's endeavors in the Middle East, other allied attempts to form covert small units in WWI included the deployment of Dunsterforce in the Caucasus, led by British Major General L. C. Dunsterville. The unit selected volunteers from Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.⁵⁹ The element's mission was to re-organize faltering Russian, Georgian, and Armenian forces against invading Turkish armies in the narrow region between the Black and Caspian Seas.⁶⁰ Beyond Dunsterville's fluency in Russian, his subordinate officers lacked linguistic capabilities to communicate and bond with their Caucasus comrades.⁶¹ Despite a spirited defense of Baku during which the element suffered 20% casualties, the unit's cultural limitations failed to galvanize its Georgian and Armenian coalition partners that resulted in Turkish forces capturing the city.

Combined SOF units were not limited to Allied forces in WWI. German Colonel Paul von Lettow Vorbeck led a small force in East Africa that raided British supply lines and harassed larger forces between 1915 and 1918.⁶² During the interwar period, military planners across Europe studied these campaigns to propose new units capable of employing emerging technology, such as the parachute, glider, vehicle mobility, submarines, and early breathing apparatuses. T. E. Lawrence routinely visited Winston Churchill at his residence to describe how potential opponents in Europe might prepare small and flexible military units and advocate similar British units for the likelihood of

⁵⁸ T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, 1st ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1991).

⁵⁹ L.C. Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterforce* (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), <http://ia600307.us.archive.org/33/items/adventuresofduns00dunsrich/adventuresofduns00dunsrich.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterforce*.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² James Lucas, *Kommando: German Special Forces of World War Two* (London: Cassell, 1998), 24.

coming conflict.⁶³ The combined experiences of small unit employment in WWI led to the establishment of special operations units that achieved strategic influence in WWII.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OSS

Military planners in WWII produced an extraordinary number of innovative and effective special operations forces that crossed national and cultural lines. The British SOE and American OSS specialized in subversion and espionage behind enemy lines with a goal to “set Europe ablaze.”⁶⁴ The SOE limited initial intelligence sharing between the two services until the OSS enhanced American security procedures to meet higher British standards.⁶⁵ The result of this program was the X2 directorate established in 1942 that allowed top-secret intelligence sharing between the two agencies, such as information concerning Britain’s ULTRA program.⁶⁶ The OSS and SOE planned and conducted tactical operations through the combined Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) in London. Despite the complimentary systems elements of suspicion, doubts over capabilities, and social differences strained unit integration.⁶⁷

In addition to covert intelligence operations, the OSS and SOE jointly created the Jedburgh team concept. These small three man teams were capable of serving as liaisons with partisans behind enemy lines in occupied Europe. Less than 300 men from seven nations comprised the Jedburgh teams; the genesis of what Will Irwin describes as the first “diplomat soldiers”⁶⁸ The OSS and SOE recruited men for the Jedburgh teams from exceptional soldiers in U.S. and British Army airborne units and intelligence operatives. Additionally, the SOE recruited French, Belgian, and Dutch exiles living abroad. The

⁶³ Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, vol. 1 (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

⁶⁴ Michael Warner, “The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Public Affairs, May 2000), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/index.htm>, 16.

⁶⁵ Warner, “The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency,” 29.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Michael R. D. Foot, *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940–46* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 126.

⁶⁸ Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, xxiv.

United States and British conducted separate initial selections, followed by a second selection at the SOE's Student Assessment Board. The board tested psychological traits, physical toughness, mental acuity, and elements of teamwork.⁶⁹

The OSS leadership recognized the importance of establishing cohesion and trust within small teams in combat. The Jedburgh men selected their teammates after several weeks of initial training. Selection criteria required that one officer had to be from the British Commonwealth or American, the second team member was French, Belgian, or Dutch, and the radio operator could be from any country.⁷⁰ The nationality of the second team member determined the destination of the team. Despite this initial concept to integrate Jedburgh teams fully, nearly 90% of the teams had at least two members with the same nationality as most soldiers were reluctant to go to combat without a fellow countryman.⁷¹ Initial cohesion was lacking in teams as veterans British soldiers viewed their new American comrades as inexperienced and untested.⁷² Teams conducted all subsequent training together to develop unit cohesion. Despite early preconceptions, unit camaraderie improved through rigorous training consisting of 25-mile marches in rough terrain, cultural assimilation courses, advanced tactics, and marksmanship training.⁷³

Once Jedburgh teams arrived into occupied France in 1944, they were instrumental in organizing and equipping the French *Marquis* guerilla bands. The Jedburgh teams prepared the battle space for Allied invasion forces alongside their French, Belgian, and Dutch partisan allies. Despite the tactical cohesion of the teams, bureaucratic rules limited intelligence sharing between conventional forces participating in the invasion. This situation required tactical commanders to bypass guidelines and share pertinent information beyond their imposed national restrictions.⁷⁴ Following the

⁶⁹ Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, 58.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 65.

⁷¹ Julian Thompson and Imperial War Museum, *The Imperial War Museum Book of War Behind Enemy Lines*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2001), 306.

⁷² Statement derived from author's conversations with OSS veterans at OSS Society dinner in Washington DC, 2 May 2009.

⁷³ Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, 62.

⁷⁴ Foot, *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940–46*, 224.

conclusion of European combat operations, some Jedburgh teams would later see combat in the Pacific theater. Despite their success, the teams disbanded following the war, which dissipated valuable experience and techniques regarding combined special operations. Many Jedburgh veterans did not see each other for decades until the first unit reunion in 1984.⁷⁵

D. THE FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE

Another WWII forbearer to NATO SOF was the First Special Service Force (FSSF). The FSSF formed at Fort William Henry Harrison Montana in 1942, composed from American and Canadian soldiers and some Norwegian trainers. The unit's founder, Colonel Frederick, demanded that the unit have, "unity of purpose, spirit, and action to make the outfit work."⁷⁶ Despite these early efforts and a common language, the unit had early difficulties overcoming inconsistencies between the American and Canadian customs, doctrine, preference of uniforms, and weapons. Colonel Frederick mandated that the unit fully integrate between the two nationalities and produced distinctive uniforms and shoulder patch including the Native American arrowhead.⁷⁷ Throughout the training, the men could identify weak performers in the unit and have them reassigned by a majority vote.⁷⁸ The remaining men in the force knew they could trust the skills and capabilities of the men they would trust their lives within combat. Strong unit camaraderie developed prior to deployment to Europe through rigorous training, common purpose, and forced socialization.

The First Special Service Force took heavy casualties in the Mediterranean theater at Monte Casino and Anzio, yet earned a reputation for taking impenetrable objectives with courage under fire. Senior commanders often misused the FSSF as regular infantry

⁷⁵ Irwin, *The Jedburgh: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, 235.

⁷⁶ John Nadler, *A Perfect Hell: The True Story of the Black Devils, The Forefathers of the Special Forces*, vol. 2007 (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 56.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 74.

soldiers despite their advanced capabilities.⁷⁹ Following WWII, the FSSF disbanded, and thus, years of accumulated combat experience and unit cohesion disappeared. The men progressed to other careers, but many attended frequent reunions held at locations near the common border. The bonds these men developed in combat continued to develop through social functions, letter writing, and the FSSF Veterans Association. John Nadler describes the relationship among the FSSF veterans, “this bond had withstood the passage of more than sixty years. In some cases, it extended over thousands of miles and resisted sickness and the infirmities of old age.”⁸⁰

E. OTHER WORLD WAR II SOF PREDECESSORS

Creative use of well-trained combined special operations forces was not confined to the Allied forces in WWII. The German military intently studied the successful use of small and flexible raiding parties in the Middle East, Caucuses, and Africa during WWI. Admiral Canaris, head of the German counter-intelligence unit the Abwehr, proposed the recruitment of men of German heritage returning from interwar time living abroad in North America, South America, and Africa. Canaris sought “independently minded, tough and resilient men, inured to hardship and with knowledge of foreign language, customs, and cultures.”⁸¹ In September 1939, the 800th Special Purpose Training Battalion Brandenburg formed, commonly described as the “Brandenbergers.”

The unit recruited these former expatriate Germans to employ their foreign language fluency and cultural knowledge to conduct espionage, sabotage, and commando operations behind enemy lines across Europe.⁸² Training consisted of strenuous extended nighttime marches, detailed combat simulations, and small unit tactics using live ammunition and explosives to prepare the men for complex missions.⁸³ Once employed

⁷⁹ This observation is based on author’s personal conversations with FSSF veterans during a unit reunion in St. Paul, Minnesota, August 20–22, 2008.

⁸⁰ Nadler, *A Perfect Hell: The True Story of the Black Devils, The Forefathers of the Special Forces*, 359.

⁸¹ Lucas, *Kommando*.

⁸² Franz Kurowski, *The Brandenburger Commandos: Germany’s Elite Warrior Spies in World War II*, 1st ed. (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2005), 26.

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

in combat, the Brandenbergers inflicted heavy losses on Allied supply lines and were instrumental in key German successes early in the war. The varied cultural composition and diversity within this force proved to be this unit's greatest asset to form a wide clandestine network across Europe. German commando officer Otto Skorzeny would later form his Jagdverbande 502nd Hunting Group by using the examples of the British Commandos and the Brandenbergers.⁸⁴ Near the end of the war, Skozeny attempted to infiltrate Allied lines with English-speaking German commandos disguised as American soldiers.⁸⁵ Both of these units fully maximized the unique cultural traits and military expertise of their soldiers to achieve a much greater impact beyond their assigned strength.

Other influential components to the lineage of modern NATO SOF warriors are the numerous partisan forces that formed across Eastern Europe. Lithuanian SOF honors their heritage with these fighters by referring to their Special Purpose Service operators as the “Forest Brothers” (*Žaliūkai*) in honor of the fierce World War II guerilla fighters of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.⁸⁶ These forces stood united against the German and subsequent Soviet occupation for decades. The Home Army of Poland (Armia Krajowa) fought fierce urban battles in Warsaw and conducted coordinated insurgent attacks against elite German military units.⁸⁷ Many of the brave partisan fighters in Eastern Europe later had the opportunity to serve in the United States Army Special Forces under the Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950.⁸⁸ The 10th Special Forces Group would later assist in the training and development of many emerging Eastern Europe special operations units following the end of the Cold War. The proud histories of all of these units weave a proud lineage and valuable insight for future partnerships.

⁸⁴ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 169.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 166.

⁸⁶ Riho Rongelep and Michael Clemmesen, “Tartu in the 1941 Summer War,” *Baltic Defense Review* 1/2003, no. 9 (2003): 165–182.

⁸⁷ European Resistance Archive, “Poland: European Resistance Archive,” 2011, <http://www.resistance-archive.org/en/resistance/poland>.

⁸⁸ James Carafano, “Mobilizing Europe’s Stateless” (Harvard University, 1999), <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/carafano.pdf>.

F. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II SOF

The lessons of multinational SOF integration in WWII emphasize the importance of camaraderie, common goals, and efficient information flow in contemporary special operations. These units faced daunting challenges in overcoming cultural, social, tactical, and bureaucratic cleavages. The OSS and SOE had to create the X2 program to overcome intelligence sharing limitations, and in the process had to assume potential risk to combat a greater common threat. SOF operations over the past decade have demonstrated how barriers to open communication create hierarchies within a coalition. A fully effective SOF coalition must have an open and collaborative flow of information to facilitate integration and maximize unit potential. An effective special operations coalition must allow all parties to communicate freely over compatible classified networks and participate in the intelligence production process. Beyond trusting comrades with intelligence, partners must trust other members' capabilities. Ongoing research by U.S. Army scientist James Griffith has shown some correlations of this dynamic of increased unit cohesion stemming from common perceptions of group competence.⁸⁹ Each of the WWII special operations units established criteria for evaluating specific traits for ensuring each unit member was tactically proficient.

Both allied and axis forces' leadership in WWII gave special operations units significant autonomy to structure their own selection process and evaluate peer performance prior to combat service. Trust must develop over time and through repeated actions within a small group to establish individual credibility. Additionally, these units understood the importance of forming SOF camaraderie through rigorous physical and mental training. Once these specialized units formed, they tended to stay together through training, deployment, and draw down, with less individual replacement than conventional units. Research by military sociologist Bruce Newsome identifies correlations between special operations selection methods and personnel systems and small unit cohesion and performance.⁹⁰ Further research sponsored by the U.S. Army has shown correlations of

⁸⁹ James Griffith, "Further Considerations Concerning the Cohesion-Performance Relation in Military Settings," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 1 (October 2007).

⁹⁰ Newsome, *Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others*.

realistic and difficult common training, but delivered in a non-hazing environment.⁹¹ Although the WWII era training was demanding, unit members were generally treated in a professional manner in recognition of their volunteer status and dedication. These methods of selection, training, and employment minimized cultural cleavages and brought the units together with a common purpose and vision. Once unity emerged, the small elements transformed from multinational allies to true brothers in arms.

The post-WWII military draw down prevented either units from building upon the skills and capabilities developed in combat to reach the next level of coalition SOF integration. The FSSF veterans remained connected in the years following the war, which allowed the personal bonds forged in combat to continue to flourish.⁹² Many OSS veterans achieved remarkable careers in politics, diplomacy, and enterprise, yet most of these veterans maintained little contact until modern technology facilitated easier communication.⁹³ Modern technologies enable the newest generation of warriors to remain connected and further strengthen the camaraderie and trust developed in conflict. These factors offer an unprecedented opportunity to enhance global SOF integration through personal and professional networks beyond what was possible following WWII. The network structures established by NATO SOF can form the framework for enduring special operations partnership and personal relationships.

G. THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY

Digital age technologies offer modern special operations forces the ability to develop further inter-personal bonds formed in combat. Through these communications, collaborative professional relationships develop. The bonds created between special operations forces can create networks of increased diplomatic ties, connectivity with foreign interagency partners, and allied conventional unit integration. Emerging

⁹¹ Mikael Salo, *Cohesion Components as Predictors of Performance and Attitudinal Criteria* (International Military Testing Association, 2005), <http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2005/2005102P.pdf>.

⁹² This observation is based on the author's discussions with FSSF veterans at a unit reunion in St. Paul Minnesota, August 20–22, 2008.

⁹³ This observation is based on the author's discussions with OSS veterans at a unit reunion dinner in Washington, DC, May 2, 2008.

technologies facilitate collaborative doctrine development and intelligence analysis. Modern multi-layer network communications allow operators to bridge gaps that previous generations could not overcome. More than 65 years after WWII, modern multinational SOF warriors possess the advanced technology and background to develop combat bonds further. Young special operations warriors have been well equipped to exploit this golden opportunity of special operations integration. Contemporary special operations commanders grew up in a rapidly changing world. Most of these warriors were in middle school as the Cold War ended. Following the collapse of communism, young students in Eastern Europe experienced Western languages, media, and expanded educational and travel opportunities. This generation later attended college at the dawn of the Internet age, which gave them access to news and information from around the world.

The 9–11 attacks initiated events that have shaped the world outlook and military careers of young American soldiers and NATO allies. The subsequent attacks in Madrid and London further galvanized young men and women across Europe. This generation of tech savvy warriors has gained extensive experience in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Through their combat deployments, they exchanged e-mail addresses and established trusted relationships with their coalition partners. They honed their individual skills and capabilities to protect their homelands and join their international comrades on the frontlines of the Long War. From the most remote regions of the world, these newly trained SOF warriors remained digitally connected with friends, family, and their coalition partners. In Afghanistan, they learned to overcome structural, doctrinal, and bureaucratic challenges to conduct combined tactical operations. They forged strong relationships, and mourned collectively when one of their fellow SOF operators fell in the line of duty. Through this journey, these young veterans gained camaraderie their WWII forefathers never fully achieved. Fully harnessing this wealth of experience, camaraderie, and interoperability is the foremost NATO SOF challenge.

IV. COMMON THREATS TO NATO

A. OVERVIEW

If global trends of the past decade persist, NATO collective security efforts in the remainder of the 21st century will be defined by uncertain threats, persistent conflict, and the empowerment of non-state actors. Security reviews among global powers emphasize the strength of continued military cooperation to combat evolving defense challenges. The British 2010 Strategic Security and Defence Review recommends a national strategy that “strengthens mutual dependence with key allies and partners who are willing and able to act, not least to make our collective resources go further.”⁹⁴ The 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security summarizes the uncertainty of modern threats: “new powers have emerged and new vulnerabilities have been exposed. The traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred.”⁹⁵ NATO has gained a new capability to confront common threats and challenges through the NATO SOF Headquarters. This analysis evaluates modern threats to key European partners, how the NSHQ is adapting to meet these challenges, and what must be done to ensure a strong future for the NATO Alliance.

The NATO SOF Headquarters has made significant advances from its inception in 2007 as the NATO SOF Coordination Center. In four years, the NATO SOF Headquarters has grown from a small staff section within the Special Operations Command-Europe into a three-star headquarters led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Kisner. The headquarters conducts combined special operations training courses and serves as the epicenter for establishing doctrine, developing new tactics, and defining procedures for NATO’s special operations capabilities. The NSHQ’s rapid development and success prove that a NATO subordinate command can succeed despite the dysfunction normally associated with NATO decision making. The organization is likely

⁹⁴ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty,” November 30, 2010.

⁹⁵ French Government, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Paris: O. Jacob, 2008), 10.

to take a central role in defending the NATO alliance against evolving threats, such as international and domestic terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, and WMD proliferation. The NSHQ has initiated reforms, training, and infrastructure development to meet the guidance of the new NATO Strategic Concept and remain “effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.”⁹⁶ As the gravity of irregular threats increases across Europe and North America, the role of special operations as a cornerstone of international security, diplomacy, and intelligence collaboration is likely to increase.

Common threats provide purpose and an impetus for allies to overcome differences in national political objectives, ensure common security, and instill collective responsibility. Within many NATO nations, radical Islamic groups have gained substantial followings among the growing immigrant populations from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Increasingly within nations, such as Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the call of global jihad has infiltrated second and third generation immigrant populations. The followers of radical terror groups across Europe hold European Union passports, speak with local accents, and grew up in the communities they wish to attack. These factors indicate that the NATO alliance may confront domestic, as well as international threats in the future. The presence of common threats can facilitate the development of collective capabilities and cooperation by alliance partners. Allies facing imminent security threats are likely to achieve cooperation without political delay, demonstrated by the rapid development of the NATO SOF Headquarters and its subordinate units.

B. EVOLVING NATO SECURITY CONCERNS

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen commented in October 2010 that “NATO’s core mission, to protect the 900 million civilians of NATO countries from attack, must never change...but it must be modern defense against modern threats.”⁹⁷ As

⁹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” November 19, 2010, 1.

⁹⁷ “NATO Chief Urges New Response to Modern-Day Threats,” October 14, 2010, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/NATO-Chief-Urges-New-Response-to-Modern-Day-Threats-104941859.html>.

the focus of European security has shifted from Cold War deterrence to countering internal extremism, enemy attacks are much more likely to emanate from Hamburg, Milan, or London than from Beijing, Moscow or even Tehran. While Baltic and Scandinavian nations' fears of a re-immersing Russia do have merit, potential aggressive influence is more likely to come in asymmetric forms, such as cyber terror to NATO's border nations than any conventional military action. Russia's calculus to intervene in the Caucasus in 2008 likely would have taken a different form had Georgia gained NATO membership. Subversive groups within Europe seek to destroy the societies that have welcomed and sheltered their families. The recently released 2010 *NATO Strategic Concept* declares that the potential for a conventional attack on the territory of an alliance member is low, yet reaffirms that terrorism "poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly."⁹⁸ Extremist groups have demonstrated agility, flexibility, and the ability to collaborate using advanced networks, whereas NATO's conventional military forces have failed to demonstrate the same capabilities. Additionally, the new concept emphasizes that instability abroad can affect alliance security "by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities."⁹⁹

The threats emphasized in the 2010 *NATO Strategic Concept* echo growing awareness in alliance member nations that the scope and purpose of NATO must adjust to changing security concerns in a globalized society. An analysis of European defense reviews and security white papers shown in Appendix A demonstrate this trend. Of the 14 national strategies reviewed, all describe a diminished threat of conventional attack while stressing the increasing uncertainty and asymmetric threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁰ The NSHQ has made significant progress in decreasing key capability gaps and stands poised to counter NATO's asymmetric threats. Despite NATO SOF's success in internal domestic security and operations abroad in Afghanistan,

⁹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's New Strategic Concept," par 10.

⁹⁹ Ibid., par 11.

¹⁰⁰ ABC News, "Paris Riots in Perspective," 4 November 2005, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1280843>.

the new strategic concept never mentions special operations. This omission is quite notable because most conventional forces cannot effectively challenge many modern threats. Contemporary threats require flexible and adaptable units highly trained to detect, destroy and deter complex terror networks; within NATO, much of this capability resides within NATO SOF units.

C. DEMOGRAPHICS IN EUROPE IN SECURITY TERMS

Between 1970 and 2006, the fertility rate of European NATO nations fell from 2.6 to 1.4 children per mother, which is incapable of maintaining current population levels without increased immigration.¹⁰¹ Over the past two decades, 80% of Europe's population growth has come from immigration. Despite low fertility rates, European populations have increased slightly over the past four decades with increased longevity, immigration, and the maturation of larger post WWII populations.¹⁰² Children born in the early stages of steady lowered fertility rates across Europe are now reaching childrearing age. Many demographers predict that European populations will steadily decrease during the next several decades as longevity and immigration will not be able to offset the dwindling fertility rates.¹⁰³ These trends indicate that the Europe of the future will be older, more culturally diverse and struggling to maintain the social security programs developed since WWII with fewer working age persons contributing tax revenue. Many European nations will likely further reduce military budgets in efforts to keep social programs solvent for as long as possible. These trends also indicate that European militaries will have few military aged males available for service, and those available, will come from a diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural background.

Although the majority of Europe's 17 million Muslims supports national governments and renounces terrorism, a growing wave of religious extremism has

¹⁰¹ Richard Sandell, "Coping with Demography in NATO Europe," in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

¹⁰² Sandell, "Coping with Demography in NATO Europe."

¹⁰³ Ibid.

manifested into more than 28 jihadist networks across the continent.¹⁰⁴ Across Europe, many Islamic societies have renounced violence and advocated achieving organizational goals through secular political movements. Organizations, such as the British Muslims for Secular Democracy, have cooperated with military and law enforcement agencies to limit the influence of jihadi organizations.¹⁰⁵ The Muslim population of Europe has increased more than 58% in the past two decades, while birthrates among native European populations continue to decline.¹⁰⁶ At this pace, several European nations may have majority Muslim populations within the next 50 years.¹⁰⁷ Following this trend of increased immigration, the name “Mohammed” in its varied spellings has become the most popular name for boys born in Britain during the past several years.¹⁰⁸ European society is becoming increasingly multicultural. The increased diversity of European society provides a pool of potential recruits from varied ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds with advanced language capability. However, mistrust in many immigrant communities with national government and law enforcement is likely to deter many young people from serving their adopted nations’ militaries.

Many of the various terror cells identified in recent years across Europe have supported both international jihad efforts, as well as internal national level plots. According to Peter Nesser of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, “the distinction between ‘homegrown’ and ‘international’ jihadism in the European context is vague in terms of organizational affiliation and motivational landscape.”¹⁰⁹ This dual-natured threat demonstrates the overlapping of internal and external security concerns

¹⁰⁴ Pew Research Center, “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe,” 2010, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1731/muslim-networks-movements-western-europe>, 34.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 32.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁷ Telegraph UK, “Muslim Europe: the demographic time bomb transforming our continent,” 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Telegraph UK, “‘Mohammed’ is the Top Boys’ Name,” October 2010, <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100061260/mohammed-is-the-top-boys-name-because-muslims-are-becoming-more-religious-not-because-there-are-more-muslims/>.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Nesser, “Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot,” *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 4, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (March 2008), <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss4.pdf>, 7.

present in Europe in the modern age.¹¹⁰ Radicalism has converts in Europe's non-immigrant population as well. In September 2007, German authorities uncovered a plot targeting Frankfurt Airport and Ramstein Air Base, led by German-born converts to Islam.¹¹¹ The men linked to the plot came from stable traditional German Catholic families and had advanced university educations. The efforts to disrupt the plot demonstrated a great deal of cooperation between American intelligence agencies, German security officials, special operations forces, and law enforcement. The sophisticated methods used to disrupt this plot demonstrate a significant increase in the capabilities available to NATO allies.

D. THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

In a Kabul interview in November 2001, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that Al Qaeda had obtained weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and even possessed a suitcase nuclear weapon purchased after the fall of the Soviet Union.¹¹² This claim was likely a deception operation, yet the fear this claim triggered is evident in defense reviews across NATO. According to the 2010 United States National Security Strategy:

Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Kathryn Haahr, "The Growth of Militant Islamist Micro-Diaspora Communities: Observations from Spain," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 4, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (March 2008), <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss4.pdf>, 18.

¹¹¹ Nesser, "Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot."

¹¹² Peter Bergen, "Reevaluating Al-Qaida's Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities," *CTC Sentinel* 3, no. 9, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (September 2010).

¹¹³ President of the United States, "2010 National Security Strategy" (U.S. Government Executive Branch, May 2010).

In 2007, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that through 2006, 1,080 incidents of illicit or unauthorized transfer of nuclear or radioactive material occurred; however, all of these incidents accounted for only a total of 8 kg of highly enriched uranium, which is far below the 25 kg required to construct a conventional nuclear explosive device.¹¹⁴

The difficulty in purchasing, stealing, or developing a nuclear explosive device suggests that the probability of a terrorist attack using a radioactive dirty bomb is much higher.¹¹⁵ The capabilities and materials required to conduct a dirty bomb attack fall within the potential of a number of worldwide terror groups including Al Qaeda. Although the number of potential casualties from such an attack would be relatively low compared to a nuclear device detonation, the psychological damage imposed on a NATO nation would be devastating. Nuclear forensics may offer the most likely safeguard against rogue states providing nuclear material or devices to terrorist groups potentially threatening NATO allies. The fear of attribution and probable military reprisals against rogue nations transferring nuclear components would deter nations from collaborating with Al Qaeda and other groups.¹¹⁶

The potential for a terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons is much higher than the threat of a nuclear detonation by terrorists, as suggested by the actions of the apocalyptic religious terror cult Aum Shinrikyo. From the early 1990s, the group recruited more than 300 scientists, physicians, and other technical advisers with advanced degrees in an attempt to procure nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and instigate global conflict.¹¹⁷ Despite huge financial resources and high-level connections, efforts to acquire nuclear weapons failed, which led the group to abandon its nuclear efforts and

¹¹⁴ International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, “Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material,” 2007, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/pub1309_web.pdf, 126.

¹¹⁵ Bergen, “Reevaluating Al-Qaida’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities,” 3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁷ Sara Daly, *Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism*, Project Air Force (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005).

focus on biological and chemical weapons.¹¹⁸ In 1995, the group attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas, which resulted in 13 dead, more than 50 seriously injured and thousands more affected.

Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 Tokyo attack serves as the most striking example of an attempt to employ chemical or biological weapons in a cosmopolitan capital. The plotters of the Madrid and London train bombings copied elements of the Tokyo attacks, including the targeting of confined train cars, methods of pre-attack reconnaissance, and target selection to maximize psychological effect. The February 2010 report by the United States Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism highlighted the threat of non-state actors armed with WMD. The report predicted that "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."¹¹⁹ Conventional NATO troops do not have the advanced training and equipment required to target these threats. Combined special operations task forces must match and surpass terrorist financial, logistic, and intelligence structures using similar networked approaches characterized by collaborative intelligence sharing and diffused command and control.¹²⁰ These efforts must constitute a coordinated effort among NATO special operations forces, law enforcement, and inter-agency partners to identify, monitor, and interdict potential threats.

E. THE INCREASED THREAT OF PIRACY

The increased prevalence of piracy in the waters off Somalia in the past decade has galvanized leading global economic powers towards increased security cooperation to secure shared shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. Piracy off the East Africa coast increased an average of 19.40% each year from 1998 to 2008, as well as increasing from

¹¹⁸ Robert Robins, *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 130.

¹¹⁹ United States Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, *World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism* (Washington, DC, 2008).

¹²⁰ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*.

19 attacks in 1998 to 134 in 2008.¹²¹ Although a number of nations have participated in antipiracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, these operations have had a minimal impact in countering the growing threat to international maritime cargo. Current NATO efforts in the region fall under the Operation Ocean Shield, which consists of five ships from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.¹²² A recent trend in European Union shipping companies has been reflagging vessels in “open registry” countries to circumvent European Union law and allow armed security contractors to provide security against potential pirates.¹²³ The current rise in worldwide piracy blurs the traditional lines between naval combat and law enforcement. During the past two years, several international SOF units have executed rescue operations aboard hijacked ships off the Somali coast, such as the United States Navy SEALS rescuing the captain of the *Maersk Alabama* and Russian Spetsnaz rescuing the crew of the oil freighter *Moscow University*.¹²⁴

F. EXTREMISM WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has decades of experience countering domestic terrorism, yet rapidly evolving demographics within the nation have created unique challenges and a generation of disenfranchised and impressionable young Muslim men. Irish nationalist terror dates back to the 1860s and between 1960 and 2000, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed more than 1,800 people, which included more than 650 civilians.¹²⁵ As the threat of IRA violence decreased in the 1990s, the threat of radical Islamic groups grew

¹²¹ Mathew Chambers, *International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Hindering Maritime Trade and Water Transportation Around the World* (U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, April 2010), 1.

¹²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Counter-Piracy Operations,” 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm#ocean.

¹²³ Peter Chalk, “Piracy in the Horn of Africa: A Growing Maritime Security Threat,” *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (September 2010).

¹²⁴ ABC News, “Russian Commandos Capture Pirates in Dramatic Rescue,” May 6, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/russian-commandos-capture-pirates-dramatic-rescue/story?id=10573767>; and Times Online UK, “Maersk Alabama crew return to U.S. to tell of Somali pirate ordeal,” April 18, 2009, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6115871.ece>.

¹²⁵ New York Times, “I.R.A. Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Its 30-Year Campaign,” July 17, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/17/world/ira-apologizes-for-civilian-deaths-in-its-30-year-campaign.html>.

under the tutelage of fiery clerics, such as London-based Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Anwar Al-Awlaki. British authorities imprisoned Al-Masri in 2006 on terrorism-related charges, while Al-Awlaki fled to Yemen in the face of increased British pressure.¹²⁶ These extremist clerics vied for support from the children of immigrants who flocked to Britain from the 1970s to the 1990s to escape conflict areas and benefit from generous social security benefits. These extremist groups produced radical followers, such as the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid and the two British born suicide bombers who attacked a Tel Aviv bar in 2003.¹²⁷

Despite their long history in dealing with terrorism, the London Tube attacks on July 7, 2005 caught British security officials by surprise. One month prior to the London attack, MI5’s Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre published a report stating that no group in Britain had the capability or intent to conduct a major terrorist attack.¹²⁸ During the London attack, four suicide bombers killed 56 people. The attack consisted of three simultaneous explosions within the London subway system and a subsequent explosion on a bus near Bloomsbury Square.¹²⁹ In addition to those killed, nearly 700 London residents suffered serious injuries. Terrorists attempted a nearly identical attack two weeks later; fortunately, all four bombs failed to detonate.¹³⁰ The martyrdom videos of the four successful London bombers shocked Britain because all of the attackers, aged 18 to 30, were British citizens who grew up in suburbs of London, held university diplomas, and spoke with Yorkshire accents.¹³¹ Three of the bombers were born in Britain, and the fourth moved to Britain from Jamaica when he was a child of five.¹³² The attacks introduced the British public and world media to a number of radical Islamic groups operating in public view in London and other British cities.

¹²⁶ Pew Research Center, “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe,” 34.

¹²⁷ Phillips, *Londonistan*, 4.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹²⁹ Hewitt, *The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front Since 9-11*, 50.

¹³⁰ Phillips, *Londonistan*, vii.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, viii.

¹³² Hewitt, *The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front Since 9-11*, 50.

The increasing religious fervor among young British men serves as fertile ground to implant the seeds of extremism by radical groups. The British Security Service (MI5) warns that a “significant” number of British citizens or residents have links to or sympathize with Al Qaeda.¹³³ These supporters contribute to fundraising and recruiting efforts, facilitate training, and provide false documents to potential terrorists. A 2006 Pew Research poll found that 43% of Muslims in Britain stated that they were “very concerned with the rise of Islamic extremism” within the United Kingdom compared with 42% of the general population.¹³⁴ These results reflect that Britain’s Muslim community equally shares the growing concerns regarding the radical clerics spewing violence and intolerance from their neighborhood mosques. The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence and Security Review echoes this concern, and warns of “a severe terrorist threat that has origins at home and overseas.”¹³⁵ The review further states that the best method of prevention is to “maintain military capabilities that provide maximum mutual benefit, for example Special Forces.”¹³⁶ Britain’s valuable contributions to NATO SOF include the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), as well as collaboration with MI5 and MI6.

G. ASSIMILATION CHALLENGES IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

A variety of extremist groups in the past four decades have challenged Europe’s leading economies, France and Germany. In the 1970s, attacks by the Baader-Meinhof Group and the assassination of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics led to Germany founding the GSG-9 counter-terror unit.¹³⁷ A peak in terrorist events occurred in 1986 in both nations with the Berlin discotheque bombing by Libyan-sponsored terrorists and a

¹³³ UK Security Service MI5, “The Nature of the Threat,” *MI5 Webpage*, 2010, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-nature-of-the-threat.html>.

¹³⁴ Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity,” July 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-cultural-identity/>, 30.

¹³⁵ UK Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty,” *About Defence- Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 2010, 3.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹³⁷ Time Magazine, “Terrorism: Horror and Death at the Olympics,” September 18, 1972, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906384,00.html>.

series of 10 attacks around Paris by pro-Iranian groups. In the 25 years since these attacks, both nations have become destinations for increased immigration from predominantly Muslim nations. France is now home to the largest Islamic population in Europe. The U.S. State Department estimates there are approximately 6.5 million French Muslims, which is roughly 10% of the population.¹³⁸ More than a million immigrants from Algeria and other North African nations came to France in the 1960s and 1970s. In the summer and fall of 2005, a series of riots demonstrated dissatisfaction among the second and third generation of French Muslims centered in the Clichy-sous-Bois suburb and other dilapidated neighborhoods of Paris. Within these neighborhoods, severe housing restrictions, unemployment approaching 40%, government work restrictions, and lack of adequate civilian police created flash points that erupted into violence.¹³⁹ The riots peaked in early November 2005 with hundreds of French Muslims detained and up to 1,500 vehicles burned each night during several weeks of intense conflicts between rioters and police. Violence erupted again in the fall of 2007 following the deaths of two French Muslim teenagers killed in a crash with a French police car.¹⁴⁰

The French government's October 2010 ban on Muslim women's burqas and other similar Islamic coverings has sparked further social unrest within the French Muslim community, and prompted a threat of attacks against France by Osama Bin Laden.¹⁴¹ Although Al Qaeda and other groups have spared both France and Germany from major attacks during the past decade, the threat of significant attacks looms on the near horizon. In September 2010, German and French authorities disclosed they thwarted a "Mumbai-like terror attack" in central Europe through a combined operation, which references the 2008 series of attacks in India's largest city that killed 164 people.¹⁴² In

¹³⁸ United States State Department, "Background Note: France," 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm>.

¹³⁹ ABC News, "Paris Riots in Perspective."

¹⁴⁰ CBC News, "News In Depth: France Riots," November 28, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/paris_riots/.

¹⁴¹ Cable News Network (CNN), "France Threatened in Alleged Bin Laden Tape," October 27, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-27/world/france.bin.laden_1 rtl-radio-new-tape-al-qaeda?_s=pm:world.

¹⁴² The Guardian UK, "'Mumbai-style' Terror Attack on UK, France and Germany Foiled," September 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled>.

response to emerging threats, the French government established special operations as a national security priority to conduct activities “on a national basis or in a narrow multilateral framework in order to free hostages or to pursue terrorists.”¹⁴³ Significant French contributions to NATO SOF include the *Brigade des Forces Spéciales Terre* (BFST) and the *Commandos Marine*.

The 2006 German White Paper on Defense notes, “given such threats posed by WMD and international terrorism, internal and external security are overlapping more and more.”¹⁴⁴ The White Paper further elaborates, “the most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks.”¹⁴⁵ Within Germany, the nation’s large immigrant community has not assimilated fully into national society. The growing ethnic tensions in Germany have attracted the attention of Germany’s political leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in 2010 that multiculturalism in Germany had “utterly failed” and top Bavarian politician Horst Seehofer called for a cessation of immigration from Turkey and Arab countries.¹⁴⁶

German security officials estimate that there are more than 400 violent Islamic extremists in Germany and more than 70 German citizens have received training in overseas terrorist camps.¹⁴⁷ Germany faces a threat emanating from extremist groups in several major cities. The largest group resides in the northern city of Hamburg. These groups recruit impressionable young Muslim men who have failed to benefit from German economic success or have suffered discrimination from the nation’s resurgent right wing neo-Nazi hate groups. A Muslim Kosovar immigrant’s murder of two U.S. Air Force personnel on a transfer bus at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011 portrays some

¹⁴³ Commission to Appraise France’s Defence and Security Strategy, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Paris: O. Jacob, 2008), 192.

¹⁴⁴ German Federal Ministry of Defence, “White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” 2006, 17.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 18.

¹⁴⁶ The Guardian UK, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has ‘Utterly Failed,’ October 17, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>.

¹⁴⁷ Spiegel Online, “Terror Alert: Hamburg Islamist Speaks of Threat of Attacks in Germany,” June 9, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715919,00.html>.

of the complexities of countering radicalism in Europe.¹⁴⁸ Despite the U.S. Air Force's protection of Kosovo Muslims against Christian Serbs in the 1999 air campaign, the 21-year-old attacker still targeted the unarmed airmen for slaughter. As racial and ethnic tensions rise, Germans fear that cultural intolerance may re-emerge in response to Islamic extremism, despite laws banning hate crimes and speech. The greatest question for German lawmakers is whether the nation will continue to open its doors to Muslim immigrants seeking a better life, or impose the more stringent restrictions sponsored by some conservative groups out of security and economic concerns. German contributions to NATO SOF include the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) and training partnerships with the GSG-9 counter-terror unit of the German Federal Police.

H. TURKEY AND SPAIN: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

Turkey's secular government has a long and bloody history of battling Islamic extremism, terrorism, and insurgent movements. For more than 40 years, Turkish forces have conducted campaigns against groups, such as the ethnic Armenian group ASALA and the Kurdish PKK. In the Defense White Paper 2000, Turkey emphasized its efforts to keep the nation secular and focused on combating any form of extremism within its borders.¹⁴⁹ At the time of publication before the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Turkey urged other nations to match its counter-terror efforts and stated, "at present, it is not possible to say that the international community shows the needed reaction to terrorism."¹⁵⁰ In November 2003, Istanbul suffered two large car bombs that killed the British consul general in addition to 60 others and wounded more than 750 people. In March 2010, Turkish authorities arrested three retired Turkish general officers in connection to this plot, which demonstrates the complex security situation within the nation.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Helen Pidd, "Frankfurt Airport Attack: Police Explore 'Terror Link,'" *Guardian UK*, March 3, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/03/frankfurt-airport-attack-terror-link-explored>.

¹⁴⁹ Turkey Ministry of National Defense, "Defense White Paper," 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵¹ Telegraph UK, "Turkey Generals Accused of Plotting 2003 Istanbul Bombing," March 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/7347026/Turkey-generals-accused-of-plotting-2003-Istanbul-bombing.html>.

To combat radicalism, Turkey has employed efforts to rehabilitate radicalized young men under the “Penitence Law,” which is similar to efforts employed in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵² These efforts are especially critical as public support for western nations is at an all-time low within the Turkish population. Favorable opinions of the United States have decreased from 52% in 2000 to 9% in 2007.¹⁵³ Despite declining public perceptions of western nations within the Muslim world, Turkey’s special operations forces remain a critical and trusted ally in the NATO SOF community.¹⁵⁴ Due to their advanced capabilities and long history of battling asymmetric threats in challenging terrain, Turkish Special Forces were among the first allied partners to join U.S. SOF in Afghanistan in November 2001.¹⁵⁵

Like many other European nations, Spain has battled both domestic and trans-national terrorism. In contrast to the Basque separatist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) attacks typically directed against government installations and prefaced by warnings, a much more violent form of radicalism has migrated from Morocco to threaten the nation. The Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004 killed 192 people and injured more than 2,050 with 10 backpack bombs that detonated nearly simultaneously near the Atocha station.¹⁵⁶ The attack demonstrated modern terror groups’ ability to use terrorism to influence political decisions and elections, which has resulted in a change to the national political leadership and the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Poorly educated members of the North African guest worker community that had not assimilated into Spanish society

¹⁵² Turkey Ministry of National Defense, “Defense White Paper,” 39.

¹⁵³ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved: Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World*, July 23, 2009, <http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/264.pdf>, 1.

¹⁵⁴ Pew Research Center, “Pew Forum: Widespread Negativity: Muslims Distrust Westerners More than Vice Versa,” 2007, <http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Widespread-Negativity-Muslims-Distrust-Westerners-More-than-Vice-Versa.aspx>.

¹⁵⁵ CNN, “Turk Special Forces Boost Alliance,” November 2001, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-01/world/ret.turkey.afghanistan_1_special-forces-kurdish-rebels-turkey?_s=PM:asiapcf.

¹⁵⁶ Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe*, 115.

executed the attack.¹⁵⁷ As Spanish police attempted to arrest the likely plotters of the Madrid attacks, the seven suspects detonated suicide vests and destroyed their apartment building and killed one police officer.¹⁵⁸

Radical groups in Spain have attempted to export terror beyond the nation's borders. In January 2008, Spanish authorities uncovered a terrorist cell in Barcelona that recruited suicide bombers for overseas Jihad.¹⁵⁹ The rise of religious extremism over the past decade has influenced the Spanish public's views of the Muslim community. Forty-one percent of non-Muslim residents responded in polls, "most or many Muslims in their country support extremists like Al Qaeda."¹⁶⁰ The growing animosity, fear, and intolerance of Europe's different ethnic groups serve as a major hurdle to the long-term peace and stability of the continent.

I. SOF DEVELOPMENT IN ADVERSE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The global economic crisis has resulted in strained national defense budgets across NATO, which has resulted in reduced military spending among allies. In 2009, the United States accounted for approximately 68% of all NATO defense expenditures and only Albania, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States met the NATO target of 2% of GDP military spending.¹⁶¹ Despite cuts to military spending over the past several years, most European NATO nations have increased their SOF budgets since they have recognized the utility of these capabilities for a range of domestic and international

¹⁵⁷ Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe*, 116.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 127.

¹⁵⁹ Haahr, "The Growth of Militant Islamist Micro-Diaspora Communities: Observations from Spain," 18.

¹⁶⁰ Pew Research Center, "Pew Forum: Widespread Negativity: Muslims Distrust Westerners More than Vice Versa."

¹⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence" (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, June 2010), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_06/20100610_PR_CP_2010_078.pdf.

purposes.¹⁶² Although training and equipping a SOF operator cost slightly more than supporting an infantry soldier, the tactical flexibility and advanced capabilities of these troops make special operations forces a wise investment.

As a strategic asset capable of implementing national policy, a moderate sized special operations force can provide a much greater economy of force than other assets available to NATO military planners. A European nation can fully outfit a 110-man SOF land force for approximately 13 million euro; a virtual bargain compared to the steep 77 million euro cost of a Eurofighter jet.¹⁶³ With such a high return on minimal investment, NATO partners are protecting SOF budgets during seasons of austerity measures while they slash conventional military funding. While British defense cumulative growth will decrease by 7.5%, the 2010 Spending Review stresses the importance of “enhanced Special Forces capabilities to make the Army more flexible and mobile.”¹⁶⁴ Although SOF are not mentioned specifically in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, the document echoes the spirit of cost efficiency in SOF. The document “commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defense.”¹⁶⁵ If the economic situation of EU and NATO nations deteriorates, political and military leaders will probably continue to see the wisdom of investing in capable special operations forces.

J. AFGHANISTAN: FOSTERING SOF INTEROPERABILITY

Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the U.S. Government rapidly developed a special operations focused response for contingency operations in Afghanistan targeting Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. Within 24 hours of the attacks, the North Atlantic Council took the unprecedeted step of invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite the allocation of large-scale military support from NATO forces

¹⁶² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” June 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_64221.htm?mode=pressrelease.

¹⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study,” 1.

¹⁶⁴ UK HM Treasury, “UK Spending Review” (United Kingdom Government, October 2010), 10, 57.

¹⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” 1.

and the massive conventional capabilities of the U.S. military, the lessons learned from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan dictated a smaller special operations response. Then Colonel John Mulholland, former 5th Special Forces Group Commander, stated, “by the 13th a decision had been made that we would stand up what's called a Joint Special Operations Task Force headquarters [and that] I'd be responsible for conducting unconventional warfare operations in the region.”¹⁶⁶ This rapid decision demonstrated American planners’ confidence in the capabilities and flexibility of special operations in austere environments.

American special operations planners also recognized the diverse capabilities of traditional coalition SOF partners and requested their assistance to augment expeditionary combat operations. The tactical flexibility and small logistic footprint of these units made special operations forces more appealing than conventional forces dedicated to the NATO Reaction Force. Nations contributing some form of special operations capability to the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom included Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, and Turkey.¹⁶⁷ From 2001 to 2007, NATO SOF forces continued to support U.S. SOF forces in Afghanistan in a subordinate role. Since 2007, the NATO SOF linked command in Afghanistan, ISAF SOF, has served as an example of effective, efficient, and rapid multinational command and control during conflict. Within this command, U.S. soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group serve under British and Australian SOF commanders during counter-terror operations. The momentum gained from this “one team, one fight” ethos now extends from remote Afghan villages to cosmopolitan European capitals.

K. THE WAY FORWARD IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Despite the rise of complex and uncertain threats, the NATO Alliance has the most professional, capable, and battle hardened collective special operations forces in its history. Supplemental defense spending over the past decade in many NATO countries

¹⁶⁶ John Mulholland, “Frontline: Campaign Against Terror: Interviews: Colonel John Mulholland,” 2002, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/mulholland.html>.

¹⁶⁷ Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and The European Union*, 10.

has gone a long way to ensure forces have effective combat equipment, improved battlefield medical capabilities, and competitive pay. The challenge to military planners is to ensure these valuable resources, skills, and momentum are not lost as the NATO Alliance faces further austerity measures in the coming decades. To accomplish this goal, NATO SOF is developing centralized training, education, and communication resources to provide common opportunities at reduced expenditures. Chapter V Developing Trusted SOF Networks covers these programs in detail. While common asymmetric threats pose challenges to NATO, this new mission set gives the Alliance a renewed focus and mechanism to foster enhanced special operations interoperability and capacity.

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V. DEVELOPING TRUSTED SOF NETWORKS

A. OVERVIEW

Special operations networks and coalitions cannot ignore trust development until a crisis emerges. Long-term trust relationships contribute to enhanced performance in combined military organizations. Special operations forces (SOF) integration requires seamless communication and interoperability between coalition SOF, interagency partners, and international organizations built upon layers of trusted networks. The 9–11 attacks, Madrid and London bombings, and the extensive financing and recruiting terrorist networks currently operating in Europe create an environment in which trust-based relationships are essential for collective security. Members of the NATO Alliance must refocus efforts on domestic defense against the asymmetric threats described in Chapter IV. Coalition special operations in Afghanistan have increased familiarization and camaraderie rapidly among soldiers, which has achieved the highest degree of cohesion among allied special operations forces since the OSS and FSSF in WWII. This unique occurrence combined with the specter of common asymmetric threats creates an excellent opportunity to achieve long-lasting social ties among NATO SOF soldiers.

The NSHQ fosters the establishment of trust-based relationships among soldiers through various initiatives to develop unity of effort and optimal performance. The command tailors initiatives to the unique antecedent conditions that shape NATO SOF soldiers including historical factors, technology proliferation, and previous interaction in training and combat. The NSHQ describes these collective efforts as the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network. Elements of this network includes establishment of the NATO SOF Training and Educational Program (NSTEP), expansion of the BICES Network, development of SOF social networking tools, and English language training.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ This assessment is based on the author's personal experience with NATO SOF 2007–2011 and from research visits and interviews at NSHQ in Mons, Belgium and NSTEP at Chièvres Air Base, Belgium in February 2011.

The success of NSHQ initiatives will hinge on fostering networked interoperability among the various NATO SOF units and its ability to safeguard NATO allies and partners from asymmetric threats.

B. EUROPEAN SOF ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

Analyzing the establishment of trust networks in NATO SOF requires a study of the antecedent conditions prevalent within European military demographics over the past 30 years. In many ways, the officers and soldiers aged in their mid-30s and below hold different worldviews than previous generations. The remarkable fall of communism in the late 1980s created an unprecedented opportunity for young men and women in Eastern Europe to gain exposure to Western European culture, languages, and travel to foreign nations. Following the end of the Cold War, students in Eastern Europe had the opportunity to study English rather than Russian, mandated under communism. This trend is apparent in young soldiers in nations, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Soldiers born after 1975 are more likely to speak English and have a more “western” outlook than older citizens of their nations.¹⁶⁹ This generation of Eastern European young men and women was just old enough to remember the repression of communism, yet young enough to consider emerging ideas and appreciate the role NATO played in delivering freedom to their nations.¹⁷⁰ During their years under communism, western nations served as beacons of freedom, and were more trusted than their own governments. The domination of communist ideology created what Sztompka describes as “bloc culture,” with the inadvertent decay in public trust.¹⁷¹ Despite the general lack of trust in many aspects of East European society in post Cold War development, trust in national militaries and soldiers remained considerably strong.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Author’s personal observations while living in Europe from 2001 until 2008 and more than 60 interviews conducted in 2011 with NATO SOF members.

¹⁷⁰ Observation derived from round table discussions by the author in Prague, Czech Republic with Czech special operations forces during a combined training event in January–February 2007.

¹⁷¹ Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge UK New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 152.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 44.

Contemporary mid-career officers and enlisted soldiers across NATO SOF completed high school at the beginning of the modern digital age of the mid-1990s. The West Point Class of 1999 was the first class in the military academy's history to have access to the Internet midway through their first year. The class of 2000 had Internet access from the start of its academic classes in August 1996.¹⁷³ These two classes and their peers across NATO were military platoon leaders on September 2001, and are mid-career U.S. Army majors with more than a decade of experience in multinational combat operations. The trend of expanding technology rippled across Europe as students learned to access information from around the world via communal libraries and Internet cafes and communication with cell phones. Although the United States held a considerable advantage in the number of Internet users in 1996, by the dawn of the Global War on Terror five years later, there were more Internet users in the European Union.¹⁷⁴ The phased implementation of the Schengen Agreement between 1995 and 2001 offered the opportunity to travel across Western Europe without border controls, which increased the opportunities for young students and military members to travel and experience other European cultures.¹⁷⁵ When this generation entered service as lieutenants and soldiers of the newly expanded NATO, Balkan peacekeeping missions were the only military operations on the foreseeable horizon. The 9-11 terrorist attacks abruptly altered these young NATO soldiers' brief peacetime service.

The 9-11 attacks shaped American soldiers' global perspectives and military careers, as well as those of their NATO allies.¹⁷⁶ The subsequent attacks in Madrid and London reinforced common irregular threats facing NATO contributing countries and the industrialized societies of the world. For many soldiers, these attacks served as a strong motivation to continue their military service careers; for others, they were rallying calls to join the military. For the next nine years, these generations of digital age warriors

¹⁷³ Author's personal observations while a student at the United States Military Academy.

¹⁷⁴ See Appendix B: Internet; Internet Use Statistics derived from the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default.

¹⁷⁵ European Commission Home Affairs, "Background to Schengen Cooperation," 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm.

¹⁷⁶ Gordon, "NATO after 11 September."

deployed to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and quickly establishing trusted relationships with their coalition partners.¹⁷⁷ From remote regions around the world, these newly trained SOF warriors remained digitally connected with friends, family, and their coalition partners. In Afghanistan, they learned to overcome structural, doctrinal, and bureaucratic challenges to conduct daily combined tactical operations. They forged strong relationships, established long-term trust, and mourned collectively when one of their fellow SOF operators fell in the line of duty.

C. THE EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN NATO

Social theorist Jon Elster described that in a well-functioning group, “duty enjoins us to do what we can rationally will that everyone should do.”¹⁷⁸ In the early stages of the NATO Alliance, members obligated themselves to honor their collective defense commitments if other members were attacked, and trusted their allies to respond in kind. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the lack of a conventional threat to the European homeland. In this changing environment, many European nations took a “rational actor” approach to defense budgets, which meant contributing the minimum amount required to stay active in the alliance.¹⁷⁹ Reduced defense budgets funded development projects and assisted Eastern European infrastructure upgrades. Many NATO nations’ defense expenditures fell to all-time lows below the 2% required under the NATO treaty, and thus, placed trust in the United States to honor security guarantees.¹⁸⁰

Post-Cold War military force reductions altered the structure and composition of European militaries as many European nations transitioned from conscript armies to much smaller professional militaries. Between 1988 and 2003, the combined number of active duty military forces among NATO allies in Europe fell by 43%, whereas United

¹⁷⁷ For a first person perspective of a British junior officer with service in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan see: Patrick Hennessey, *The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars*, vol. 1 (New York: Riverhead Books, 2010).

¹⁷⁸ Jon Elster, “Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action,” *Ethics* 96, no. 1 (October 1985): 136–155.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 142.

¹⁸⁰ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence.”

States troop levels fell by 31%.¹⁸¹ While these numbers appear comparable, significant gaps in the individual training levels and force projection capacity between U.S. and European military forces emerged.¹⁸² During peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO authorized members to determine their own force contributions. This precedent for participation in “out of area” conflicts further encouraged many nations to limit the size and scope of their participation in NATO and contributed to accusations of defense free riding by some NATO partners.¹⁸³ Muller and Opp described the dichotomy of the free rider dilemma “thus what is individually rational is collectively irrational.”¹⁸⁴ Beyond differences in military employment and funding, larger social and political differences began to erode trans-Atlantic unity and trust.¹⁸⁵ Despite these differences, NATO continued to expand eastward, and absorbed new alliance partners with diverse cultures, languages, history, and military capabilities. The lack of identifiable common threats, varying levels of cooperation, and cultural differences created uncertainty over the future of the alliance.¹⁸⁶

Following the 9–11 terrorist attacks, the primary security concerns for NATO members shifted from conventional threats and conduct of peacekeeping missions to fears of asymmetric threats.¹⁸⁷ The attacks demonstrated that traditional deterrence measures would not likely influence non-state actors. Mohamed Atta’s support network revealed European hubs and connections, which prompted many NATO nations to examine their own domestic threats.¹⁸⁸ For the first time since the end of the Cold War, NATO nations appeared unified against common asymmetric threats at home and abroad.

¹⁸¹ Sandell, “Coping with Demography in NATO Europe,” 38.

¹⁸² Ibid., 41.

¹⁸³ David Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

¹⁸⁴ Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,” *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2 (June 1986): 471–488.

¹⁸⁵ Ivo Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?,” *International Affairs* 77, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 553–67.

¹⁸⁶ For an overview of the debate over the future role of NATO in a post Cold War world see: Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Future of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

¹⁸⁷ Gordon, “NATO after 11 September.”

¹⁸⁸ Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe*.

In the years since the 9–11 attacks, themes of uncertain security treats including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and domestic disruptions, appeared in national defense reviews and white papers of NATO Alliance nations.¹⁸⁹

D. TRUST DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

While NATO operations in Afghanistan have been politically controversial in many European nations, the combined effort has achieved the significant development of some trust-based relationships, while negatively influencing other partnerships. U.S. special operations forces, specifically the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), assisted in the establishment, development, and training of many European SOF forces, which created close working relationships and personal bonds. While U.S. military planners had respect for tactical SOF units across NATO, these planners did not hold equivalent confidence and trust in the capabilities of the NATO Alliance to wage an unconventional war.¹⁹⁰

Strategists planned initial military operations in Afghanistan upon custom designed special operations frameworks intended to maximize trusted partners' capabilities rather than NATO hierarchical structures. In a *New York Times* editorial in late September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld summarized this belief that "the mission will define the coalition - not the other way around."¹⁹¹ Special operations units with trusted reputations and pre-existing working relationships with U.S. forces received invitations to participate in the coalition, while American planners politely declined unvetted forces' offers of support. During the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. forces requested support from trusted special operations allies including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Many early SOF operations in Afghanistan employed principles of network centric warfare advocated by defense strategists John Arquilla using small "hunter networks" to collect information regarding enemy situation and disposition in real

¹⁸⁹ See Appendix A: Views on security noted in national defense reviews and white papers.

¹⁹⁰ Gordon, "NATO after 11 September."

¹⁹¹ Donald Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War," *New York Times*, September 27, 2001, <http://www.tep-online.info/laku/usa/news/27rums.html>.

time.”¹⁹² From remote outposts, SOF leaders conducted daily video teleconferences with senior leadership halfway around the world that allowed rapid approval and feedback during key operations.¹⁹³ Between 2001 and 2007, combined coalition SOF operations expanded to include valuable participation from many NATO SOF nations.

Many of the ongoing NATO SOF initiatives began in 2007, which initiated an ambitious period of special operations capacity and network infrastructure development across the alliance. By the spring of 2007, the International Security and Assistance Force Special Operations (ISAF SOF) coordination element reached initial operating capacity in Afghanistan. By summer 2007, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) emerged out of the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and established offices at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. Both organizations advocated SOF interoperability, network connectivity, and harnessing the significant camaraderie and trust developed during previous Afghanistan combined operations. While most U.S. SOF units in Afghanistan remained under the American led Operation Enduring Freedom, Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) from 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (1-10th SFG) based in Germany deployed to support ISAF SOF. While serving as the Special Operations Command-Europe Commander, Rear Admiral McRaven performed a significant demonstration of trust in coalition special operations capabilities by placing his American special forces under foreign leadership for the first time in the conflict. Following these commitments, 1-10th SFG personnel reported to British and Australian SAS flag officers and served key staff positions in the ISAF SOF headquarters.¹⁹⁴ A case study in Chapter VI of this report outlines 1-10th SFG’s contributions to NATO SOF integration. Many of these early initiatives achieved significant progress in standardizing coalition contributions, which set the stage for subsequent efforts focused on increasing special operations capacity, network infrastructure, and enhanced partnership.

¹⁹² John Arquilla, *It Takes a Network: On Countering Terrorism While Reforming the Military* (U.S. Congress, 2008), http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC091808/Arquilla_Testimony091808.pdf.

¹⁹³ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*.

¹⁹⁴ This observation is based on the author’s exposure to ISAF SOF organizational structure in Afghanistan in July 2007.

E. THE ALLIED AND PARTNER COLLABORATIVE NETWORK

The NSHQ describes its multifaceted approach to developing SOF interoperability and cooperation as the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network with a mandate “to create an enduring Allied and Partner SOF community of interest anchored by personal relationships which assure loyalty and trust.”¹⁹⁵ While many network initiatives focus on technological means, the Collaborative Network relies on an investment in human capital by leveraging personal relationships established between special operations soldiers to solidify unit trust and cooperation.¹⁹⁶ Initiatives supporting these goals include expanding the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) network, establishing the NATO SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP), investment in English language training, and developing a special operations social networking web portal. These initiatives attempt to take a multi-faceted approach to build upon combat camaraderie and establish long-term trusted relationships to improve special operations performance and enhance security for NATO contributing nations.

F. THE NATO SOF BICES NETWORK:

The key development facilitating NATO SOF interoperability and intelligence sharing was the expansion of the NATO Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). The expansion of the network began in 2007 as the newly established NSCC recognized deficiencies in the existing classified communication infrastructure linking allied partners. These network structures lacked sufficient resources and available connections to tactical level units. Most NATO SOF units relied on unclassified e-mail and phone lines for most communication between units.¹⁹⁷ NATO special operations leaders relied on preexisting personal relationships established during

¹⁹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner Collaborative Network (APCN).”

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Alan Dron, “Special Network—Alliance Aims to Improve Cooperation among Special Operators,” September 1, 2009, <http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=4211503>.

exercises and deployments, or mutual contacts captured in Rolodexes and business card books to exchange information. These methods of communication were incapable of supporting the rapid flow of information required to support combined operations.

As NATO special operations visionaries, such as then-Rear Admiral McRaven, outlined requirements for enhanced network connectivity, identifying the most efficient infrastructure became a top priority within the organization. To address limitations in network capability, an implementation team evaluated the feasibility of linking special operations units around the world through a comprehensive NATO all channel communication network.¹⁹⁸ Rather than establish a new network, the implementation team recommended expanding the BICES intelligence network.¹⁹⁹ The initial version of the enhanced network provided secure e-mail, phone, and limited video teleconference capability in addition to the preexisting limited intelligence sharing capabilities. Subsequent upgrades to the network included full motion video linked to air platforms, intelligence tools linking national level and NATO fusion centers, advanced targeting functions, access to biometrics, and geo imagery.²⁰⁰

Once a robust BICES network infrastructure began to emerge, the implementation team researched methods to connect the network safely to other alliance systems to facilitate information sharing. These efforts resulted in “cross domain solutions” that facilitate integration with NATO and U.S. secure networks.²⁰¹ With these advanced capabilities, the NATO SOF BICES network can serve as a mechanism to overlap pre-existing bonds among users and link expanded networks of national level inter-agency partners and partner countries. Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter’s research focuses on this dynamic to show how strong and weak bonds between individuals can expand to link extended communities of associates.²⁰² The NSHQ worked to establish NATO SOF

¹⁹⁸ Dron, “Special Network—Alliance Aims to Improve Cooperation Among Special Operators.”

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Briefing slides and interview by author of COL Stu Bradin, NSHQ Chief of Staff, October 2010.

²⁰¹ Gary Brundidge, “AFCEA Cyber Symposium: Interview with BG Brundidge,” November 8, 2010, <http://voices.mysanantonio.com/afcea/2010/11/>.

²⁰² Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited.”

BICES as the central hub for communication on emerging domestic and international threats and a mechanism to capture relationships and interoperability established in Afghanistan.

The NSHQ will continue to expand BICES Network capabilities with more than \$7 million dollars dedicated over the next five years to research and development initiatives.²⁰³ Recent upgrades to the network provide mobile access to the network through encrypted satellite links and deployable Mobile Expandable Container Configurations that provide communications centers that can rapidly deploy via small aircraft to remote regions of the world. Within four years, the NATO SOF Headquarters greatly enhanced the ability of its subordinate commands to communicate, collaborate, and develop long-term trusted personal and professional networks effectively. While the BICES Network greatly enhances special operations intelligence sharing, enhanced security protocols are essential to mitigate the mishandling of classified information. Any careless mishandling of intelligence or diplomatic correspondence could severely compromise ongoing combined special operations, and thus, requires common vigilance to approved data safe guarding practices

The recent security breach of U.S. classified reports and diplomatic cables and subsequent posting on the Wikileaks website demonstrated the damage one nefarious network user could inflict.²⁰⁴ To mitigate this threat, the NSHQ has established common protocols for vetting potential network users and safeguarding the network infrastructure. The BICES network's cross domain solutions eliminate requirements to "air gap" or manually copy and move classified data via writable media between networks, which eliminates a security weakness exploited by Manning.²⁰⁵ Although no classified system can be impervious to potential compromise, prudent implementation of established security rules and practices will ensure BICES can continue to serve as the hub of an

²⁰³ United States Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Appropriations for International Intelligence Technology Assessment, Advancement & Integration*, 2010.

²⁰⁴ David Cloud, "Soldier in Wiki Leaks Case Charged with Aiding the Enemy," *Los Angeles Times*, March 3, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/03/nation/la-na-wikileaks-manning-20110303>.

²⁰⁵ Dron, "Special Network -Alliance Aims to Improve Cooperation Among Special Operators."

expanding network of trusted global partners. This initiative and other emerging technologies may give NATO SOF greater protection from potential cyber-attacks like those conducted against Estonia in 2007.²⁰⁶




Figure 6. NATO SOF BICES Network Capabilities²⁰⁷

G. MAINTAINING MOMENTUM THROUGH EDUCATION

The NATO SOF Training and Educational Program (NSTEP) is another important component of the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network.²⁰⁸ NSTEP classes prepare NATO SOF soldiers and staff for operations in Afghanistan, improve performance and capabilities in future “out of area” contingency missions, and field emerging technology capable of improving networked interoperability. NSTEP academic campus construction began in 2009 at Chievres Air Base, 19 kilometers from the NATO

²⁰⁶ BBC News, “Estonia Hit by ‘Moscow Cyber War,’ May 17, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm>.

²⁰⁷ Diagram used by permission from the NATO SOF Headquarters-Mons, Belgium, prepared for Chief of Staff PowerPoint briefing, October 2010.

²⁰⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “NSHQ APCN,” 2011, <http://www.nscc.bices.org/page/APCN/>.

Headquarters in Mons, Belgium.²⁰⁹ The new campus incorporates emerging technology and network communications to link students with forces currently conducting operations in Afghanistan and global SOF partners. Each of the campus' 10 classrooms contains computer workstations for all students connected to the BICES network and advanced military planning software.²¹⁰ Returning students train their units on these platforms. Of the 14 primary courses taught at the NSTEP campus, only one, the ISAF SOF Operations Course, specifically focuses on the NATO role in Afghanistan.²¹¹ Classroom instruction in the other 13 courses attempts to harness students' experience in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and other contingencies. The courses build on previous experience to prepare students for future combined special operations to combat emerging threats or provide military assistance to developing nations.²¹²

NATO SOF Training and Education Program curriculum constantly evolves to ensure instruction supports ongoing operations. The instructor cadre has considerable tactical experience and frequently conducts Afghanistan site visits to ensure instruction remains relevant. Many instructors and staff members attended the Defense Analysis Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, which gave them a common academic foundation and access to a worldwide graduate network sharing recent lessons learned in combat.²¹³ Most courses last several weeks and created conditions for students to establish relationships rapidly during courses. Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler describe this form of trust development in temporary systems as "swift trust."²¹⁴ This rapid socialization can serve as building blocks to establishing long-term trust in colleagues as they maintain future communication through social networking sites, e-mail, classified

²⁰⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Training and Educational Program (NSTEP), "NSHQ 2011 Course Catalog" (NATO SOF Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, 2011).

²¹⁰ Author's personal observations from NSTEP Campus site visit and auditing of four classes, February 2011.

²¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Training and Educational Program (NSTEP), "NSHQ 2011 Course Catalog."

²¹² Derived from interviews conducted by author in Chievres, Belgium with NATO SOF Headquarters staff; February 2011.

²¹³ Authors visit to NSTEP Campus on Chievres Air Base, Belgium; February 2011.

²¹⁴ Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler, *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 167.

networks, and cooperation in training and deployments. Each time a student attends a course, that student becomes a link in formal and informal networks, further expanding cooperation and organizational trust.




Figure 7. NSTEP Course Offerings²¹⁵

H. BENEFITS OF COMMON LANGUAGE

The complexity and intimacy of special operations requires members of combined operations to communicate through a common language effectively. To promote common language capabilities across NATO special operations, the NSTEP campus conducts all training in English. Most courses offered require prospective students to achieve level

²¹⁵ Diagram provided to author by the NATO SOF Headquarters-Mons, Belgium, which was prepared by LTC Peterson, October 2010.

three-language proficiency and demonstrate technical writing capabilities.²¹⁶ NSTEP language requirements advance a broader NSHQ goal to achieve common language proficiency across all NATO SOF units. While the NATO SOF BICES network includes translation tools to facilitate multinational communication, the intricate nature of military communications and intelligence products dictates that users preferably share common language capabilities. The formal establishment of English as the mandated international language of aviation in 2008 further emphasized the necessity of precise language skills as SOF operators coordinated close air support with English-speaking allied pilots near population centers and troop concentrations.²¹⁷ When soldiers and civilians lives are at risk, coalition partners reading or listening to dispatches must trust the accuracy of reports. While progress has been made in this initiative through English language training funded by the United States at units' home stations, much work must be done to overcome lagging English language skills in emerging NATO partners in Eastern Europe.²¹⁸ Younger European soldiers' exposure to the Voice of America, United States Armed Forces Radio Europe, American movies and television, the Internet, and participation in multinational military operations have contributed to enhanced English language skills.²¹⁹

I. SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOCIAL NETWORKING

While the tactical requirements for common language capability in small units are essential, language also influences the levels of trust between associates. Colleagues sharing face-to-face communication are more likely to make astute trust assessments.²²⁰ Within combined SOF operations, soldiers who can communicate without the assistance of an interpreter form personal bonds, share intimate conversations, and maintain future

²¹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Training and Educational Program (NSTEP), "NSHQ 2011 Course Catalog," 2010.

²¹⁷ "International Civil Aviation Organization," 2011, <http://www.icao.int/>.

²¹⁸ Author's personal observations while conducting combined training exercises and military operations with Eastern European militaries from 2006–2008 and exposure to U.S. Embassy Prague language training programs in the Czech Republic.

²¹⁹ David Crystal, *English as a Global Language*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²²⁰ Ostrom, *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research*.

correspondence via e-mail and social networking.²²¹ The senior leadership of the NSHQ recognizes the power of social networking to harness and strengthen pre-existing relationships, which is directing the establishment of a NATO SOF specific social networking web portal. With a working title of SOF Net, the portal has an anticipated beta version unveiling in April 2011.²²² The portal will include tools to capture the “swift trust” networks established during NSTEP courses. As students attend future classes, they enroll in collaborative forums with classmates and remain linked following their return to their units. Other functions will include online collaborative forums to conduct unclassified discussions concerning recent experiences during deployments, doctrine development, and resources to facilitate combined training events between coalition SOF partners.

The unclassified NATO special operations SOF Net social networking site under development can serve as a gateway to increase online participation on classified networks. Conversations and relationships that emerge on the social networking site can transition to classified forums to ensure operational security when exchanging recent combat experience, sharing emerging intelligence, or planning upcoming training. To achieve seamless transition between SOF Net and BICES, the unclassified social networking site should mirror BICES network layout and basic functions. As soldiers navigate through the unclassified portal, they gain familiarity with the collaborative tools available on BICES portals. This gateway structure is similar to the mirrored layout of the U.S. Army Knowledge Online (AKO) unclassified and classified versions.²²³ Additional functions will include unclassified e-mail, chat, and white page functions. These tools will allow users to reconnect with other NATO SOF soldiers they have met during courses, deployments, training, or through mutual acquaintances.

²²¹ Assessment made from the author’s participation in multinational military operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009, as well as ongoing survey research of more than 225 NATO SOF soldiers.

²²² Derived from author’s discussions with NATO SOF Headquarters Knowledge Management personnel, Mons, Belgium, February 2011.

²²³ United States Army Knowledge Online, “AKO Login,” 2011, <https://www.us.army.mil>.

The NATO special operations SOF Net social networking site would perform similar to West-Point.org, a privately funded portal started in 1996 by a graduate linking his former classmates and Vietnam War comrades. The site rapidly grew to offer a wealth of services connecting nearly 30,000 graduates, parents, and friends of all West Point classes.²²⁴ The site provides relevant news, an online eulogy forum, e-mail accounts, web portals, and a living history project that captures graduates' combat and life experiences.²²⁵ The success of this site demonstrates the power of not only linking military colleagues but also the extended network of friends and family. The U.S. military has stressed the importance of forging social networks among military spouses during the past decade of prolonged military deployments. Many tactical military battalions now have a full-time paid family readiness coordinator on staff working with company and level volunteer spouses to give military commanders a structured method to disseminate pertinent information to family members quickly.

As social networking tools grow, many of these formal and informal spouse networks span large geographic distances and military structures. In one example of the power of these networks during the Japanese earthquake in March 2011, military spouses stationed in coastal communities in California and Hawaii were alerted in the middle of the night by text messages from a spouse stationed in Germany watching reports of potential Tsunami warnings in the Pacific on television.²²⁶ The wives formed strong bonds during a previous assignment when their spouses frequently deployed and the women volunteered as family readiness coordinators. While constructing social networking initiatives, the NSHQ should consider the powerful dynamic of linking military spouses, especially during combined deployments. Similar to efforts connecting NATO SOF service members, these potential social networking efforts will have to explore options to overcome language barriers and military information confidentiality protocols.

²²⁴ West-Point.org, "West-Point.org, The West Point Connection," 2011, <http://www.west-point.org>.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Author's review of text message communications among military spouses spanning 12 time zones concerning potential tsunami danger before local news reported warnings, March 11, 2011.

An analysis of Internet growth across Europe from 1991 to 2008 indicates that sufficient Internet saturation across NATO contributing nations has occurred to facilitate widespread participation in online social networking.²²⁷ The phased introduction of the Internet beginning in Western Europe and spreading eastward indicates that some older soldiers from these regions will be less likely to use these tools than their younger colleagues or western peers. The rapid advancement of technology across Europe and the rest of the world will likely render these demographic differences obsolete within the next decade.




Figure 8. NSHQ SOF Net Special Operations Social Networking Portal²²⁸

²²⁷ See Appendix B: Internet Use in NATO Contributing Nations, compiled by the author from data obtained through The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default.

²²⁸ NATO SOF Headquarters, SOFNet Login Portal, <https://aaa.nshq.nato.int/vpn/tmindex.html>, 2011.

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VI. COMMON THEMES IN NATO SOF DEVELOPMENT

A. CZECH REPUBLIC: EASTERN EUROPE SOF DEVELOPMENT

The Czech Republic's 601st Special Forces typifies the transition of former Eastern Bloc airborne units to modern special operations units. These units transitioned from centralized command and control structures during the Cold War to structures with empowered subordinate leadership in current conflicts. The 601st Special Forces traces its lineage to 1952, when it was a Czechoslovakian airborne brigade in Presov, which moved to Prostějov in 1960.²²⁹ In 1969, the brigade reorganized into a regimental structure with one airborne battalion and two airborne recon companies. In 1976, the unit adopted a “diversion” mission of sabotage and harassment attacks in enemy rear echelons. As the Cold War ended, the unit took on the additional missions of long-range reconnaissance and deep penetration.

In 1995, the unit reorganized as the 6th Special Brigade and adopted NATO standards in preparation for entrance into the Alliance.²³⁰ In 1998, the Czech Army created an independent Special Forces Company within the brigade. The company experimented with new training methods, specialized equipment, standards, and personnel policies. The Special Forces Company selected unit members based on their performance and ability to assist in NATO special operations interoperability initiatives, such as English language training and specialized courses. In 2002, then Lieutenant Colonel Ondrej Palenik assumed command of the newly expanded 601st Special Forces Group (601st SFG) and initiated a series of reorganization initiatives that expanded the unit's capabilities.²³¹ The former Special Forces Company dispersed throughout the

²²⁹ Czech Army 601st SFG, “Official Pages of 601st Special Forces Group,” 2011, <http://www.601skss.cz/english/history.html>.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Former 601st SFG commander Ondrej Palenik has held the position as the head of Czech Military Intelligence since 2007 at the current rank of Lieutenant General.

601st SFG to ensure a distribution of experience and best practices in 2003.²³² The same year, the unit completed the transition to NATO special operations interoperability standards.

Under the innovative leadership of Ondrej Palenik, the 601st SFG initiated a systematic development plan that directly contributed to the unit's rapid transition into a prominent NATO special operations partner. As the unit grew, it retained significant autonomy to develop unit structures, tactics, and selection procedures.²³³ This autonomy empowered senior leadership to hand select trusted subordinate leaders who enforced high unit performance standards. Once selected, early 601st SFG senior leaders empowered lower echelon leaders and soldiers to experiment with "bottom up" development within the Special Forces Coys (companies) that expanded identified best practices across the unit. Upon returning from a successful company deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom VI in 2006, the 601st SFG dispersed returning combat-proven junior leaders across the 601st SFG to ensure distribution of exceptional talent and experience.²³⁴ Similar to other NATO special operations units, the 601st SFG selected subsequent unit members following rigorous tests of physical aptitude and psychological testing. An exceptionally innovative and gifted non-commissioned officer, who developed a screening profile for soldiers who "would be fit to go for any mission," led the selection team.²³⁵ Unit selection events frequently selected fewer than 5% of the recruits that tried out for the unit, while adhering to the truth that "SOF cannot be mass produced."²³⁶

Unit cohesion and partnership development took a central role in the 601st SFG's development, and created structures and policies that contributed to effective unit

²³² Czech Army 601st SFG, "Official Pages of 601st Special Forces Group."

²³³ Information derived from author's interviews with members of the Czech 601st SFG, February–April 2011.

²³⁴ Account is derived from interviews with Czech 601st SFG unit members between February and May 2011.

²³⁵ Author's interviews with members of the Czech 601st SFG, February–May 2011.

²³⁶ Reference to one of the "SOF truths" common in special operations units across NATO. Selection percentages in the 601st SFG provided to the author by current unit members during conversations between February and May 2011.

performance through years of evolution. Unlike former Communist era policies favoring party insiders, the unit evolved as a meritocracy that selected leaders with high levels of demonstrated work ethic and merit. The 601st SFG embraced airborne and reconnaissance unit lineage while creating new Special Forces specific traditions to form enhanced camaraderie within the unit. To expand tactical skills and unit readiness levels, the 601st SFG conducted partnership training with U.S. Army Special Forces and United Kingdom SAS during its unit development.²³⁷ In addition to its NATO allies, the 601st SFG benefited from unit training with the Czech National Police's domestic counter-terror unit established in 1981, the *Útvar rychlého nasazení* (URN).²³⁸ Beyond unit partnerships, the 601st deployed soldiers to international training courses, such as the U.S. Army Ranger School, Special Forces qualification and medical courses, and the International SOF Training Center (ISTC) in Pfullendorf, Germany. In addition to military training, the unit encourages advanced civil schooling as well. More than 27% of the soldiers in the unit hold university degrees.²³⁹ These investments in training and education assisted the unit in increasing unit capacity and preparing for increased participation in NATO contingency operations.

Between 2002 and 2009, the Czech Military Police developed another special operations unit in Prague; the Special Operations Group (SOG) focused on domestic counter-terrorism and overseas close protection details. The unit consisted of former police members, and some Army soldiers. During the units' existence, it deployed to Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and the Balkans and participated in one Joint Combined Executed Training (JCET) with U.S. special operations. U.S. efforts to assist the development of the new unit diverted monetary assistance, partnership training, and some SOF-specific equipment from the 601st SFG until the Czech Army disbanded the SOG in

²³⁷ The 601st SFG conducted eight Joint Combined Executed Training (JCET) events with U.S. Army Special Forces detachments between 1998 and 2011.

²³⁸ "Policie České republiky - Útvar rychlého nasazení - Policie České republiky," 2011, <http://www.policie.cz/clanek/utvar-rychleho-nasazeni-policie-ceske-republiky-utvar-rychleho-nasazeni.aspx>.

²³⁹ Czech Army 601st SFG, "601st Special Forces Group Official Website," 2011, <http://www.601skss.cz/english/training.html>.

2009.²⁴⁰ Following the SOG's disbanding, officials distributed the unit's equipment to several Czech military units. Some of the equipment went to the 601st SFG to fill outstanding requirements. The unit overcame other limitations through the unit commander's persistence, prudent equipment acquisitions, and steady growth using systematic processes.

The Czech 601st Special Forces Group's evolution enabled the unit transition from a former Eastern Bloc organization and tactics to a vital special operations partner in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.²⁴¹ The unit serves as an example of a special operations unit structured to assimilate into NATO structure, develop unit cohesion, and partner with allies to combat common threats. The 601st SFG's solid combat performance in Iraq and Afghanistan validated the systematic methods employed during the unit's development, which indicates that the unit will continue to evolve to meet asymmetric threats.

B. GERMAN SOF DEVELOPMENT: BENEFITS OF PROXIMITY

Forward presence of American SOF in Germany directly facilitated the development of German special operations capability. Elements of the U.S. Army 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) occupied Flint Kaserne in the Alpine village of Bad Tolz in 1953. Its Cold war mission was to conduct guerilla warfare behind enemy lines.²⁴² In 1968, the unit redeployed the 10th Group headquarters and much of the unit to Fort Devens, Massachusetts. The 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (1-10th SFG) remained forward deployed in Bad Tolz. Following the end of the Cold War, 1-10th SFG's primary mission shifted to out of area contingency operations. In 1991, the U.S. Army moved the 1-10th SFG to a WWII era German tank post, Panzer Kaserne, in the Stuttgart suburb of Boeblingen. The move placed the unit within proximity of

²⁴⁰ Information is derived from the author's conversations with former members of the Czech SOG between 2007 and 2008 and current members of the 601st SFG between February and May 2011.

²⁴¹ Elements of the 601st SFG deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004, 2006, and 2008–2009 for three 6-month deployments. During OEF deployments, the unit fielded independent 100–120 man task forces including approximately 50 special operation operators and 50–70 support and staff personnel.

²⁴² U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "10th SFG(A) History," 2011, <http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/10thSFGA/10thSFG%20History.html>.

Stuttgart Army Airfield, an asset required for rapid deployment not available in Bad Tolz. In addition to 1-10th SFG, the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Unit-2 established a small compound to house rotating SEAL units on Panzer Kaserne

In 1994, the German government requested assistance from Belgian para-commandos to evacuate 12 German citizens from Rwanda. Germany lacked a force capable of conducting rapid operations outside of German borders.²⁴³ This event triggered the German government to consider development of an out of area deployable special operations capability to augment the Federal Police's GSG-9 unit near Bonn.²⁴⁴ On September 20, 1996, the newly formed Kommando *Spezialkräfte* (KSK) replaced the 25 Luftlande "Swarzwald" Brigade-25 at Graf-Zeppelin-Kaserne in the village of Calw. The political decision to locate the unit 25 kilometers away from Panzer Kaserne created positive conditions for unit partnership with U.S. SOF. From its establishment in Calw, the KSK formed close bonds with the three Special Forces companies in Boeblingen, and shared some resources and conducted combined training.

Regularly scheduled partnership training has enabled the KSK and U.S. SOF to share valuable experience gained in global contingency operations over the past decade.²⁴⁵ Training typically occurs at the Panzer Kaserne urban combat training center or the KSK's *Ausbildungs-und Versuchszentrum* (AVZ) training center.²⁴⁶ Partnership with U.S. SOF and priority funding and manning allowed the unit to establish itself as one of the foremost special operations units in the world. In 15 years, the unit has grown to nearly 1,300 soldiers with a full range of SOF capabilities. Partnership extended beyond training as both units invited delegations to military balls, changes of command, and encouraged off hours socializing. Many U.S. special operations soldiers' families live in

²⁴³ German Federal Ministry of Defence-Heer (Army), "History of the KSK, German Heer," 2011, <http://www.deutschsheer.de>.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ The KSK and 1st-10th SFG additionally supported peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and frequently supported efforts to find and capture persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWIC).

²⁴⁶ German Federal Ministry of Defence-Heer (Army), "History of the KSK, German Heer."

the same communities as their KSK comrades and some have married German spouses, and thus, gained valuable cultural awareness, language skills, and social networks in the Stuttgart community.

The relationship between U.S. SOF and the KSK demonstrate the benefits of U.S. SOF persistent forward presence. Beyond the German KSK, 1-10th SFG sponsorship and training contributed to initial SOF development in Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, and assisted other emerging special operations forces. Forward presence in Europe assists U.S. SOF as well. Forward deployed American SOF soldiers are typically better prepared to immerse themselves in a foreign culture and have a greater understanding of NATO policy and doctrine than their continental U.S. counterparts. These soldiers are more likely to hold personal relationships with NATO SOF soldiers through previous combined training, schooling, or friendships established during off-duty socializing and travel. These relationships serve as valuable social capital when conducting partnership operations or liaison duty. These relationships continue to improve partner unit capacity and interoperability, as witnessed by the KSK's emergence as one of the best special operations units in the world

C. THE “NORWAY MODEL” AN EMERGING SOF BLUEPRINT

Norwegian SOF has earned a reputation for exceptional volunteerism and professionalism in global conflicts. Norway is unique as a charter member of NATO, although twice voting to reject membership in the European Union.²⁴⁷ This unique relationship encouraged Norway to pursue its active role in the alliance as a mechanism for achieving national security and defense goals. The proud history of Norwegian special operations soldiers dating back to World War II demonstrated the economy of force benefits of SOF in combined operations, and especially in austere environments.²⁴⁸ This lineage set the example for the active participation and steady employment of

²⁴⁷ Norway’s Mission to the European Union, “Norway and the European Union,” 2011, <http://www.eu-norway.org/eu/>. Note: The Norwegian population voted to reject European Union membership in 1972 and 1994, which resulted in 52% against EU membership and 48% in favor during the last vote in 1994.

²⁴⁸ Norwegian Armed Forces, “Historie,” 2011, <http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/historie/Sider/historie.aspx>.

Norwegian SOF in NATO operations. This elevated level of participation beyond many other NATO allies has earned NORSOF influence, and increased representation within NATO SOF and forward deployed commands, such as ISAF SOF.²⁴⁹ Special operations leaders typically refer to a “Norway model” in recognition of ambitious NORSOF participation in combined operations and command structures.²⁵⁰ This model serves as an example that emerging SOF units can pursue to secure influence and respectability within the SOF community through consistent performance and reliable partnership.

In addition to participation in contingency operations, Norway has pursued special operations training and education efforts aggressively. Norway has taken a leading role in assisting its NATO allies prepare for potential cold weather contingency operations through a series of annual training exercises near the Arctic Circle. Operation Cold Response 2010 drew more than 8,500 soldiers from 14 nations.²⁵¹ Beyond exercises, NORSOF soldiers and officers routinely attend partner military training courses and advanced schooling. These efforts have built an educated corps of SOF leaders while generating an impressive collection of SOF specific literature and thesis work.²⁵² NORSOF operators’ advanced technical skills, academic background, and fluency in the English language have made the unit a strong partner in combined operations. NORSOF took an active role in operations in the Balkans, was among the first NATO allies to deploy to Afghanistan in 2001, and played a central role in security operations in Kabul province under ISAF SOF in recent years.²⁵³

²⁴⁹ Authors observation of NATO SOF and ISAF SOF command infrastructure from 2007 to 2011, as well as interviews with Norwegian officers within both structures in 2011.

²⁵⁰ NORSOF development as a model for emerging SOF was cited routinely by senior leaders and soldiers across NATO SOF units during the author’s interviews conducted between February and May 2011.

²⁵¹ United States Navy, “Navy Special Forces Support Cold Response 2010,” March 2010, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52108.

²⁵² Previous NORSOF thesis work at the Naval Postgraduate School has been widely circulated within NATO SOF. Examples include Mellingen, “Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces”; Petter Hellese, “Counterinsurgency and its Implications for The Norwegian Special Operations Forces” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Hellesen.pdf.

²⁵³ Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and The European Union*.

Several emerging NATO SOF units have attempted to emulate the “Norway Model” through increased participation in coalition operations. Lithuania has attempted to emulate Norway and establish itself as a SOF leader in the Baltic region. Similar to Norway, Lithuania has a proud history of special operations dating to the “Forrest Brothers” partisan forces of WWII and the Cold War.²⁵⁴ The Lithuanian military created its first Special Forces unit in 1995 to give the nation additional capacity against asymmetric threats.²⁵⁵ In 2002, Lithuania joined NATO along with Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia.²⁵⁶ The same year, Lithuania created a unified special operations command designated the Special Operations Unit (SOU) and deployed its first elements to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.²⁵⁷ As the unit developed its capabilities, LITHSOF participated in a number of combined training exercises including Shamrock Key, Cold Response, and co-hosted the Jackal Stone exercise with Poland in 2010.²⁵⁸ In addition to partnership exercises and capability development, LITHSOF combat operations in Kandahar Province since 2007 have earned the unit a solid reputation among its NATO allies.²⁵⁹

The ambitious LITHSOF pursuit of influence within NATO SOF has not come without challenges. The relatively small size of LITHSOF has resulted in high operational tempo to fulfill force allocation goals comparable to other partners with high deployment rates. The cumulative effect of nine years of deployments has resulted in reduced family time, limited opportunities for individual schooling, and fatigue in some

²⁵⁴ Juozas Daumantas, *Forest Brothers: The Account of an Anti-Soviet Lithuanian Freedom Fighter, 1944–1948* (New York: Central European University Press, 2009).

²⁵⁵ “Lithuanian Armed Forces: Structure-Special Forces,” 2011, http://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/structure_1469/special_forces.html.

²⁵⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Lithuania,” 2011, <http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania.htm>.

²⁵⁷ “Lithuanian Armed Forces: Structure, Special Forces.”

²⁵⁸ United States European Command, “Ceremony Kicks off Jackal Stone 2010 Special Operations Forces Exercise in Poland,” September 24, 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Ceremony-kicks-Jackal-Stone-2010-Special-Forces>.

²⁵⁹ “President of the Republic of Lithuania,” June 12, 2010, http://www.president.lt/en/press_center/press_releases/the_president_no_matter_how_far_from_your_homeland_you_serve_you_protect_the_interests_of_lithuania.html.

LITHSOF and other NATO SOF units.²⁶⁰ Despite these limitations, the “Norway Model” serves as a valid mechanism for emerging nations seeking to gain increased influence, trust, and respect within the NATO SOF community.

D. TASK FORCE-10: TACTICAL LEVEL SOF PARTNERSHIP

By the spring of 2007, “B” Company, 1st Battalion 10th SFG (1-10th SFG), was one of the few U.S. Special Forces companies that had not deployed as an Area Operational Base (AOB) to tactical operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The unit’s dedication to SOCEUR regional contingency plans previously prevented deployment with the remainder of 10th SFG to operations in Iraq. Although the company headquarters had not deployed, many of its soldiers and subordinate leaders had previous combat experience with other units. Several combined training exercises honed the unit’s tactical skills and NATO SOF interoperability.²⁶¹ The unit was well trained and eager to contribute to ongoing combat operations. At a conference in Mons, Belgium in June 2007, the former SOCEUR Commander and NSCC Director Rear Admiral McRaven, outlined his plan to deploy the company to Afghanistan under the ISAF SOF mission. Initially, the unit would fill a six-month gap in NORSOF deployments in Regional Command-Central. This allocation served as a significant demonstration of trust in coalition SOF capabilities by placing U.S. special operations forces under ISAF SOF leadership for the first time in the conflict. The effort attempted to improve NATO SOF interoperability by infusing the Stuttgart-based U.S. Special Forces into the organization’s tactical operations as Special Operations Task Force-10 in honor of the 10th SFG.²⁶²

Under the ISAF SOF structure, the Task Force-10 contingent would report to British and Australian officers and fill vacant staff positions, while all other U.S. SOF

²⁶⁰ Comment based on author’s interviews with NATO SOF soldiers from February to May 2011.

²⁶¹ “B” Company, 1-10th SFG conducted a series of pre-mission training events with NATO SOF partners including combined training at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany and a series of combined training exercises with Eastern European SOF partners.

²⁶² Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) under ISAF SOF typically are assigned numeric designations. An initial assessment team in the summer of 2007 chose the name in honor of the simultaneous deployments of 10th SFG forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, and Europe, as well as emphasizing the small elements daunting task to sustain itself independent of CJSOTF logistic channels.

remained under the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom.²⁶³ The men of 1-10th SFG were ideal candidates for this mission. The unit had developed long-running unit partnerships across Europe from the early 1950s. Many of the unit's initial members were native-born Eastern European partisan fighters from WWII, who were allowed entry into the U.S. Army by the Lodge Act of 1950. These early foreign-born Green Berets were among the first soldiers to carry unit challenge coins to serve as a "bona fides" of their status as 10th Group soldiers, despite their heavily accented speech.²⁶⁴ Following the end of the Cold War, the unit's forward deployed mission shifted to developing Eastern European special operations capacity. In this role, the battalion assisted in SOF capability development in Romania and Hungary over the past decade. These partnerships became a key element of subsequent combined deployments. The lineage of foreign-born soldiers in the battalion continues through present day with a higher percentage of East European emigrants in the unit than other Special Forces units. These cultural ties, military partnerships, and geographic proximity directly contributed to the development of significant trust and influence with NATO SOF units.

While the men and leadership of 1-10th SFG eagerly welcomed the potential deployment, the plan to place U.S. special operations forces under the ISAF SOF structure was not popular with some American senior leaders. These leaders feared the deployment would set a precedent of U.S. special operations units transitioning under the ISAF command structure, and thus, challenge the autonomy of the Operation Enduring Freedom command structure. These concerns led several senior leaders to issue memorandums of non-concurrence to the SOCEUR proposal. These memorandums meant that U.S. Special Forces under Task Force-10 could not receive any logistical or operational support from their American special operations colleagues within the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). Task Force-10 would have to rely on SOCEUR or the unit's internal support company to push supplies from Germany or request support from NATO allies. In the summer of 2007, the ISAF SOF staff in

²⁶³ Author's observations of ISAF SOF Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE) in Afghanistan from October 2007 to April 2008.

²⁶⁴ United States Special Forces Association, "Special Forces Coin Rules and History," 2010, http://www.sfalx.com/h_coin_rules_and_history.htm.

Kabul had many unfilled positions and could not provide any logistical support to Task Groups. One five-man assessment team sent to Afghanistan in the summer 2007 concluded that under the initial constraints, the mission “ISAF SOF is a bring your own beer party, and we will be living in a dry county.”²⁶⁵ The consensus was that Task Force-10 had to be self-sufficient upon initial arrival in Afghanistan, and bring essential supplies and equipment, and coordinate monthly resupply aircraft from Germany.

Despite early support limitations, logistics officers and leadership at SOCEUR and 1-10th SFG worked tirelessly to secure vehicles and heavy weapons to equip the initial TF-10 deployment in September 2007. Task Force-10 established a temporary headquarters in the NORSOF compound at Camp Warehouse in Kabul, while three detachments deployed to American infantry posts in Kapisa, Logar, and Wardak provinces surrounding the capital. Two additional detachments supported Italian and Spanish efforts in Herat and Badghis provinces in northwestern Afghanistan.²⁶⁶ Without American logistic support, the western detachments relied on NATO allies for food, fuel, force protection, and tents for lodging and planning. In December 2007, the two Regional Command-West detachments redeployed to Kabul to target suicide bomber and improvised explosive device (IED) networks. Without access to CJSOTF resources, Task Force-10 formed its own information and support network, and partnered with Afghan intelligence, coalition interagency partners, American and British Infantry units, and other ISAF SOF units. The task force worked closely with ISAF SOF to create intelligence collaboration structures, such as the Kabul Effects Group and bi-weekly targeting meetings with NATO SOF allies. These efforts resulted in improved intelligence sharing and the detention of a number of high-level Joint Priority Effects List (JPTEL) targets.

In April 2008, “A” Company, 1-10th SFG assumed the second Task Force-10 rotation. The company was accompanied by two Romanian SOF detachments that partnered with American detachments on all combat missions. Hungarian Special Forces

²⁶⁵ Quote cited in an analysis of logistic support in Afghanistan conducted by a TF-10 site survey team, June–July 2007.

²⁶⁶ Task Force-10 initial foreword operating base deployments observed by author in Afghanistan from September–December 2007.

joined Task Force-10 for the third rotation. These partnerships demonstrated the deep ties that resulted from 1-10th SFG's role in founding their units and subsequent partnership training. This partnership began a model of subsequent combined pre-mission training between Romanian, Hungarian, and U.S. detachments in preparation for Task Force-10 rotations. These efforts increased interoperability and enhanced socialization prior to deployment, which resulted in strategic level success. Three years of combined combat at the tactical level created strong bonds within the multi-national task force. American, Hungarian, and Romanian soldiers live and fight together, and collectively mourn fallen comrades. Since 2007, one Romanian and two U.S. Special Forces soldiers died while fighting under Task Force-10 in Afghanistan.²⁶⁷ In memory of these soldiers, TF-10 renamed the compound in Kabul Camp Vose, and the post in the Tagab Valley FOB Kutschbach. Romanian Major Marcel Petre posthumously received a Green Beret and Bronze Star medal.²⁶⁸ Task Force-10 has served as an example of how pre-existing social and professional bonds can overlap to develop trust and cooperation in multinational SOF organizations.

E. DEBT AS A COMMON SECURITY CONCERN TO NATO

1. Greece: Indicator for Future NATO Austerity

The dramatic austerity measures in Greece serve as a warning of potential future financial constraints across NATO. In 2010, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund implemented a 110 billion-euro Greek financial bailout.²⁶⁹ In 2009, Greece was one of only five NATO nations including Albania, France, the United

²⁶⁷ Task Force-10 Special Forces soldiers killed in Afghanistan include U.S. Staff Sergeant Patrick Kutschbach in November 2007, Romanian Special Forces MAJ Marcel Petre in April 2009, and U.S. Chief Warrant Officer Doug Vose in July 2009.

²⁶⁸ Combined Joint Task Force 82 Web Portal, "FOB Kutschbach Dedicated in Tag Ab Valley," 2008, <http://www.cjtf82.com/ar/component/content/article/299-fob-kutschbach-dedicated-in-tag-ab-valley.html>; United States European Command News Portal News Portal, "Romanian SOF Officer Honored Posthumously with U.S. Bronze Star Medal," 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Romanian-SOF-officer-honored-posthumously-U.S.-Star>; United States European Command, "CW2 Doug Vose," 2009, <https://useucom.wordpress.com/tag/cw2-doug-vose/>.

²⁶⁹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "Greek Military Spending under the Spotlight after Economic Crisis," May 29, 2010, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?shortcut=2138>.

Kingdom, and the United States to meet the 2% of gross domestic spending (GDP) spending goal.²⁷⁰ Greece dedicated much of this spending to countering fellow NATO member Turkey's military strength. Turkey consistently maintained defense expenditures over 2% of GDP until 2007 when it dropped to 1.8%.²⁷¹ The bailout agreement called for Greece to reduce military spending and implement sweeping austerity measures to improve its national financial situation.²⁷² The defense austerity measures quickly affected Greek military personnel as compensation, housing allowances, and pensions decreased, which sparked several protests marches.²⁷³ Greece representation at NATO Headquarters in Mons dropped from more than 150 personnel prior to 2008 to less than 90 personnel by 2011 that reduced the nation's influence in the Alliance.²⁷⁴

The global recession was not the single cause the Greek crisis. A number of factors contributed to the continental financial destabilization. Years of expanding Greek federal spending coupled with persistent inflation led the exchange rate of one U.S. dollar to 100 Greek drachma to decrease from \$3.33 in 1973 to \$0.27 in 2000 prior to the introduction of the euro currency.²⁷⁵ Years of perceived improvements to the Greek economy under the euro merely distracted attention from the growing Greek debt. This debt became unsustainable as global markets fluctuated in 2008 and brought Greece perilously close to defaulting on its foreign debts. In 2009, Greece held the second worst government deficit as a percentage of GDP within the EU27 at 13.6%, which falls between Ireland's 14.3% and the United Kingdom's 11.5%.²⁷⁶ These large federal deficits were not isolated to these nations. In 2009, all EU27 nations ran federal budget

²⁷⁰ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence."

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "Greek Military Spending under the Spotlight after Economic Crisis."

²⁷³ Euronews, "Greek Military Marches against Cuts," May 4, 2010, <http://www.euronews.net/2010/05/04/greek-military-marches-against-cuts/>.

²⁷⁴ Author's interview with Greek military officers, Mons, Belgium, February 2011.

²⁷⁵ Time Magazine, "Why Greece's Economic Debt Crisis Threatens the Euro," February 22, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1963732,00.html>.

²⁷⁶ Eurostat, *Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2009-First Notification*, April 22, 2010.

deficits, which, thus, portrayed the vast scope of the crisis.²⁷⁷ Comparable U.S. federal deficits would have tied Spain for the fourth worst in the EU at approximately 11.2% of GDP, which is the highest percentage since the end of WWII. The Greek example is merely the first instance of a looming trend in required military austerity measures in the near future across all NATO nations.

2. United States Debt and SOF As an Economy of Force

The financial cost of large-scale military interventions over the past decade and the global economic crisis will limit the U.S.’s ability to sustain current commitments in the long term. U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the need to run a budget deficit to fund global counter-terror efforts in his 2002 State of the Union speech. President Bush stated “to achieve these great national objectives—to win the war, protect the homeland and revitalize our economy, our budget will run a deficit that will be small and short.”²⁷⁸ The budget deficit has been neither small nor short, as the U.S. has spent nearly \$1.28 trillion dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and enhanced security measures related to the 9-11 attacks.²⁷⁹ The financial costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are rising. The annual cost per soldier deployed to Iraq will increase from \$433,000 in 2009 to nearly \$802,000 in 2011, and increase in Afghanistan from \$507,000 per soldier deployed in 2009 to nearly \$694,000 in 2011.²⁸⁰ These figures do not include the significant cost of training and equipment for Afghan and Iraqi soldiers, or the large numbers of government contractors supporting both conflicts.

The U.S. national debt not only threatens American security, it also endangers the viability of the NATO Alliance. In February 2010, Gerald Seib highlighted the potential danger of the growing national debt in the *Wall Street Journal*, by stating that the deficit “has become so large and persistent that it is time to start thinking of it as something else

²⁷⁷ Eurostat, *Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2009-First Notification*.

²⁷⁸ George W. Bush, “State of the Union Speech,” January 29, 2002, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/allpolitics/01/29/bush.speech.txt/>.

²⁷⁹ Congressional Research Office, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, March 29, 2011, 1.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 22.

entirely: a national-security threat.”²⁸¹ By November 2010, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stated the federal deficit was the primary national security threat to the United States.²⁸² In response to these troubling statistics, Secretary Gates lobbied Congress to limit 2011 military pay, reduce future payroll expenses and retirement costs to the Armed Services while freezing civilian federal pay for two years.²⁸³ U.S. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Swartz is to reduce spending by limiting personnel and family support programs.²⁸⁴

The current global economic crisis increased the U.S. and NATO allies’ reliance on foreign lenders, which further complicates collective security obligations. China and other foreign lenders are likely to exert economic pressure to achieve policy goals and influence nations seeking additional funding. These financial constraints will force NATO allies to seek more efficient foreign policy mechanisms. Prudent employment of special operations forces can implement foreign policy through foreign internal defense training and combat advisory roles in countries at risk by radical extremist groups. The small signature light logistics trail of these forces, and ability to penetrate deep into restricted terrain make special operations forces ideal for military assistance and counter-terror missions. All NATO nations will continue to face asymmetric threats and limited financial resources in the near future; prudent investment in special operations units represents the best defense against both common threats.

F. DUTCH SOF: POST AFGHANISTAN ENGAGEMENT

The departure of Dutch special operations forces from Afghanistan spurred discussion over post-ISAF commitments as other NATO SOF allies plan their departure from the conflict. While the ISAF SOF mission enhanced interoperability among

²⁸¹ Gerald F. Seib, “Deficit Balloons into National Security Threat,” *Wall Street Journal Online*, February 2, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703422904575039173633482894.html>.

²⁸² Jalal, Malik Ahmad, “The Number One National Security Threat?,” *Harvard National Security Journal* 2, no. 2 (March 2011).

²⁸³ Tom Philpott, “End May Be Near for Big Raises,” *The Daily Press*, May 10, 2010, http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_milupdate_0510may10,0,2504227.column.

²⁸⁴ Vago Muradian, “Interview with General Norton Schwartz,” *Defense News*, May 10, 2010, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4617346&c=FEA&s=INT>.

coalition partners, these units' post-Afghanistan commitments will determine the course of future special operations integration. In February 2010, debate over whether to extend the Dutch mission to Afghanistan contributed to the collapse of former Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende's ruling coalition.²⁸⁵ In August 2010, the Dutch military began to withdrawal approximately 2,000 soldiers from the Uruzgan Province where they had partnered with Australian forces since 2006.²⁸⁶ Within this force, Dutch SOF contributed approximately 75 operators working in unison with nearly 300 Australian Special Air Service troops operating under ISAF SOF.²⁸⁷ Throughout the mission, Dutch and Australian special operations soldiers established close working relationships with U.S. SOF operating in Uruzgan under the CJSOTF-Afghanistan. Beyond formal liaison nodes, much of the partnership and battle de-confliction occurred through informal relationships between tactical level leaders and operators.²⁸⁸ New Zealand deployed 70 Special Air Service soldiers to fill the void left by the departure of Dutch SOF from Uruzgan.²⁸⁹ The Dutch departure from Afghanistan represented the first NATO ally to withdrawal troops from the ISAF mission, which serves as a preview for the scheduled departure of Canadian forces from Kandahar in July 2011.²⁹⁰ These forces will be difficult to replace; Dutch and Canadian forces have fought with bravery in traditional Taliban strongholds of southern Afghanistan with few national caveats. Governments will seek to balance post-Afghanistan operations to take advantage of the unprecedented combat experience gained in the conflict while protecting soldiers' health and family cohesion.²⁹¹

²⁸⁵ Euronews, "Dutch Leaders to Hold Talks After Coalition Collapse," February 21, 2010, <http://www.euronews.net/2010/02/21/dutch-leaders-to-hold-talks-after-coalition-collapse/>.

²⁸⁶ Reuters, "Dutch Troops End Their Mission in Afghanistan," August 1, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/01/us-afghanistan-dutch-idUSTRE67019L20100801>.

²⁸⁷ Ottawa Citizen, "New Zealand SAS to Replace Dutch SOF, Not JTF2: Report," August 14, 2009, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2009/08/14/new-zealand-sas-to-replace-dutch-sof-not-jtf2-report.aspx>.

²⁸⁸ Information obtained through the author's interviews with Dutch SOF and U.S. Special Forces posted in the Uruzgan Province between 2006 and 2010.

²⁸⁹ Ottawa Citizen, "New Zealand SAS to Replace Dutch SOF, Not JTF2: Report."

²⁹⁰ National Post Canada, "Canada's War in Afghanistan," April 9, 2011, <http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/Canada+Afghanistan/4586967/story.html>.

²⁹¹ CTV News, "Ottawa, Military Ponder Post-Afghan War Future," May 6, 2011, <http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20100705/after-afghanistan-100705/>.

While the withdrawal of Dutch SOF from Afghanistan weakened ISAF SOF combat capacity, the departure facilitated greater participation in other global missions. CANSOF units are also expected to take a leading role in combined operations and training missions following the end of their Afghanistan mission. Dutch and Canadian SOF units maintain an array of tactical capabilities for future contingency missions, counter-terrorism efforts, and combined counter-piracy operations. In April 2010, Dutch special operations forces stormed a German ship held captive by Somali pirates, which ensured the freedom of the crew and jailed the hostage takers.²⁹² In a subsequent operation in January 2011, Dutch SOF freed the crew of the *New York Star* in a combined operation with Australian aircraft and Russian naval forces.²⁹³ The current level of participation in these combined counter-piracy operations would likely have not been possible without the relief of ISAF force commitments.

In addition to counter-terrorism efforts, Dutch and Canadian SOF actively contribute to combined military assistance efforts around the world. While almost every NATO SOF unit has advanced skills in direct action and counter-terrorism operations, capability gaps exist in military assistance capabilities. These units' affinity for military assistance provides a greater force multiplier advantage than other forces with limited experience in training roles. Both nations employed their military assistance skills during participation in the U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCOM) sponsored 2011 Flintlock exercise.²⁹⁴ During the exercise, Dutch SOF and CANSOF elements partnered with French, German, and Spanish forces to train six northern and western African nations' militaries in basic counter-terrorism tactics.²⁹⁵

Dutch and Canadian post-Afghanistan military obligations will set a precedent for other allies' global engagement strategies following ISAF participation. While some

²⁹² David Pugliese, "Dutch Special Forces, Russian SOF Raid Pirate-Held Ships: A Future Trend?," May 8, 2010, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2010/05/08/dutch-special-forces-russian-sof-raid-pirate-held-ships-a-future-trend.aspx>.

²⁹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Warship Freed Crew after Attack by Pirates," January 31, 2011, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page42420379.aspx>.

²⁹⁴ United States Special Operations Command Africa, "Flintlock 11 Kicks off February 21 in Senegal," *U.S. Africa Command Home*, 3 February 2011, <http://www.afri.com.mil/getArticle.asp?art=5937>.

²⁹⁵ Pugliese, "Dutch Special Forces, Russian SOF Raid Pirate-Held Ships: A Future Trend?."

NATO SOF units will return primarily to domestic counter-terrorism roles, those nations that have the capacity to assist in the full spectrum of special operations roles around the globe will best support the NSHQ's long-term goals.²⁹⁶ Active participation in combined military assistance operations will assist overstretched U.S. SOF units and create conditions for further NATO SOF capacity development. Afghanistan operations have given NATO SOF units the greatest collective combat experience since WWII. NATO SOF units can capitalize on the combined wisdom and established social networks forged in combat by embracing training and advisory roles in global partnerships to advance global SOF interoperability and collective security against asymmetric threats.

G. NATO SOF PARTNERS: EXTENDED INTEROPERABILITY

The support of the Australian and New Zealand Special Air Services has been instrumental in NATO successes in Afghanistan over the nine-year conflict, beginning with participation in early operations to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Over the past four years, both nations have served as vital partners in combined special operations.²⁹⁷ The selection of Brigadier General Rick Burr to serve as the first ISAF SOF commanding general from 2007–2008 demonstrated the prominent role of Australian SOF in the combined command. Over the past four years, Australia has contributed rotations of nearly 300 men to their SOTG in Uruzgan, which was complimented by 70 man New Zealand rotations.²⁹⁸ While both nations' prolonged rotations have generated some domestic political debate, the support and cumulative experience of the Australian and New Zealand SAS has been vital to successful combined special operations in southern Afghanistan.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, "NATO SOF Handbook" (NSCC, December 11, 2009), 16.

²⁹⁷ Information gained from the author's interviews with former ISAF SOF staff officers between 2007 and 2011, and conducted between February–March 2011.

²⁹⁸ Ottawa Citizen, "New Zealand SAS to Replace Dutch SOF, Not JTF2: Report."

²⁹⁹ "Exhausted' SAS Doubting Mission-*The West Australian*," October 1, 2010, <http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/8046782/exhausted-sas-doubting-mission/>, and "SAS redeployed to Afghanistan - National - NZ Herald News," February 1, 2011, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10703456.

The common lineage and organizational structure with British SAS forces and habitual partnerships and common doctrine with other NATO SOF units created favorable conditions for operational interoperability. Nearly a decade of combined combat in Afghanistan has further enhanced SOF integration and social bonds between NATO SOF and its dedicated Australian and New Zealand SAS partners. These partnerships have allowed best practices observed in Afghanistan to permeate to other common SOF partners in the Pacific region during combined training or contingency operations. The close affiliation with U.S. SOF, specifically with the Army's 1st Special Forces Group and Navy's West Coast SEAL teams, creates a hub linking a number of special operations forces participating in common counter-terror efforts in Asia. These linkages may one day lay the foundation for a SOF regional partnership in the Pacific region using the NSHQ model. The Pacific Area Special Operations Conference hosted annually in Hawaii by the U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific is one tool facilitating the construction of networks in Asia to enhance partnerships and global SOF interoperability.³⁰⁰

³⁰⁰ Dave Ahearn, "Q&A: Rear Admiral Sean A. Pybus," *Special Operations Technology* 9, no. 2 (April 2011).

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VII. RESULTS AND DATA

A. SURVEY RESULTS

The NATO SOF survey population conducted in support of this research consisted of NSHQ staff, special operations students at the Naval Postgraduate School and the NATO SOF Training and Education Program, and forward deployed U.S. special operations soldiers in Europe. The author administered surveys over five months in early 2011. The author collected 225 complete surveys, including 126 U.S. special operations soldiers and support personnel and 100 international soldiers and support personnel from 17 of the 26 nations contributing forces to NATO SOF. This report analyzed data from American and European responses separately to prevent skewing data toward any nation in the total survey sample. The survey included a wide distribution of ranks mirroring the distribution of NATO SOF units with most officer responses coming from OF-1 through OF-4 and most enlisted soldiers coming from ranks of OR-5 through OR-7. The survey's largest concentration holds the rank of OR-6.




Figure 9. Basic Demographics and Exposure to Global Trends

The ages of respondents ranged from 21 to 53, with most respondents in their late 20s or early 30s with an average age of 32.5. The average number of years in active military service in the sample population was 12.2 years, which indicates a typically more senior special operations force than conventional units. Military specialties were almost equally split between 51% of respondents currently serving as tactical operators and the remaining 49% performing functions or staff officer positions. Exposure to global trends indicated U.S. soldiers had access to technology at an earlier age. Although this technology gap largely disappeared in younger soldiers, the data suggests that senior U.S. soldiers may have a slight advantage over their European peers in embracing emerging networking initiatives. American soldiers first accessed the Internet almost four and a half years earlier, and first use cellular phones two years earlier than their European counterparts during their formative years in the 1990s. The sample showed that English language training is reaching younger students across Europe. Most current NATO SOF soldiers receive language training during their middle school years or earlier. Within the American sample, 9.8% of the soldiers surveyed spoke English as a second language, which indicates the long history of U.S. Special Forces recruiting foreign-born men. English language training programs appear to have made significant progress in the past decade with 72% of European respondents indicating that more than half of their tactical units speak English at an intermediate level or greater. Other languages frequently spoken among respondents included 16.7% of respondents speaking French and 21.8% with German language skills.

Exposure Trend	United States Sample	European Sample
• Age of first exposure to Internet	15.3	20.1
• Age of first use of cellular phone	17.1	20.3
• Age learning basic English	NA	15.5

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 1. Exposure to Global Trends

1. Languages, Combined Training, and Deployments

Professional experience demographic questions indicated the survey population had participated in extensive combined training and held considerable deployment experience. Respondents indicated distributed attendance at NATO SOF Training and Education Program courses, international training courses, and combined training. Responses to this question indicated that most NATO SOF units have made combined education opportunities a priority within their forces, even through increasing financial constraints. In addition to individual training, combined pre-mission training and partnership events remains a priority. The U.S. sample indicated 36.5% of respondents have trained with German special operations, 26.8% with Hungarian, and 34.1% with Romanian units. Both survey samples demonstrated significant deployment experience. Nearly 72.1% of the total survey population has served in Afghanistan under either the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) or ISAF Special Operations Forces; 6.5% have served under both commands, which facilitate the spread of best practices. Beyond this wealth of combat experience, respondents indicated that other members in their units had more experience in contingency operations than the survey population. Three-quarters of soldiers polled indicated that more than 85% of the personnel in their units have deployed outside of their nation.

Deployments	United States Sample	European Sample
Bosnia and Herzegovina	19.6%	31.9%
Kosovo	13.4%	34.0%
ISAF SOF—Afghanistan	79.5%	59.5%
Iraq	64.3%	47.8%
CJSOTF—Afghanistan	14.60%	17.10%

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 2. Survey Sample Overseas Deployments

Following the basic demographic and training and education background, the remainder of the NATO SOF survey asked respondents to evaluate several themes in special operations interoperability, cohesion, and future employment. Survey respondents offered their perspective by evaluating questions using a scale of one through seven.

Under this rating scale, questions with an average rating less than four indicates disagreement with the statement and scores greater than four indicate approval with the statement. The following graphic displays the spectrum of potential responses to questions in this section.




Figure 10. Rating Scale Used in Survey

2. Mission Readiness

The majority of soldiers polled across NATO special operations indicated their units maintain proficiency to confront modern asymmetric threats. When asked to assess whether their units maintained capabilities in various special operations missions, patterns emerged between the U.S. and European samples along historic unit strengths. Both survey samples demonstrated significant confidence in their units' capabilities, but responses indicated different training priorities among national forces. The U.S. sample indicated that special operations forces held a higher confidence in their unit's capabilities across a wider mission set. The remaining respondents held greater confidence in traditional European special operations strengths of special reconnaissance, direct action, and senior leader protection.

My unit is highly trained and capable to conduct the following special operations missions.	United States Sample	European Sample
• Irregular Warfare	6.11	4.96
• Unconventional Warfare	6.13	4.99
• Counter-Terrorism	6.03	4.92
• Special Reconnaissance	5.91	6.05
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID)	6.17	5.28
• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)	5.63	5.09
• Direct Action (DA)	6.20	6.22
• Counter-Insurgency (COIN)	6.19	5.52
• Civil Affairs	5.29	4.04
• PSYOP / MISO	5.09	3.99
• Senior leader / VIP close protection duty	5.72	5.76

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 3. Views on Mission Readiness

3. Views on U.S. Special Operations Influence

Survey respondents indicated strong support for U.S. forward presence and participation in combined deployments, training, and educational opportunities to advance NATO special operations interoperability. While members of the U.S. sample believed performance in overseas contingency operations and forward presence were their greatest contributions, European sample respondents emphasized school sponsorship and joint training events. Both samples indicated that Task Force-10 presence in ISAF SOF facilitated the success of future operations, although the U.S. sample indicated a slightly higher correlation than the European sample. Eastern European soldiers who have participated with Task Force-10 on tactical level operations recorded significantly higher support for U.S. partnership, sponsored exercises, school sponsorship, and combined training than the remainder of the European sample. These results reflect that those nations with the closest relationship with U.S. special operations over the past five years have viewed these relationships as helpful to their unit development.

Participation by U.S. SOF in the following actions has greatly enhanced potential future success of combined operations	United States Sample	European Sample	European SOF with TF-10 tactical Experience.
• Establishment of forward staged SOF units in Germany	6.22	5.52	5.93
• Participation in the ISAF SOF mission (TF-10)	6.17	5.93	6.65
• Other U.S. SOF forces participation in other overseas deployments	6.09	5.53	5.57
• Sponsored large-scale scenario exercises (Jackal Stone etc.)	5.76	5.73	6.58
• Leadership and staff roles within NSHQ and associated schools	5.62	5.65	5.36
• Sponsorship of foreign students at U.S. military schools	5.69	5.90	6.93
• Joint Combined Executed Training (JCETS)	6.11	5.74	6.79

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 4. Views on United States SOF Participation

4. Views on Required Support

An analysis of the U.S. and European survey samples reveals different concerns regarding combat support and combined operations execution. Americans strongly voiced their concern for a lack of rotary wing aircraft, which is an indicator of frustrations over limited Task Force-160 aviation support to U.S. theater level special operations units. Frequently, U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan must compete with conventional units for limited aviation support provided by regular U.S. Army aviation brigades. American soldiers additionally desired increased training resources and facilities, intelligence collection, ground mobility, and close air support, despite present support structures and capabilities far exceeding their European colleagues. Anticipated reductions to defense spending indicate that further enhancements of these assets will not likely improve in the near term. The European sample requested additional intelligence collection and sharing capacity, increased rotary-wing support, and enhanced communications technology.

Evaluate whether your SOF unit could be more effective with increases in the following support.	United States Sample	European Sample
• Intelligence sharing between my unit and other SOF units and interagency partners	5.28	6.11
• Share of national military funding	5.23	5.62
• Flexibility with national caveats	5.12	5.65
• Combined training between my unit and other NATO SOF units	5.39	5.94
• Assistance from the NSHQ to develop new capabilities	5.09	5.69
• Training resources and improved facilities	5.67	5.85
• Rotary wing airlift	5.88	5.89
• Fire Support (Artillery, Mortars, ADA)	5.18	5.27
• Intelligence collection and exploitation means (including UAVs)	5.61	6.28
• Information and communication technology	5.48	5.92
• Logistics support	5.65	5.59
• Ground mobility assets / vehicles	5.67	5.51
• Close air support (CAS)	5.66	5.76

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 5. Views on Desired Combat Support and Combat Service Support

5. Views on Combined Training and Combat

American and European special operations recognize the role of combined combat in forging relationships and trust among soldiers while recognizing that capability gaps remain among some emerging units. Follow up interviews with a portion of the survey population indicated that capability gaps resulted from inequities in some emerging units' equipment and capacity, rather than individual soldier skills. Most NATO special operations soldiers maintain advanced individual technical and tactical skills, such as marksmanship, close quarter battle, or various infiltration methods, but maintain varying levels of military funding and equipment fielding. Adherence to NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) standards improves unit capabilities and capacity among emerging special operations units and will likely improve levels of trust among future coalitions. The survey samples portray moderate levels confidence among soldiers of both samples who indicated they would prefer to partner with a NATO SOF unit from another country with equivalent capabilities rather than a conventional unit with lesser capability. This finding indicates that special operations soldiers place greater value on competence and performance in combat than common nationality and common cultural traits. Both the American and European survey populations cited a strong correlation between relationships forged in combat and special operations interoperability

development. These responses are consistent with other survey responses emphasizing the close bonds formed over the past decade among veterans of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan conflicts.

Evaluate the following statements regarding combined training or participation in combat coalitions.	United States Sample	European Sample
• Combined training events have led to the creation of a substantial number of personal friendships or subsequent social events.	5.50	5.92
• In combat, I would prefer to partner with another NATO SOF unit with capabilities equal to my unit rather than a conventional unit from my home nation with lesser capabilities.	5.13	5.66
• I can count on other NATO SOF forces to perform well under fire during combined combat operations.	4.86	5.32
• I am as equally proud to be a member of NATO SOF as I am a member of my own national SOF unit.	4.61	5.50
• There is not much variation in capabilities across the spectrum of NATO SOF units.	3.45	4.04
• My unit is better prepared to accomplish its given mission now than it was in 2007.	5.09	5.93
• Relationships developed during combat improve future interoperability between SOF units.	5.61	5.99

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 6. Views on Combined Training and Combat

6. Perceptions of Emerging Threats

Special operations soldiers across NATO shared similar security concerns when questioned regarding emerging threats to their nations and the alliance over the next five years. The U.S. sample showed a greater concern for a sizable terrorist attack within the nation by foreign terror groups than their European colleagues.³⁰¹ Analyzing special operations soldiers from the three leading economies in Europe revealed a higher average score of 5.45, which indicates the regular threats from foreign groups and previous attacks have influenced security concerns.³⁰² Similarly, respondents from the leading

³⁰¹ No data collected from Spanish respondents, who were the target of the Madrid train bombings. Spanish respondents would likely have responded with greater concern for foreign terrorism within their borders than the overall European sample, and would have slightly skewed the total sample lower than would be expected with a total European distribution.

³⁰² Respondents from the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.

economies within NATO responded with greater certainty that their nations would play a prominent role in world affairs in the next five years than the entire European sample. These responses indicate a correlation between increased national political and economic power and potential targeting by foreign terrorist networks.

U.S. respondents expressed a statistically significant greater concern for domestic terrorism than the European sample. This response indicates the diversity a potential radical groups, large geographic area of the nation, and concerns over increasing division within American political and social groups over the past decade potentially influenced U.S. soldiers concerns. Both survey populations responded with greater confidence that a sizable terrorist attack was likely to happen in another European nation, and showed slightly greater concern for international terrorism than domestic threats. The U.S. and European samples responded with equal certainty that NATO was not under threat of conventional attack. No consistent patterns of increased concern for conventional attack were seen among survey respondents from Baltic nations and Eastern Europe, although some Baltic soldiers indicated a resurgent Russia still influences security concerns within their nations.³⁰³ U.S. and European special operations soldiers collectively responded that their units would deploy with greater frequency than conventional forces from their nations in the next five years. This series of questions indicates that NATO SOF soldiers identify asymmetric networks as the primary security concern for the alliance in the near future, and special operations forces are best qualified to confront these threats.

³⁰³ Views voiced during six personal interviews with soldiers from Baltic nations between January and May 2011.

Evaluate the possibility that the following events will occur within the next 5 years	United States Sample	European Sample
• A sizable terrorist attack within your borders by foreign terror groups	5.00	Total EUR: 4.26
• A sizable terrorist attack within your borders by domestic groups		UK, GER, FRA: 5.45
• A sizable terrorist attack in another European country by foreign terror groups	4.73	3.31
• A large terrorist attack in another European country by domestic groups	5.53	5.61
• A conventional military incursion into your nation / treaty partners territory requiring military response	5.03	4.68
• My unit will deploy to combat (outside of scheduled Afghanistan deployments)	2.84	2.79
• My nation's conventional military forces will deploy to combat (outside of scheduled Afghanistan deployments)	5.32	5.38
• My nation will play a prominent role in world affairs	4.98	4.07
	6.19	Total EUR: 4.31
		UK, GER, FRA: 5.05

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 7. Expectations of Future Threats

7. BICES Network Training and Access

While the BICES network has enhanced collaboration and communication among NATO special operations forces, the majority of the operational forces surveyed lacks access and adequate training to use this platform's various functions. The limited number of respondents with access to the BICES network (48.6%) required a combined survey sample analysis. Less than a quarter of respondents had a BICES terminal within their office, and more than half of the respondents indicated that they must walk to another building to gain access on a multi-use terminal. The data indicates that tactical level operators lack immediate access to BICES terminals. Tactical level units require access to technical networking structures, such as the BICES network to facilitate operational planning, collaborations, and communication with partner special operations units.

Do You have access to the NATO BICES Network	Combined Sample Response Percent
• BICES Network available	48.6%
• BICES Network not available	51.4%
What is the location / availability of your closest BICES Terminal?	Combined Sample Response Percent
• At your personal workstation	14.7%
• Communal workstation within your Office	7.8%
• Communal workstation in your building	18.6%
• Communal workstation in adjacent building	17.6%
• Communal workstation within walking distance	26.5%
• Communal workstation within 10 minute drive	1.0%
• Communal workstation requiring longer drive to reach.	1.0%
• Limited time use terminal nearby available with coordination to secure access.	12.7%

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 8. BICES Network Access

Of those with access to the network, slightly more than half received training in the systems' functions and capabilities. Soldiers who participated in training generally received only a basic overview of BICES basic functions or how to obtain and account and login to the network. Respondents that reported access to the BICES network primarily use the system for e-mail (70.6%), and intelligence analysis (57.4%). Less than a third of respondents routinely use the full suite of advanced functions available to BICES users, which limits the system's capacity to improve special operations interoperability and integration. Only 5.6% of the 225 survey respondents reported both access and detailed BICES network training. The limited training and distribution contributed to a majority of soldiers indicating neutral views when asked to assess whether the BICES network in its current form was an effective tool to assist with military duties. Soldiers across the alliance routinely voiced concerns with limited training opportunities and access to BICES terminals during personal interviews. These soldiers were eager to use the advanced functions provided by the network, but frustrated with the current distribution of terminals to higher-level headquarters.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁴ Summary of interviews with special operations soldiers from nine nations with access to the NATO BICES network between February and May 2011.

Please indicate the amount of training you have received on the BICES network (percentages only among survey population with BICES access)	Combined Sample Response Percent
• No training	49.5%
• Only demonstration of how to sign up and login	10.5%
• Basic familiarization of main functions	27.6%
• Detailed overview of main functions	5.7%
• Detailed overview, plus separate classes on key functions	1.0%
• I am proficient with BICES and have given instruction to others	5.7%
What activities do you perform on the BICES Network? (Please check all that apply)	Combined Sample Response Percent
• Intelligence gathering / analysis	57.4%
• Video Teleconferences	20.6%
• E-mail	70.6%
• Exercises	22.1%
• Doctrine review	25.0%
• Training coordination, prep, or scheduling Pre-deployment preparation	30.9%
• Online training courses	14.7%
Current BICES Network Effectiveness	Combined Sample Rating Average
• The BICES network in the current form is an effective tool to assist me with my military duties.	4.39

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 9. BICES Network Training and Use

8. Methods of Establishing Relationships

U.S. and European special operations soldiers indicated that serving together in combat was the most effective method of building relationships between units, yet agreed that several other traditional methods of establishing unit cohesion benefit collaboration as well. Only one respondent indicated disagreement with the statement that serving together in combat missions was very effective at building relationships. Combined service in peacekeeping missions evoked strong, but less robust agreement than direct combat from survey members. Both survey populations indicated strong agreement that combined pre-mission training, social outings, endurance events, and combined airborne operations assisted relationship building among special operations forces. Full intelligence collaboration garnered significantly greater support from European

respondents than their U.S. colleagues, which indicates potential frustration over security clearance restrictions during combined combat over the past decades among European partners.

The following activities are very effective at building relationships with other SOF forces:	United States Sample	European Sample
• Social outings organized between units	6.04	5.88
• Sporting contests between units	5.57	5.55
• Combined airborne jumps / wings exchanges	6.01	5.77
• Combined pre-mission training at a central training center	5.99	6.10
• Serving together in peacekeeping missions	5.77	6.13
• Serving together in combat missions.	6.28	6.52
• Participating together in physically demanding /endurance events	5.80	5.96
• Allowing full collaboration with available intelligence	5.13	6.29

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 10. Evaluation of Relationship Building Activities

9. Perceptions of International Colleagues

NATO SOF survey responses indicate that combined combat experience, training, and education over the past decade have contributed to favorable characterization assessments of international NATO SOF comrades. Both survey samples showed strong correlations with the positive personality traits of honesty, bravery, and trustworthiness. The survey sample showed a greater variance when asked to evaluate performance indicators of effectiveness, reliability, and competency. European soldiers replied with stronger agreement in support of these variables. While U.S. respondents were typically more reserved in praise for international partners, they were very complimentary of their tactical level comrades. Handwritten comments and personal follow up interviews among U.S. special operations soldiers indicated significant levels of trust and confidence in their Romanian and Hungarian SOF tactical level partners in Afghanistan.³⁰⁵

While variance among respondents exists, the data in this series of questions is encouraging. The responses indicate that special operations soldiers across NATO show

³⁰⁵ Personal interviews with 20 U.S. special operations soldiers from February to May 2011, and data from 123 U.S. surveys.

significant respect and confidence for their international colleagues. The data also shows that special operations soldiers can distinguish between personality traits and military capability. Military capability can develop through training resources and support, whereas personality traits are typically more difficult to influence. Combined special operations training and deployments built upon a framework of mutual admiration for positive personality traits are more likely to succeed and assist capability development. Ongoing efforts to increase social interaction among NATO special operations soldiers beyond combined combat operations will likely continue to increase trust network development that should lead to increased intelligence sharing, enhanced partnerships and increased operational performance.

Characterization of Comrades	United States Sample	European Sample
• Honest	5.12	5.60
• Effective	4.68	5.30
• Reliable	4.69	5.38
• Brave	5.17	5.65
• Competent	4.77	5.49
• Trustworthy	5.10	5.57

(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates)

Table 11. Characterization of Comrades

10 Regression Analysis

The author conducted a more detailed data analysis using regression modeling to identify the interaction between the theoretical model variables.³⁰⁶ This method identifies qualities that enhance trusted special operations relationships and enhance unit performance. Multiple iterations of regression analysis identified the prominence of combined training and combat, complimentary doctrine and resources, and common language in coalescing combined special operations organizations. While both survey samples recognized the importance of overcoming barriers to communication, this variable and the establishment of trust had a higher causal effect in the European sample. Persistent frustrations regarding barriers to intelligence sharing likely contributed to the

³⁰⁶ Regression statistics derived from NATO SOF Survey data may be found in Appendix D.

prominence of this variable. The data produced in the multiple regressions indicates that NATO SOF interoperability and integration initiatives over the past four years have contributed to increased levels of trust and cooperation among special operations soldiers. This enhanced trust and cooperation continues to improve combined special operations performance in training and combat in support of common goals.

B. CROSS SECTIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON

1. Growth, Development, and Funding

NATO special operations forces have increased in size, composition, and capacity over the past decade. Currently, 26 of 28 nations in the alliance contribute special operations forces and staff to NATO SOF initiatives, schools, and headquarters. A comparison of special operations units in NATO between 2005 and 2011 reveals rapidly emerging capabilities in the Balkans, and Eastern Europe.³⁰⁷ Following their entrance into NATO, many of these nations pursued ambitious special operations capability development programs with assistance from other alliance partner forces. Other nations with well-established special operations forces have developed additional units to enhance their range of capabilities in unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, and military assistance. These developments included the creation of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment and the Polish 1st Special Forces Regiment, which augmented Canada's Combined Joint Task Force-2 and the Polish GROM. The development of both units marked recognition that NATO allies should maintain proficiency in a wide spectrum of special operations missions beyond direct action or counter-terrorism. Canada, Poland, and Norway established separate special operations commands to ensure their subordinate units received adequate funding, training, and proper employment in future conflicts. Maintaining these trends in special operations capacity building will be essential as the alliance continues to confront non-state actors employing unconventional tactics in out of area contingency operations, as well as conducting combined training in Africa and Asia to build partner nation capacity.

³⁰⁷ Please see Table 12, Special Operations Capabilities and Longitudinal Growth, for data and references mentioned in this comparative analysis.

While NATO special operations capabilities have increased over the past six years, U.S. Special Operations Command units have increased as well with funded personnel strength of 55,007 in 2011. The United States developed the Marine Special Operations Command, which then gave all four branches of service a robust special operations capability. U.S. Army Special Forces received three additional battalions, as well as two additional battalions in formation. European special operations capabilities expansion has matched the parallel expansion of U.S. special operations growth over the past decade that has, resulted in similar combined personnel strength but disproportionate funding. While most European allies have decreased military spending in the past decade, U.S. defense budgets increased to support the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and military capability growth. In 2009, the United States spent \$697.8 billion in total defense expenditures, while the 25 other NATO SOF contributors spent a combined \$269.6 billion, or less than 40 percent of U.S. spending.

A review of defense spending in NATO by nation reveals a prolonged trend of most nations not meeting the stated alliance goal of 2% of gross domestic product per nation.³⁰⁸ In 2008, a former SACEUR General, James Jones, cited the failure to meet spending goals under his command as one of the greatest practical problems facing the alliance. Jones stated, “this means that we can expect a ‘train wreck’ in the future unless the Allies can generate the political will to commit more resources to NATO.”³⁰⁹ To avoid the prediction outlined by Jones, NATO members will need either to increase funding or become more efficient with limited resources. Despite reduced military spending, many nations have invested limited resources prudently in special operations development. While Hungary defense spending (1.1%) in 2009 fell well below the alliance goal, the nation fields a well-trained and capable Special Forces battalion that has been a crucial partner to U.S. Special Forces serving in Afghanistan and operates a special operations training center and qualification course. Similarly, Spain’s military contributions fell far short of stated goals (1.2%), yet Spanish special operations forces

³⁰⁸ Data provided in Table 12, cited accordingly from multiple sources.

³⁰⁹ David Yost, *An Interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 2003–2006* (NATO Defense College, Rome, January 2008), http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_34.pdf.

maintain high capability levels and interoperable equipment. These nations identified the economy of force aspect of special operations and allocated funding to units best prepared to meet emerging threats.

The aftermath of the global economic crisis and spending deficits in all alliance nations indicates that a spending goal designed to fund a large and inefficient alliance focused on conventional threats is not feasible in the near term. If NATO defense budgets hypothetically represent petroleum reserves, the NATO structure of the Cold War could represent a gas guzzling truck, a comfortable luxury feasible when resources and conditions allow. Under this analogy, a NATO Alliance facing modern asymmetric threats must be an efficient and mobile hybrid capable of achieving high performance with a minimal expenditure of resources. A refocused alliance designed under this model would place the NATO SOF Headquarters as the priority of effort and funding to meet modern security challenges in times of uncertainty and austerity.

2. Afghanistan Service Common Across NATO SOF Units

Combined special operations in Afghanistan serve as a common framework of knowledge and experience. Since October 2001, special operations soldiers from all 26 nations participating in the NATO SOF Headquarters have served in some capacity in Afghanistan. While many nations served in the Balkans and some served together in Iraq, the Afghan mission is the only conflict that has drawn universal participation. While variations in deployment packages and mandates exist, the combined effort in Afghanistan will continue to serve as common educational tool long after troops withdraw from the conflict. The political and military goals in Afghanistan have been difficult to achieve and the conflict has resulted in the expenditure of significant blood and treasure. These losses have been significant, particularly to the United States with at least 174 special operations soldiers killed in combat in Afghanistan from October 2001 to March 2011.³¹⁰ However, the conflict has served as a tool to enhance special

³¹⁰ iCasualties.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom Casualties,” as of March 13, 2011, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx>, 174 casualties cited includes all U.S. soldiers supported by the 55,000 man U.S. Special Operations Command. U.S. Army Rangers supporting special operations in Afghanistan are included in this figure.

operations capacity and interoperability in the alliance and beyond. While only a limited number of U.S. soldiers under the Special Operations Command-Europe have served under the ISAF SOF mission, many other American soldiers have gained a greater understanding for NATO SOF capabilities during Afghanistan service. Only a limited number of U.S. special operations troops forward stationed in Europe have participated in NATO combined training, education, or command structures. These troops represent approximately less than 1,000 soldiers, or 1% of the total U.S. Special Operations Command strength. Without common service in Afghanistan, few of these soldiers would appreciate the dramatic capability gains NATO SOF units have made in the past decade. The Afghan conflict will be the common narrative that will shape the way NATO SOF units organize, equip, and prepare for future conflict in the next decade, as well as a common experience to bind special operations veterans beyond their military service.



Figure 11. Spanish and United States SOF in Afghanistan

Nation	Some Subordinate Units	2009 Defense Spending	2009 Mil / %GDP	2005 Military Balance Description	2011 Military Balance Description	Combined deployments
Albania	Reparti i Neutralizimit të Elementit të Armatosur	\$ 249m	2	1 commando regiment+ police CT	1 commando regiment + police CT	Iraq, Afghanistan, Balkans
Belgium	Immediate reaction Cell (since 2003)	\$3.97bn	1.2	1 para-commando brigade (2 paratroop/parachute, 1 commando, 2 mechanized)	1 SF group	Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Bulgaria	68th Special Forces BDE	\$1.04bn	1.9	1 SF comd. (brigade)	1 SF brigade	Iraq, Afghanistan
Canada	JTF-2, Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CANSOR)	\$18.5 bn	1.5	1 commando unit	1,500 persons, 1 combined command, 1 counter terror bn, 1 CANSOR , 1 AVN 1 CJIRU bn	Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Croatia	Bojna za Specijalna Delovanja (BSB)	\$972m	1.6	1 SF battalion	1 SF battalion	Iraq, Afghanistan
Czech Republic	601st Special Forces Group	\$2.96bn	1.6	1 SF group	1 SF group	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Denmark*	Jaegerkorpset (land) / Fronmandskorpset (sea)	\$4.11bn	1.4	1 SF unit	1 SF unit	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Estonia	ESTFOR / K-Komando	\$396m	1.9	1 recce battalion	1 scout battalion	Afghanistan
France	Brigade des Forces Spéciales Terre (BFST)	\$46bn	2.1	2,700 persons (aprox): 1 special operations command, 1 paratroop/parachute regiment 1 AVN unit	2,200 persons, 1 HQ Comd, 2 Para Regiments, 1 AVN Reg, 3 training Cent.	Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia
Germany	Division Spezielle Operationen, Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK)	\$43.5bn	1.4	1 SOF division with 2 airborne (1 crisis response force), 1 SF command (1 commando/	1 airborne division, 1 SF brigade, 1 AD bn, 1 sig BN	Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Greece	Hellenic Special Operations Command	\$10.9bn	3.1	commando squadron), 1 commando brigade (3 commando, 1 paratroop/parachute squadron)	1 command with 1 commando amphibious brigade, 1 commando airborne bn	Afghanistan, Balkans
Hungary	34. Bercsény László Különleges Műveleti Zászlóalj	\$1.63bn	1.1	not mentioned	1 SF battalion	Afghanistan
Italy	Comando Forze Speciali Interarma	\$21.5bn	1.4	naval special forces command with 4 groups: 1 diving operation, 1 navy SF operation, 1 school, 1 research	1 SF command, (4 Alpini Reg, 1 Naval SF op, 1 diving op))	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Latvia	Speciālo Uzdevumu Vienība (SUV)	\$341m	1.2	1 SF team	1 ranger battalion, 1 CBT diver unit, 1 anti-terror unit	Afghanistan
Lithuania	Lithuanian Special Operations Force / Special Purpose Service	\$484m	1.1	1 SF team	1 SF group (1 CT unit, 1 Jaeger Bn, 1 CBT diver unit)	Afghanistan
Neatherlands	Korps Commandotroepen	\$12.1 bn	1.5	1 SF battalion	5 SF coys (4 land, 1 maritime), some SF marines	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Norway	FSK(CT), HJK(SF), MJK (Navy)	\$5.36bn	1.6	1 Ranger battalion	1 army SF command (1 Regiment), 1 Naval SF SQN	Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia
Poland	GROM, 1st Special Commando Regiment (Para Commando)	\$7.36bn	1.7	1 special operations regiment	1,650, 3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA, and CDO)	Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo
Portugal	Centro de Tropas de Operações Especiais, Comandos, Destacamento de Acções Especiais	\$2.54bn	1.6	1 special operations unit; 1 commando battalion	1 special operations unit, 1 commando bn	Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia
Romania	Regimentul 1 Operatii Speciale, Regimentul 1 Operatii Speciale, Detașamentul Special de Protecție și Intervenție	\$2.29bn	1.4	describes 1 Counter-terror unit under development	*Special operations regiment not identified	Afghanistan
Slovak Republic	5th Special Forces Regiment	\$1.53bn	1.5	1 recce BN	1 special regiment (Recce)	Afghanistan
Slovenia	Slovenska Specialna Enota / ESD	\$766 m	1.6	1 recce bn reserves	1 SF unit, 1 recce bn	Afghanistan
Spain	Unidad de Operaciones Especiales, Mando de Operaciones Especiales, Escuadrón de Zapadores Paracaidistas	\$10.9bn	1.2	special operations command with 3 special operations battalions	1 comd with (1HQ bn, 3 Spec Ops bn, 1 sig coy), 1 naval specops unit	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Turkey	Bordo Bereiller (Maroon berets) ,Ozel Jandarma Komando Bölgüsü	\$9.95bn	1.8	SF command headquarters; 5 commando brigades	1 command headquarters with 4 commando brigades, some marine commandos	Internal COIN /CT, northern Iraq, Afghanistan
UK	SAS, SBS, SRR	\$60.5 bn	2.7	1 Special Air Services regiment, 1 marine commando brigade, SAS Reserve forces, 1 SBS Regiment	1 (SAS) Regiment, 1 (Special Recce Reiment), 1 SF SPT Group (based on para BN), 2 SAS Reserve regiments, 1 SBS Reiment	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo ,
USA	US Army Special Forces, Navy SEALS, Marine Special Operations, Air Force SOC	\$697.8 bn	4.00	31,496 active duty, 11,247 reserve within US Special Operations Command	* US Special Operations Command requested funding for 55,007 soldiers in FY 2011 US Budget	Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo

Table 12. Special Operations Capabilities and Longitudinal Growth³¹¹

311 Table created by author using data available from: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2011* (London: Oxford University Press, 2011); *The Military Balance 2005* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) and cross referenced with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” June 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_64221.htm?mode=pressrelease. Deployment data was gathered using open source Internet data.

C. INTERVIEW SESSION THEMES

Over the course of research, the author conducted personal interviews and roundtable discussions with 60 special operations professionals from 18 NATO SOF nations and two partner nations.³¹² Participants in these discussions included unit leadership, tactical level operators, support personnel, and staff officers. Several round table discussions included six-eight tactical level soldiers from a variety of NATO special operations units offering their experience in special operations development, recent combat experience, and evaluations of NATO SOF sponsored training and education programs. The author typically conducted personal interviews with unit leadership and primary staff officers to gain insight in specific areas of special operations development and employment. Although some themes addressed in these conversations represented regional or unit specific concerns, several central themes of discussion emerged. Persons interviewed typically offered very positive comments concerning the progress made by NATO SOF development initiatives over the past four years. Many people expressed admiration for the rapid progress made in these initiatives and offered complimentary assessments for the vision outlined in the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network to promote personal relationship and coordination among special operations forces within the alliance and its partners.³¹³

Respondents offered similar praise for NATO SOF Training and Education Program initiatives, quality of instruction, and rapid expansion of the Chièvres campus and course offerings. During round table discussions, current students voiced near unilateral agreement that course offerings included an appropriate balance between emphasis on near-term training to prepare for current contingency operations, as well as enduring professional skills. Many of the discussion participants have attended multiple courses, while colleagues with less polished English language skills lacked the fluency to attend some offerings. Most respondents stated that English language training programs within their units have achieved significant progress. Enduring commitments to these

³¹² The author conducted round table discussions and interviews from January to May 2011 in Mons and Chièvres Air Base Belgium, Boeblingen, Germany and Monterey, California.

³¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner Collaborative Network (APCN),” 2011, <http://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/page/APCN/>.

programs would ensure increased levels of fluency and subsequent access to greater educational opportunities. A number of respondents mentioned they had brought their families to Belgium to sightsee during their training courses, and thus, potentially offered STEP an opportunity for outreach and socialization among spouses during duty hours.

Many round table and interview participants expressed concern over impending financial austerity measures across NATO. Several participants previously suffered pay cuts and reduced military budgets in their national units. Many people expressed fears that reduced military spending may undermine some of the progress made in special operations development, or limit future opportunities for combined training and education. Additional concerns focused on potential reductions in military pensions and long-term health care for recent combat veterans. Several participants paired admiration for NSHQ development with concerns that future expansion goals may not be sustainable through future austerity measures. Others respondents indicated they viewed growing national debts among NATO nations as a greater security threat than terrorism or other emerging asymmetric threats.

While economic concerns typically dominated discussions regarding security concerns, most soldiers expressed common concerns for the increased threat of international and domestic terrorism in Europe. Other security concerns mentioned frequently included cyber-terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics proliferation, and piracy in European shipping lanes. Several European participants mentioned the benefits of moving away from conscription toward professional militaries, but countered with concerns over demographic change resulting in population decline and more culturally diverse societies. These demographic changes are likely to complicate recruiting efforts in second and third generation immigrant communities. Encouraging promising applicants within these communities will become increasingly important to European special operations forces and intelligence services as European society becomes more culturally diverse. Young members of these communities also potentially offer increased cultural awareness and language capabilities in support of overseas contingency operations.

Round table discussion participants expressed pride in their Afghanistan service. Many thought the conflict gave their units the opportunity to prove capabilities to their national leadership, as well as their allies. Many believed their units' participation in the conflict allowed them to achieve significant progress in developing special operations capabilities while highlighting limited areas for improvement. Many respondents expressed concerns that any outcome in Afghanistan short of victory may be viewed as a loss for all ISAF partners, including many NATO special operations units that have participated in operations over the past decade. Ongoing complications, strategy disagreements over NATO operations in Libya and a potential stalemate, and increasing European troop withdrawals in Afghanistan potentially test the alliance's resolve and question its future mandate. Most individuals favored a smaller and more agile future NATO focused on combating asymmetric threats with a special operations focus. Several interviewees mentioned the construction of a new \$15 million NATO SOF Headquarters building near the decades-old SHAPE Headquarters building as an analogy emphasizing new security concerns for the alliance. The older building represents NATO's Cold War mission to deter conventional attacks, while the new NSHQ Headquarters under construction represents the emergency of asymmetric threats as the primary security challenge facing the alliance and a corresponding increased role for special operations.



Figure 12. Future NATO SOF Headquarters Building

D. FEEDBACK OF SCHOLARS AND SENIOR LEADERS

To gain additional insight from authors referenced in the literature review section of this report, the author contacted several of the scholars referenced with follow up questions via electronic mail and phone conversations. These conversations asked the scholars how specific areas of their research might apply to several general topics relating to general topics concerning unit cohesion, emerging security threats, social networking, and military education development. The feedback provided by these scholars offered significant insight into a wide array of academic disciplines and ongoing research that may assist future special operations capacity development. Each of the prominent scholars contacted provided unique insight into their academic disciplines and research, which imparted a multifaceted approach-to-approach coalition development.

Stanford senior fellow and political scientist Francis Fukuyama has written widely on the development of trust and social capital within societies, post-Cold War democratization, European security, and political institution development. In a phone conversation with the author, Dr. Fukuyama emphasized the benefits of regimental systems rather than centralized personnel management structures in fostering social capital and trust within military units.³¹⁴ In these structures, trust forms through shared experiences and repeated interactions among individuals. Dr. Fukuyama emphasized potential limitations in establishing continuity within multinational organizations, in which each unit would have separate personnel systems and would not be reliant upon a coalition commander for promotions, evaluations, or career incentives. When questioned on what he sees as the greatest threat to Europe today, Dr. Fukuyama responded that overreaction to increased immigration and the potential threat of terrorism may galvanize popular support for extreme right-wing groups organized across the continent.³¹⁵ NATO special operations forces must pursue prudent security measures and interdiction efforts without alienating immigrant populations or supporting extreme right-wing narratives.

³¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, phone interview with author, April 18, 2011.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

Harvard social scientist and physician Nicholas Christakis leads a research group exploring trends in social networking, is the co-author of *Connected* and several TED lectures, and made *Foreign Policy*'s list of "Top 100 Global Thinkers."³¹⁶ In a phone interview with the author, Dr. Christakis offered extensive insight into how social network mapping methods might highlight the distribution of social capital within tight-knit organizations, such as military units.³¹⁷ Christakis emphasized that much sociocentric research indicates that optimal communication structures consists of approximately 100 man networks composed of 10 man sub-units. This proposed optimal communication structure is similar to the current organizational structure of many NATO special operations tactical units and other military units dating back to the Roman Legions. Christakis agreed with the author's statement that the SOF Net special operations social networking platform could be a useful tool to capture previously established social networks, enhance social capital development, and encourage further collaboration on classified networks. He emphasized the importance of creating webpage layouts and tools that mirror classified sites to allow users to become familiar with the advanced capabilities available prior to use. Christakis proposed that research analyzing the impact of frequent personnel moves and unit casualties within special operations units might identify breakdowns in social capital development within networks.³¹⁸

Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter is a leading researcher emphasizing the strength of weak ties in communication in social networks. In communication with the author, Dr. Granovetter described the role of weak ties in facilitating "increased cooperation and understanding," and developing ties that might be beneficial in future operations.³¹⁹ Granovetter additionally emphasized that solidarity gained in previous deployments should facilitate future planning by improving coordination and "reduce

³¹⁶ Nicholas Christakis, *Connected: The Surprising Power of our Social Networks and How They Shape our Lives*, 1st ed. (New York: Little Brown and Co., 2009); and TED.com, "Nicholas Christakis Profile," 2011, http://www.ted.com/speakers/nicholas_christakis.html.

³¹⁷ Nicholas Christakis, phone interview with author, April 22, 2011.

³¹⁸ Christakis, phone interview with author.

³¹⁹ Mark Granovetter, e-mail correspondence-response to questions from author, April 19, 2011.

start up cost” in initial coalition development.³²⁰ Ongoing NSHQ efforts seek to build on established camaraderie through combined training, education, and technical networking to ensure that special operations coalitions can rapidly form and achieve optimal performance. Weak ties linking special operations coalitions with interagency and host-nation partners facilitate communication and cooperation among partners pursuing common goals.

Social scientist and former diplomat Joseph Nye is a leading international relations scholar best known for his work with Robert Keohane in developing the theory of complex interdependence. The highly interconnected North American and European economy creates incentives for NATO special operations units to collaborate in counter-terror operations across the alliance and encourages cooperation in military assistance efforts training emerging security partners. In response to an e-mail inquiry from the author, Dr. Nye stated, “in addition to fighting, military power has important roles in deterrence, protection, and assistance.”³²¹ He further emphasized that “in the future, it will be importance to train for all of these roles.”³²² Nye discusses these new military roles in his recent book, *The Future of Power*, with specific emphasis on nesting counter-insurgency doctrine with political goals and foreign policy.³²³

Military psychologist James Griffith is a leading researcher in the fields of unit cohesion and soldier performance on behalf of the U.S. Army. Dr. Griffith emphasized that he has come to view social identity as a critical component of cohesion.³²⁴ Elements of social identity provide “the individual a social context to access additional coping strategies and social support to reduce the negative effects.”³²⁵ For further study, Griffith recommended reviewing previous research work regarding cohesion in U.S. Army

³²⁰ Granovetter, e-mail correspondence-response to questions from author.

³²¹ Joseph S. Nye, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author, April 18, 2011.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

³²⁴ James Griffith, e-mail correspondence- response to questions from author, April 12, 2011.

³²⁵ James Griffith, “Reserve Identities: What Are They? And Do They Matter? An Empirical Examination,” *Armed Forces & Society* (February 28, 2011), <http:// afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/27/0095327X10382213.abstract>.

Special Forces units in the late 1980s. This research found that organizational structures rather than personality traits in special operations units facilitate unit camaraderie and offer some inoculation from mental stress incurred in training and combat.³²⁶

Military strategist Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales served as a Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. In discussions with the author, MG (Ret.) Scales emphasized the importance of common goals, or “having skin in the game,” in facilitating interoperability.³²⁷ Scales has proposed using many of the best practices in training special operations soldiers during conventional basic training, employing sports psychologists, small team “coaches,” and cultural training. He emphasizes the role of social networking in maximizing small unit combat performance; envisioning soldiers interconnected among comrades, senior leader and “dashboard operators” providing access to interpreters, cultural advisers, or intelligence analysts. If MG (Ret.) Scales vision of future combat training becomes a reality, NATO special operations forces one day may rapidly communicate using BICES network functions available in mobile helmet or I-phone sized platforms.

Australian Major General Rick Burr, the current commander of the Australian 1st Division, served as the former commander of the Australian Special Air Service, as well as the first ISAF SOF commanding general in Afghanistan from 2008–2009.³²⁸ From his previous unique experience, the author sought his opinion on whether a network structure similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters might develop in the Pacific region or Asia.³²⁹ Major General Burr emphasized that currently neither an existing parent structure nor framework, such as NATO, exists in the region and that most militaries in the areas lack a common operational focus. Burr further described that across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, “strategically, countries within this region generally tend to favor bilateral

³²⁶ Frederick Manning and Terrence Fullerton, “Health and Well-Being in Highly Cohesive Units in the U.S. Army,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 18, no. 6 (1988): 503–519.

³²⁷ Bob Scales, phone conversation with author, April 22, 2011.

³²⁸ Rick Burr, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author, May 15, 2011.

³²⁹ Ibid.

approaches rather than multilateral engagements and alliances.”³³⁰ A senior U.S. special operations officer described similar difficulties in building similar frameworks in South America beyond the bilateral partnership with Colombia.³³¹ The limitations cited by these leaders indicates that regional special operations interoperability efforts outside of NATO may take the form of loose partnerships pursuing combined training and education similar to the NATO SOF Training and Education Program rather than a fully functioning combined headquarters similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters.

As described in Chapter IV of this report, many NATO nations have described future security threats using language of uncertainty, which requires the development of flexible and adaptive network structures, such as the NATO SOF Headquarters, to combat emerging threats. As a testing ground for potential global SOF interoperability, the NSHQ serves as a laboratory for innovation and creative solutions for complicated challenges. The organization has prudently sought the advice of international scholars and leaders from a variety of disciplines to approach these challenges from different perspectives. The valuable feedback provided by the esteemed panel of scholars and leaders in this report contributes to this tradition.

³³⁰ Burr, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author.

³³¹ Author’s conversation with a U.S. flag officer with former operational experience in the U.S., European and Southern commands, April 2011.

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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This report proposed a basic framework for improving special operations interoperability and performance in combined operations. Chapter I examined relevant literature relating to special operations interoperability and cohesion, contemporary threats, and social and technical networking to capture best practices and thoughts from a variety of academic disciplines. Chapter II proposed a theoretical framework to evaluate recent NATO SOF initiatives, make recommendations to the command for future development, and describe the methods of research. The theoretical framework attempted to expand elements of the NSHQ's Allied and Partner Collaborative Network narrative inspired by the work of defense analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.³³² The overarching hypothesis of this report proposed that special operations coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and the presence of common threats enable enhanced special operations interoperability and effectiveness in combined operations. These dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that contribute to elevate coalitions from marginal levels of integration to become special operations networks with increased operational performance.

Chapter III examined WWII combined special operations units to determine why social networks and interoperability did not persist following the end of the conflict and examine the common history forming the lineage of NATO SOF. This historical research found that special operations forces pursuing common goals against common threats coalesced to achieve unprecedented interoperability and integration. Following the end of the conflict, network structures were not in place to capture the high levels of trust and camaraderie that had developed through combined combat. Colleagues who maintained regular contact with each other through regular reunions, letter writing, and telephone correspondence forged closer bonds that persisted for many decades following the

³³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, "Allied and Partner Collaborative Network (APCN); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html."

conflict. Relationships not nurtured shortly following the war soon diminished. The conclusion of the chapter described the golden opportunity of collaboration and camaraderie gained by combined special operations service in Afghanistan. The author offered a recommendation that social and technical networking mechanisms and combined schooling and training could capture and enhance established camaraderie to improve performance in future contingency operations.

Chapter IV analyzed modern threats common to all members of the NATO Alliance. This analysis attempted to identify common themes that would encourage further special operations collaboration and interoperability. The author surveyed the defense white papers and national defense strategies for many NATO nations, as well as other emerging world powers to capture trends in security planning. This analysis identified themes of uncertainty and asymmetric threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and cyber-terror as the primary concerns for most world powers, rather than conventional threats. The author further explored these themes with regional analysis to identify whether the security concerns mentioned in the defense reviews posed legitimate threats to alliance nations. The author found substantial support for concerns outlined in the defense reviews and white papers and concluded that special operations forces are suited best to meet unconventional security challenges threatening NATO. These emerging threats serve as a common narrative to encourage increased special operations cooperation, intelligence sharing, and efforts to enhance unit interoperability.

Chapter V explored the antecedent conditions present during the formative years of current NATO special operations soldiers and their units' development to ascertain whether the community was likely to embrace interoperability development methods recommended in Chapter III. Discussion documented various NSHQ sponsored initiatives, such as NATO Special Operations Training and Education Program course offerings, the BICES computer network, English language instruction programs, and the development of social networking tools connecting soldiers. The chapter concluded that NATO SOF has made significant progress toward establishing mechanisms likely to improve social and technical networking efforts among returning veterans from

Afghanistan. The author presented recommendations for continued development of combined training and education programs to maintain persistent contact among NATO special operations soldiers between contingency operations.

Chapter VI presented a series of case studies outlining trends in NATO special operations development. The ambitious volunteerism of Norwegian special operations represents a model for emerging special operations forces to gain greater influence and recognition in NATO. The benefits of geographic proximity between German and U.S. special operations forces described the benefits of forward presence and persistent engagement between units. The establishment of the Czech 601st Special Forces Group presented a model for restructuring former Cold War era units into successful and effective special operations forces. The post-financial crisis austerity measures in Greece and U.S. national debt described potential eras of reduced military spending for the alliance and recommended utilizing special operations as an economy of force to achieve significant results with limited resources. The Dutch withdrawal from Afghanistan framed a discussion on future NATO special operations units' missions. The author proposed that units relieved of Afghanistan commitments could now offer substantial support in military assistance efforts in Africa and counter-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean. The significant contributions of Australia and New Zealand in Afghanistan proposed the development of regional special operations networks around the world with the NSHQ as a potential model. The author concluded that these regional network structures would be helpful to counter asymmetric threats while outlining some challenges that would likely delay the initiation of these structures.

Chapter VII presented survey research, statistical analysis, and feedback from scholars and summaries of personal interviews to capture the views and trends present in NATO special operations in support of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter II. The collected survey data supported the three primary hypotheses proposed in the framework, with correlations shown between increased camaraderie and common language, consensus with common goals and common threats, and social and technical networking to facilitate interoperability and coalition performance. Data identified significant areas for improvement regarding the deployment and training on the BICES

network. Personal interviews and round table discussions emphasized support and encouragement for NATO SOF development initiatives while voicing concerns regarding likely reduced financial resources, uncertainty regarding post-Afghanistan employment, and changing European demographics and emphasizing little concern for conventional threats but universal concern for non-state actors and asymmetric warfare. Feedback from prominent scholars gave additional insight to propose recommendations for improving unit cohesion, network communication, structure military education, and analyze emerging threats.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the course of preparing this report, the collective research, survey data, personal interviews, and feedback from prominent scholars, all support NATO SOF Headquarters development initiatives direction and momentum. These initiatives have achieved significant success in a rapid manner. The following recommendations should assist the NATO special operations community achieve the vision of the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network and optimize the employment of special operations forces in future contingency missions.

1. Address BICES Network Training Shortcomings

Less than a quarter of special operations soldiers surveyed or interviewed in this research have access and any form of BICES network training. Additional mobile training teams deployed to conduct training at tactical units would ensure soldiers receive instruction on the benefits of the network and can access the network's full suite of capabilities. Some terminals deployed to higher headquarters receive little use; identifying methods to push these available terminals to tactical level units may alleviate some of the accessibility issues noted by respondents. If no mechanism is available to soldiers returning from Afghanistan, or combined pre-mission training to capture established social networks, these bonds will rapidly fade.

2. Encourage SOF NET Social Networking Collaboration

The NSHQ sponsored unclassified social networking portal serves as a mechanism to fill gaps in BICES network training and deployment until greater distribution becomes feasible. SOF NET should mirror the layout and functions of BICES to serve as a training tool and encourage users to move online collaboration and to the classified network.

3. Embrace Common Afghanistan Service and Sacrifice

Combine service in the Afghanistan war serves as a common bond linking a majority of NATO special operations soldiers. Domestic political discourse and protests over the conduct of the war could negatively affect soldiers' perceptions of the worth of their own participation in the conflict. Capturing the social networks established through combined service and harnessing the valuable experience gained in the conflict will facilitate collaboration and maintain trusted relationships. The SOF Net online portal can direct traffic to online memorials and Afghanistan veterans group pages to maintain and enhance camaraderie forged in combat. In the long term, the headquarters should expand the online forums and create a memorial in Mons or Chièvres to honor NATO special operations warriors that fall in the line of duty in various conflicts and training and invite family members to attend the memorial's unveiling.

4. Create Well Defined Common Employment Criteria

Consensus on employment criteria within a well defined asymmetric warfare mission targeting non-state actors threatening vital infrastructure, populations, or economic interest will limit political rows among allies prior to the deployment of NATO special operations forces. Disputes among troop employment in Iraq and more recently in Libya demonstrate the importance of well-defined missions that maximize the full capabilities of special operations, while not creating cleavages among allies.

5. Maintain Emphasis English Language Training Opportunities

Providing additional training to increase proficiency in a common language is the least resource intensive method to facilitate special operations interoperability. NATO

special operations has made significant progress in this field over the past decade; however, many soldiers in emerging special operations units still lack language skills required to attend combined training courses or clearly communicate in combat.

6. Encourage Combined Training Outside of NSHQ Events

Encouraging continued cooperation and training outside of NSHQ exercises and NSTEP training through the Federation of Training Centers and Opportunities offers the headquarters a low cost solution to maintain established interoperability with minimal investment. As financial austerity measures permeate across NATO, many special operations units are likely to see training budget cuts and access to training venues outside of Europe constraining. In preparation for impending budget reduction, the headquarters may sponsor an exchange where tactical units can swap access to national training venues in Europe in a co-op fashion to ensure operators gain exposure to a variety of training scenarios and environments.

7. Promote Forward-Deployed American SOF in Europe

Forward deployed tactical units and the U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe presence forward deployed in Europe have contributed to the development, mentorship, and growth of many NATO special operations units. Budget cuts over the next decade may contribute to renewed efforts to relocate these units to the continental United States. Redeployments of forward staged troops would severely weaken interoperability development and partnership efforts. The NATO SOF Headquarters should continue to advocate the benefits of U.S. SOF persistent forward presence. Additional efforts to encourage partnership with U.S. based American special operations forces will ensure best practices in coalition warfare spread beyond the approximately 1% of American SOF forward deployed in Europe.

8. Maintain Relationships with Postgraduate Institutions

The NATO SOF Headquarters and Training and Education Program are pursuing cross-cultural initiatives to challenge emerging global threats. The unique programs offer significant incentives for collaboration with higher education institutions around the

world. Through the preparation of this report, esteemed scholars at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Stanford University and Harvard expressed significant interest in the innovative programs currently pursued by NATO SOF. Seeking partnerships for guest lectures, sponsored research, or fellowships at various institutions would benefit students and staff while advancing information operations goals.

C. THE CHALLENGE

Achieving interoperability alone will not achieve increased performance; senior leaders should employ special operations capabilities prudently to ensure these units achieve their full potential in appropriate missions. Continued coordination, integration, and persistent engagement among NATO partners will ensure relationships forged in recent combat experience are not lost. When properly resourced, combined special operations units can overcome barriers to communication and varying capabilities to coalesce against common threats. The alliance must innovate more rapidly than the irregular threats and rogue states that threaten societies with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction development, cyber-war, and radical ideologies. Special operations are the right tool to combat modern threats, but they must act with common purpose, goals, and unity of effort to maximize combined performance.

The uncertainty of European security threats mandates that NATO evolve to remain a viable security apparatus prepared to deter asymmetric threats. The emergence of non-state actors and empowered terrorist groups have led critics to question the utility of an alliance designed to deter conventional attacks by nation states; however, an array of interoperable and flexible NATO special operations capabilities are the best defense against modern threats. NATO should continue to develop highly resourced, efficient and rapidly deployable forces that can effectively conduct counter-terror operations in coordination with intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Although the creation of the NATO Response Force was a step in the right direction, this organization lacks the skills required to challenge asymmetric threats. The death of Osama Bin Laden will not

diminish the threat to Europe from non-state actors and diffused terrorist franchises. The NATO SOF Headquarters' creation ensures that the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe has a complement of rapid response options to emerging threats.

D. THE OUTLOOK

The future of NATO SOF integration looks bright. The former NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) made astounding progress in the integration of NATO special operations capabilities between 2006 and 2010 by advancing the staff functions, communications, and individual skills.³³³ This work formalized expanding relationships created in modern contingencies to ensure integration endured beyond current contingency operations. The NATO SOF Headquarters assumed and expanded efforts of these previous initiatives to enhance special operations capabilities and capacity across the alliance. The NATO SOF Headquarters now serves as a mechanism to capture the best practices in force integration and global special operations interoperability. Shared bonds formed over the past nine years of combat have established interpersonal collaborative networks linking international diplomatic, law enforcement and inter-agency partners. These networks will improve global special operations integration to meet common social, economic, and security threats from non-state actors and rogue states. Through this endeavor, the NSHQ can achieve the long-term integration the special operations pioneers of the WWII era envisioned. Pre-existing NATO initiatives, command structure, and relationships have given the NSHQ significantly more resources and mechanisms to pursue special operations integration than other regional partnerships. Despite these limitations, application of the basic framework proposed can enhance interoperability in less robust collaborative structures and bilateral relationships among special operations units.

The unique historic convergence of camaraderie, common threats, and available network access have created conditions that offer a golden opportunity to make substantial progress in advancing special operations interoperability and unit

³³³ James Jones, "A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations," 2007, <https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPT=19856&REC=14>.

effectiveness. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters prudently invested considerable resources and efforts to harness momentum achieved through recent European history and Afghanistan camaraderie. These initiatives indicate the command will continue to grow into a viable and effective trusted network, which will pursue increased global special operations interoperability and be prepared to confront future threats to ensure the NATO Alliance remains relevant in the 21st century.

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APPENDIX A. PERCEIVED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Nation	Summary of national security concerns noted in defense reviews or white papers ³³⁴
United States ³³⁵ 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. (p. 8) “Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.” (p. 5)
United Kingdom ³³⁶ 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “we do not currently face, as we have so often in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power. (p. 3) “Today, Britain faces a different and more complex range of threats from a myriad of sources. Terrorism, cyber attack, unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents or natural hazards anyone could do grave damage to our country.” (p. 3) “This Strategy is about gearing Britain up for this new age of uncertainty weighing up the threats we face, and preparing to deal with them.” (p. 3)
France ³³⁷ 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Complexity and uncertainty are unquestionably major features of this new environment. No single analytical framework can suffice to grasp in all their dimensions the economic, strategic political and cultural dynamics shaping globalization, or flowing from it.” (p. 13) The prime mission of the (NATO) Alliance is collective defence, in a context implying the need to adjust to new risks, e.g. the spread of ballistic technologies and other vehicles capable of delivering conventional or non-conventional military payloads, mass terrorism, cyber attacks, as well as all means of bypassing the Allied countries’ military assets. (p. 100)
Canada ³³⁸ 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Canadians live in a world characterized by volatility and unpredictability. (p.6) “Globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the safety and interests of Canadians at home.” (p. 6) “Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the core capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address both conventional and asymmetric threats, including terrorism, insurgencies and cyber attacks.” (p. 7)
Turkey ³³⁹ 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Turkey also believes that at present the fight against international terrorism in the world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace.” (p. 5) “At present (2000), it is not possible to say that the international community shows the needed reaction to terrorism.” (p. 5)

³³⁴ Note: English language translations of national defence reviews and white papers analyzed may be found at <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html>.

³³⁵ President of the United States, “2010 NSS.”

³³⁶ UK Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty,” 2010.

³³⁷ French Government, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2008.

³³⁸ Canadian Ministry of National Defence, “Canada First Defence Strategy,” 2008.

³³⁹ Turkey Ministry of National Defense, “Defense White Paper,” 2000.

Nation	Summary of national security concerns noted in defense reviews or white papers ³³⁴
Czech Republic ³⁴⁰ 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery including ballistic missiles rank among the gravest threats that can directly or indirectly impact security interests of the Czech Republic and her allies.” (p. 3)
Croatia ³⁴¹ 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The world increasingly faces new forms of threats. International terrorism, smuggling of narcotics, weapons and human beings and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction create enormous challenges for most states, thus becoming global concerns.” (p. 5)
Poland ³⁴² 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the context of the ongoing war on terrorism, Special Forces have gained more significance because they are best prepared to carry out operations against asymmetrical threats and to cooperate with other specialized institutions and authorities operating in the state security system.(p. 24)
Spain ³⁴³ 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “new risks and threats have emerged, such as transnational terrorism with its global reach and its immense capacity to inflict damage in an indiscriminate manner... in the face of these new risks and threats, traditional military superiority does not represent an effective deterrent.” (p. 4) “the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring these weapons (of mass destruction) today poses the most serious threat to global security” (p. 4)
Germany ³⁴⁴ 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, and the subsequent series of terror acts stretching from Bali to Madrid and London, have illustrated the vulnerability of modern states and societies worldwide. They underline that the most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks.” (p.18) “The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery potentially represents the greatest threat to global security and, consequently, one of the largest political challenges to the international community of states.” (p. 18)
Denmark ³⁴⁵ 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “in the light of the absence of a conventional threat to Danish territory, the Danish Armed Forces are currently undergoing an extensive transformation from a traditional mobilization defence to a modern deployable defence force.” (p. 1) “Danish Armed Forces, in connection with international missions, must increasingly be prepared to encounter both asymmetric instruments of warfare and more conventional instruments of warfare. (p. 3)

³⁴⁰ The Czech Republic, “The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic,” 2008.

³⁴¹ Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defense Review,” 2005.

³⁴² Republic of Poland, “National security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” 2007.

³⁴³ Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, “National Defence Directive 1/2004,” 2004.

³⁴⁴ German Federal Ministry of Defence, “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.”

³⁴⁵ Danish government, “Danish Defence Agreement,” 2009.

Nation	Summary of national security concerns noted in defense reviews or white papers ³³⁴
Lithuania ³⁴⁶ 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “There is increasing attention to the development of special operations forces and light- and medium-sized military units. Modern command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems are necessary to guarantee effective interaction between multinational forces.” (p. 15) “The main source of threat is no longer the armies of other states but non-state groups and terrorist networks, often supported by authoritarian regimes and employing unconventional fighting methods.”(p. 11)
The EU ³⁴⁷ 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.” (p.1) “Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence—and so vulnerability—on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.” (p. 1)
Australia ³⁴⁸ 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Australia cannot be secure in an insecure world. We have a strategic interest in preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.”(p. 12) “Australia's engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) centre on three main themes: seeking ways to respond effectively to threats posed by international terrorism; contributing to international counter-proliferation efforts; and sharing the challenge of dealing with the destabilizing effects of failing and failed states.” (p. 100)
China ³⁴⁹ 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “China is still confronted with long-term, complicated, and diverse security threats and challenges. Issues of existence security and development security, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and international security are interwoven and interactive.” (p. 6) “Issues such as terrorism, environmental disasters, climate change, serious epidemics, transnational crime and pirates are becoming increasingly prominent.(p.4)
Russia ³⁵⁰ 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An external threat to Russia includes “the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law”(p. 26) Russian will “combat piracy and ensure the safety of shipping” (p. 32) and “participate in the international struggle against terrorism”(p. 8)

Table 13. Summary of National Security Concerns Noted in Defense Reviews

³⁴⁶ Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, “White Paper- Lithuanian Defence Policy,” 2006.

³⁴⁷ European Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” 2003.

³⁴⁸ Australian Government, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030,” 2009.

³⁴⁹ Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” 2009.

³⁵⁰ Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 2010.

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APPENDIX B. INTERNET GROWTH IN NATO³⁵¹

1990 distribution of Internet Users in Current NATO Countries




Figure 13. 1990 NATO Nations' Internet Distribution

³⁵¹ The World Bank, "Internet Users Data," 2010, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default., Note: graphs and charts prepared by the author using data available in worldwide internet growth statistics and isolating data for the 28 NATO nations.

1996 Distribution of Internet Users in Current NATO Members




Figure 14. 1996 NATO Nations' Internet Distribution

2002 Distribution of Internet Users in Current NATO Nations




Figure 15. 2002 NATO Nations' Internet Distribution

2008 Distribution of Internet Users in Current NATO Members




Figure 16. 2008 NATO Nations' Internet Distribution

Worldwide Distribution of Internet Users 1991-2008




Figure 17. Worldwide Distribution of Internet Users from 1991–2008




Figure 18. Comparison between U.S. and EU Internet Growth

Comparison of Internet growth among Emerging European nations




Figure 19. Comparison of Internet Growth Among Some Emerging European Nations




Figure 20. Comparison of Internet Growth in Nations with Large Populations

APPENDIX C. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS




Figure 21. European SOF Antecedent Conditions

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APPENDIX D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Statistical analysis used ordinary least square (OLS) regression modeling to identify the influence of six independent variables on the dependent variable measuring special operations soldiers' assessments of their allies.³⁵² The combined dependent variable tested assessments of cohesion composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, competent, and trustworthy. The operational dependent variable isolated assessments that measured operational interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent within the combined dependent variable. The personality dependent variable isolated assessments of honest, brave, and trustworthy within the combined dependent variable. Whereas summary averages discussed in Chapter VII used data from all 225 complete survey responses, this regression analysis focused on 67 of the total 225 survey responses that had exposure to all of the variables assessed in theoretical model. The largest limiting factor in selecting responses with exposure to all variables was the limited number of respondents with routine access to emerging communication capabilities such as the BICES Network.

Total sample analysis significant observations: In the correlation matrix, a significant positive relationship was noted between training and doctrine and overcoming barriers to communication. Additional positive relationship were noted between barriers to communication and the variables presence and language. Complimentary training and doctrine emerged as the variable strongly influencing assessments of operational characterization traits, while common language was most significant in influencing perceptions of personality cohesion traits.

³⁵² An overview of how to interpret regression data may be found in Paweł Lewicki and Thomas Hill, "Statistics: Methods and Applications," 2011, <http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/>. Values in the correlation matrix portray the level of change in one variable in proportion to a change in a corresponding variable, indicating dependence in variables. For example, if a correlation coefficient is 1 then the two variables are perfectly correlated. In testing dependent variables, coefficients indicate whether the tested independent variable has a positive or negative influence on the dependent variable. P values demonstrate statistical significance of independent variables on the dependent variable. P values below 0.05 generally indicate that the tested independent variable significantly influences the dependent variable.

European sample significant observations: Within the European sample, the analysis identified high causal effects in the independent variables of complimentary training and doctrine and overcoming barriers to communication. Language, presence, and complimentary training and resources all had high statistic significance in influencing perceptions on operational characterization traits. Language was statistically significant in influencing personality cohesion traits. The significant relationship of language influencing both operational and personality assessments reinforces NSTEP's common language initiatives, which indicates that interoperability emerges both in the classroom and during afterhours socializing.

U.S. sample significant observations: Within the U.S. sample, the analysis identified high causal effects in the independent variables of complimentary training and doctrine and overcoming barriers to communication, similar to the European sample. Communication capabilities emerged as the independent variable that most directly influenced assessments of both operational capabilities as well as personality trait assessments. This finding indicates that the U.S. sample more heavily relies on communications and technology to forge personal and professional relationships as well as measure an allies' ability to participate in combined operations fully. The significant prominence of emerging technology in American special operations in Afghanistan and Iraq likely has helped shape this view, as well as the several year head start in Americans' exposure to emerging technology noted in Appendix B. Language also emerged as statistically significant in influencing assessments of personality cohesion traits. The U.S. sample demonstrated the high prominence American special operators place on being able to maintain effective communication in personal interaction and network communications.

Overview: The initiatives pursued by the NSHQ over the last four years have made significant progress in reduced impediments to communication among NATO special operations forces. The dedication of European special operations forces to expand language training opportunities and communication infrastructure at a time of unprecedented operational tempo has improved interoperability and cohesion. The analysis also highlighted the prominent role of complimentary training and doctrine in

overcoming additional impediments to effective combined operations, another area of specific focus for the NSHQ over the past four years. Data collection in this field should expand to capture a larger portion of the NATO SOF community with exposure to emerging technology to evaluate the findings of this initial analysis further. If the results of this analysis hold up under subsequent testing, it would appear that NSHQ initiatives prudently have targeted the areas of focus that most directly influence combined special operations cohesion, trust, and performance. Data tables follow on subsequent pages.

1. Total survey population: (U.S. and European SOF)

	-presence	language	training and doctrine	structure and resources	barriers to communication	communication capabilities/BICES
presence	1.0000					
language	0.552	1.000				
training and doctrine	0.568	0.538	1.000			
structure and resources	0.077	-0.213	-0.173	1.000		
overcoming barriers to communication	0.538	0.546	0.783	-0.228	1.000	
communication capabilities/BICES	-0.019	0.316	0.003	-0.053	0.227	1.000

Table 14. U.S. and EUR Sample Correlation Matrix

Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, competent, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.184	0.425
language	0.309	0.066
training and doctrine	0.232	0.351
structure and resources	0.143	0.161
barriers to communication	0.189	0.379
communication capabilities	0.178	0.041
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.458	0.701
Number of Observations: 67	R-Squared: .3319	

Table 15. U.S. and EUR Sample, Combined DV Regression Analysis

Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.329	0.189
language	0.153	0.396
training and doctrine	0.538	0.048
structure and resources	0.179	0.107
overcoming barriers to communication	0.139	0.548
communication capabilities access / BICES	0.194	0.040
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.291	0.821
Number of Observations: 67	R-Squared: .3063	

Table 16. U.S. and EUR Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis

Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.039	0.879
language	0.466	0.015
training and doctrine	-0.075	0.786
structure and resources	0.108	0.346
overcoming barriers to communication	0.239	0.324
communication capabilities access / BICES	0.162	0.096
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.624	0.641
Number of Observations: 67	R-Squared: 0.3151	

Table 17. U.S. and EUR Sample, Personality DV Regression Analysis

2. Portion of total survey population: European SOF

Cor ² = percentage of change between variables	presence	language	training and doctrine	structure and resources	barriers to communication	communication capabilities
presence	1.000					
language	0.819	1.000				
training and doctrine	0.541	0.605	1.000			
structure and resources	-0.2514	-0.218	-0.1039	1.000		
Overcoming barriers to communication	0.5586	0.649	0.705	-0.097	1.000	
communication capabilities	0.096	0.243	-0.081	-0.019	0.229	1.000

Table 18. EUR Sample Correlation Matrix

Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, competent, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.604	0.082
language	0.808	0.010
training and doctrine	0.400	0.233
structure and resources	0.425	0.034
barriers to communication	-0.097	0.776
communication capabilities	0.169	0.109
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	-0.531	0.781
Number of Observations: 31	R-Squared: 0.5459	

Table 19. EUR Sample, Combined DV Regression Analysis

Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.883	0.028
language	0.809	0.022
training and doctrine	0.786	0.045
structure and resources	0.502	0.028
overcoming barriers to communication	-0.462	0.238
communication capabilities	0.206	0.087
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.527	0.808
Number of Observations: 31	R-Squared: .5085	

Table 20. EUR Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis

Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	-0.324	0.365
language	0.807	0.015
training and doctrine	0.014	0.969
structure and resources	0.348	0.094
overcoming barriers to communication	0.269	0.456
communication capabilities	0.133	0.229
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	-1.590	0.433
Number of Observations: 31	R-Squared: .5598	

Table 21. EUR Sample, Personality DV Regression Analysis

3. Portion of total survey population: U.S. SOF

Cor ² = percentage of change between variables	presence	language	training and doctrine	structure and resources	barriers to communication	communication capabilities
presence	1.000					
language	0.336	1.000				
training and doctrine	0.609	0.514	1.000			
structure and resources	0.304	0.021	-0.173	1.000		
overcoming barriers to communication	0.607	0.429	0.845	-0.072	1.000	
communication capabilities	-0.152	0.246	0.019	0.199	0.105	1.000

Table 22. U.S. Sample Correlation Matrix

Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, competent, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	0.308	0.47
language	0.260	0.263
training and doctrine	-0.271	0.503
structure and resources	-0.149	0.394
barriers to communication	0.389	0.225
communication capabilities	0.289	0.049
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.791	0.653
Number of Observations: 36	R-Squared: 0.3512	

Table 23. U.S. Sample, Combined DV Regression Analysis

Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	0.194	0.665
language	0.055	0.819
training and doctrine	0.103	0.808
structure and resources	-0.059	0.744
overcoming barriers to communication	0.329	0.327
communication capabilities access / BICES	0.267	0.080
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	0.148	0.936
Number of Observations: 36	R-Squared: .3353	

Table 24. U.S. Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis

Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy.	Coef + or - influence	P > t Less than 0.05 stat significant
presence	0.421	0.395
language	0.465	0.089
training and doctrine	-0.645	0.174
structure and resources	-0.238	0.242
overcoming barriers to communication	0.449	0.226
communication capabilities access / BICES	0.311	0.066
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs)	1.434	0.483
Number of Observations: 36	R-Squared: .3246	

Table 25. U.S. Sample, Personality DV Regression Analysis

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